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Abstract
The major focus of this dissertation is the global climate change 
issue which threatens the international ecosystem as the most complex 
and unique environmental problem today. The study attempts to 
contribute to the understanding of the climate change cooperation, 
which has been evolving within a global scope, by displaying the major 
political and legal processes in the international arena. It aims to answer 
the question of which elements and factors have played significant roles 
with respect to climate cooperation. For this end, the research 
concentrates on the impacts of international institutions and non-state 
actors and a neoliberal institutionalist theoretical framework is employed 
while analyzing the regime formation process over the issue. The study 
has found out that being the actors of the international system, 
international institutions, along with epistemic communities and 
nongovernmental organizations, have emanated as the adherents and 
promoters of climate cooperation, and they have had significant impacts 
on the emergence of a regime over the climate issue. Thus, the ultimate 
purpose of this work is to analyze climate cooperation - which requires a 
more effective and substantial contribution of world states -  in 
connection with the important roles played by international institutions, 
and to emphasize the implications of this cooperation for the 
International Relations theory and discipline.
özet
Bu araştırmanın konusu günümüzde uluslararası ekosistemi son 
derece karmaşık ve benzersiz bir çevre problemi olarak tehdit etmekte 
olan iklim değişikliği sorunudur. Bu çalışma küresel boyutlarda 
gelişmekte olan iklim değişikliği işbirliğini vurgulamayı ve bu 
işbirliğinin daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır; 
bu sebeple konuyla ilgili belli başlı politik ve hukuki süreçleri ortaya 
koymaktadır. Ai'aştırma, iklim değişikliğiyle ilgili uluslararası rejimin 
kurulmasında hangi öğelerin ve faktörlerin önemli roller oynadığı 
sorusunu aydınlatmayı hedeflemiştir. Yine bu araştırma iklim değişikliği 
konusuyla ilgili olarak özellikle uluslararası organizasyonların, ve bunun 
yanısıra uluslararası alandaki sivil çevre örgütleri ve diğer aktörlerin 
işlevleri üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu nedenle de bu alandaki işbirliği 
incelenirken neoliberal-kurumsal (neoliberal institutionalist) bir teorik 
çerçeve kullanılmaktadır. Araştırma, uluslararası organizasyonların iklim 
değişikliği işbirliğinde ve bu konuda oluşan uluslararası rejimde, bu 
rejimin en büyük destekçileri olarak, önemli bir rol oynadıkları ve 
katkıda bulundukları sonucuna varmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu 
çalışmanın nihai amacı dünya devletlerinin daha etkili ve yoğun 
katkılarını gerektiren küresel iklim değişikliği işbirliğini analiz etmek, 
ve bunun Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi ve bilim dalı için önemini ve 
içerdiklerini ortaya koymaktır.
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Chapter I. Introduction
Humankind’s efficacy in modifying the natural environment in such a 
rapid and implausible rate during the 20“^ century has eclipsed the 
imaginations of previous generations and even gone beyond the 
expectations of many contemporaries. Today, it is a well-known fact that 
given the momentum and complications of global environmental change 
caused by anthropogenic interferences, man has been fully faced with an 
entanglement which was ironically contrived by himself.
The international ecosystem has been increasingly confronted with 
various global environmental problems as a result of devastating industrial 
and technological developments, a high rate of population growth and 
perpetual environmental abuse which entirely transcend the carrying 
capacity of our planet. Ecological imbalance and rapidly emerging 
environmental afflictions endanger continuation of life on the earth. 
Therefore, as the world approaches the 21®‘ century, environmental 
degradation emanates as a major peril and security challenge 
encountering humankind and the whole international system more 
seriously than anything else.
The anthropocentric development patterns and interest-oriented 
approaches have been predominant within this state-centric world system 
for a long time. These traditional perceptions and attitudes have not 
produced beneficial outcomes for the ecological well being of our fragile
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planet. On the contrary, as a result of the anthropocentric world-views 
that envisage the supremacy of humans over nature, the harmony and 
balance between the various subsystems of the whole ecosystem have been 
damaged unwisely which has inevitably modified the natural environment 
and challenged human life itself.
The basic handicap of these attitudes has been the neglect to 
comprehend and consider the interdependency of all forms of life on the 
earth. In other words, the international ecosystem encompasses some 
basic rules which denote undivided respect and concern towards various 
forms of life that are closely interconnected. Unfortunately, humankind 
has underestimated this fact for a long time; humans have injudiciously 
considered themselves as the only species with a right to govern the 
overall biosphere which has brought forth counterproductive and self­
destructive consequences.
Nevertheless, within the recent decade due to developments in the 
environmental sciences and material prosperity observed in many 
developed countries, there has been some growing recognition among 
people and consequently among world states that environmental 
destruction is a fundamental jeopardy which should be addressed through 
reforming the inapt and malfunctioning economic development patterns 
and through auspicious environmental policy formulations within an 
international scope. In this respect, Lynton Caldwell states that the 
observations regarding the emergence of international environmental
movement indicate that an alteration has occurred concerning peoples’ 
beliefs and attitudes towards the biosphere and its components. Caldwell 
says that:
The movement belongs to a larger transformation in human social 
thought, which may be likened to a second Copernican revolution. 
The first revolution removed the earth from the center of the universe; 
the second removes man from the center of the biosphere. Man is 
indeed the dominant resident-shaper of environmental change, but 
only people bound to prescientific theologies believe that the earth 
and its biosphere were created for man’s exclusive benefit.^
Even though a remarkable trend has been evolving - particularly in 
the developed countries - towards embracing environmental concerns more 
enthusiastically than before, a more effective, fundamental and enduring 
change in terms of ethical judgements, value preferences and priorities 
among people appears to be essential in confronting global environmental 
problems and eradicating environmental destruction more rapidly. If only 
man’s egocentric endeavours can be replaced in human societies with 
biocentric considerations that consolidate the supremacy and sacredness of 
continuation of life, then many of the regional and global environmental 
problems can be averted and addressed more effectively within a 
restructured and well-organized system.
Today, the scopes of many of the environmental problems have 
already surpassed the boundaries of a single nation and reached gruesome
^Lynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions 
(Durham, Duke University Press, 1984), 4.
global dimensions. Some of the most important international 
environmental problems of the late 20“* century are ozone depletion, 
climate change, desertification, marine pollution, acid rain (trans-boundary 
air pollution), loss of biodiversity, protection of Antarctica, destruction of 
tropical forests, nuclear testing in the atmosphere and many others. These 
global issues affect every human-being living in this international 
ecosystem - together with the other species - to varying degrees.
Therefore, deteriorating ecological conditions and the complexity of 
the environmental problematic inevitably constitute a common interest and 
an incentive for collective action among states within the contemporary 
political system. In other words, although due to these problems states 
encounter intricacies and conflicts, they are at the same time faced with 
opportunities for international cooperative activities since common threats 
obviously motivate and compel them towards global collaboration. Under 
these circumstances, collective endeavours and cooperative efforts have 
been recognized by many states as ultimate and inescapable solutions in 
mitigating and averting global environmental threats. Apparently, there is 
a growing need for rational environmental policies and effective political 
machinery within the international system. In this context, it appears that 
the concept of “environmental cooperation” has an extremely significant 
connotation for today’s international order.
Hence, all these considerations have been changing the contents and 
shape of the international political agenda. Due to the emergence of
environmental issues as crucial security challenges against the 
international community, the International Relations discipline has been 
increasingly incorporating global environmental issues into its sphere 
within the past two decades. Environmental security challenges have even 
disputed the traditional security approaches - which emphasize the 
military concerns and state-centric aspects of international politics - 
indicating that there are even more significant challenges than the 
military threats against human societies. The major aim of the students of 
global environmental politics is therefore to emphasize the implications of 
the global environmental concerns and cooperation with respect to the 
field of International Relations.
Within the past decade there have been observations corroborating 
the views about flourishing ecological cooperative processes and political 
mechanisms among the world states against the deterioration of global 
commons. For instance, international collaboration and regime formation 
over ozone depletion and transboundary air pollution are very good 
examples of successful environmental cooperation and collective strategy 
formation for the protection of the atmosphere as a global commons.^ In 
these cases, world states accomplished a remarkable convergence of
^For a detailed description and analysis of the international environmental problems related 
with the atmosphere as a global commons see Marvin S. Soroos, The Endangered Atmosphere: 
Preserving a Global Commons (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997). This work is 
unique with its specific focus on the atmospheric problems, the responses of the international 
community towards these issues and the various existing regimes over these issues.
opinions and reconciliation of interests which insinuate the likelihood that 
governments will resort to rational collective endeavours and legal 
arrangements in order to avert other common threats encountering the 
international community.
Nevertheless, with respect to climate change, which is another 
international environmental threat related with the global atmosphere, 
there has been comparatively a less effective and satisfactory cooperative 
effort among the world states. This is closely affiliated with the fact that 
climate change is a broader and more complex ecological threat compared 
to ozone depletion or acid precipitation. The dynamics of the complex 
climate system aggravate the endeavours of the climatologists, 
environmental scientists and people from related disciplines who are 
striving to illuminate the basic features and impact of this global problem. 
Since coordinated political activities in an international scope require lucid 
apprehension of the threat and clear scientific information about the 
problem, cooperation on climate change has been understandably evolving 
with a slower pace than the ozone depletion and acid rain issues. 
However, there is enough hope to expect that the international community 
will refrain from continuing self-destructive patterns of action and 
strengthen the regime that has already been existing over climate change.
The climate change issue with its complicated aspects and unique 
challenges requires further assessments and multidisciplinary efforts. 
Even though an extensive literature has already been existing regarding
climate change, since it is relatively a new problem and an effective legal 
structuring has not been fully accomplished over the issue, it appears to be 
essential to contribute to the understanding of climate change from 
various disciplines.
Hence, the main focus of this study is the climate change issue as a 
complex and global ecological problem and the evolution of international 
environmental cooperation over the climate change threat. The study 
attempts to display the major political and legal processes in the 
international arena with a secondary emphasis on the scientific 
assessments and developments on climate change. The study will observe 
the progression of international cooperative processes and regime 
formation efforts over the climate issue and it attempts to reveal the basic 
political forces and factors of multinational cooperation in this field. The 
major aim of the study is to answer what factors and which actors have 
made impact on the evolution of the climate regime and to assess to what 
extent they have contributed to the cooperation process. During this 
evaluation the basic focus will be especially on the functions of the 
international institutions and intergovernmental bodies, and their efficacy 
in and contribution to the regime formation process. Consequently, the 
empirical evidence about the evolution of climate politics will be evaluated 
and analyzed within a neoliberal institutionalist theoretical framework 
which appears to provide a more satisfactory and thorough interpretation 
of the facts of the international system compared to that of the realist
tradition, and its implications and connotations for the International 
Relations discipline and theory will be emphasized.
This study comprises seven chapters. The second chapter of the 
study will present information pertaining to political aspects of global 
environmental problems. In this chapter, the connection between the 
natural environment and politics will be elucidated. In addition to this, the 
significant developments and landmark events in international 
environmental politics will be overviewed in order to provide some basic 
information about the responses and commitments of the international 
community in connection with environmental protection.
The third chapter of the study will include a review of the persistent 
debate between the two major theoretical traditions within the field of 
International Relations. For this end, the major assumptions and 
arguments of the liberal and realist schools of thought will be displayed. In 
this chapter, the evolution of the realist-liberal debate will be traced and 
the recent shape the debate has taken will be evaluated. This theoretical 
survey is considered to be useful and significant in order to construct the 
necessary theoretical framework which will be employed while analyzing 
the climate cooperation.
Chapter Four will present substantial information pertaining to the 
scientific aspects of the climate change issue in order to elucidate the 
significance of the climate threat as a global phenomenon. At the same 
time, the existing knowledge and scientific uncertainties in connection
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with the climate issue will be described and emphasized in the fourth 
chapter.
The fifth chapter will display the evolution of the political and legal 
developments with respect to the climate change problem. Major political 
processes that took place on the way towards a regime over the climate 
change issue will be examined; the main events, international and regional 
conferences, multinational negotiations and the process of the 
accomplishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change will be explained within this fifth chapter. This chapter will 
provide the empirical evidence which will be employed in the final analysis 
of the evolution of climate politics.
Chapter Six comprises an analysis of climate change politics with 
special emphasis on the roles and functions of the international 
institutions and intergovernmental bodies. The chapter will answer the 
basic research question of which actors and what factors have been 
influential in the way leading to cooperation over climate change. The 
interpretation of the evolution of the climate cooperation will be made 
within a neoliberal institutionalist theoretical framework which appears to 
provide a more sophisticated explanatory capacity than its realist 
counterpart.
Finally, the conclusion part of the study will include an overview of 
the ideas employed within the previous chapters and it will also involve 
prospects for future cooperation over climate change.
Due to the fact that climate change is the most complex atmospheric 
problem threatening the global ecosystem and relatively a new 
phenomenon that brings forth unique challenges to the international 
community, it is in need of additional inquiry and multidisciplinary 
research. The ultimate objective of this study is therefore to contribute to 
the understanding of global climate change as an international 
environmental issue which requires a more efficient and substantial 
cooperation of world states, and to explore its inferences for the 
International Relations theory and discipline.
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Chapter II. The Politics of Global Environmental Issues
There has been a growing recognition that environmental issues 
maintain a crucial place in international relations since such topics are 
not considered peripheral to the national interests of world states any 
more. In effect, these issues have been transferred to the center stage of 
world politics.
Therefore, the major purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the 
interlocking relationship of the natural environment and politics. The 
chapter serves the purpose of contemplating the fundamental man- 
environment relationship in the face of increasing global ecological 
problems and developing scientific knowledge, which verify the fragility of 
the interrelated planetary system and signify the ecological 
interdependence inferring multinational concerted activities and explicit 
policies to ameliorate various global environmental afflictions. A structural 
overview of the present international system together with information 
pertaining to the changing scopes of global environmental cooperation as a 
result of the flourishing non-state actors will be presented within the 
chapter. Finally, within the second section a general outlook to the major 
events of international environmental politics since 1972 will be provided 
in order to shed light on the international political responses and 
commitments of the international community with respect to global 
ecological deterioration.
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The relationship between humans and their physical environment 
embodies an unprecedented connotation in today's world since the 
consequences of excessive stress and demands placed on earth by rapid 
population growth, industrialization, economic activities and technological 
developments have confronted people with various regional and global 
environmental threats. Human being;s depend on the natural environment 
for their survival, yet, the ecological exploitation and abuse of natural 
resources have brought forth serious threats to the integrity of the 
“international ecosystem.”^  In essence, environmental destruction is 
taking place in various forms every passing moment. The survival of the 
human species is a serious concern while the world approaches the year 
2000.
The abuse and overexploitation of the natural environment began to 
accelerate during the time of rapid industrialization - particularly in the 
early twentieth century. From that period till the late 1960s, the 
importance of ecological balance had been underestimated, the delicacy of 
the earth's life-support systems had been neglected and environmental 
resources had been relentlessly sacrificed for the sake of economic and 
technological developments. The western-style industrialization model,
^Dennis Pirages summarizes the term ecosystem as the total array of plant and animal 
species in an environment as well as the matter which cycles through the system" and defines the 
term international ecosystem as the entire interrelated set of smaller systems nourishing life on this 
planet and is referred to as the biosphere, ecosphere, or global ecosystem." Dennis Pirages, "The 
Ecological Perspective on International Politics, in The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives, eds.
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which assumed an infinite amount of natural resources and envisaged free 
use of the natural environment, was the dominant approach in 
accomplishing economic development and managing the relationship 
between humans and the environment.
When the rapid and uncontrolled industrialization process depleting 
natural supplies intermingled with an enormous population growth“^, it 
launched the emergence of resource scarcities and various regional and 
global environmental problems. Today, numerous global issues pleading 
sound solutions have been compelling the international community to 
contemplate on the critical man-environment relationship and the 
implications of this relation for international politics.
1. The Relationship Between International Politics and Environment:
The appearance of the above mentioned environmental problems 
indicated the fact that inhabitants of the earth live in a fragile ecosystem 
where various components of the system should work in harmony for the
Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R.Wittkopf (New York: Random House Inc., 1984), 340. Biosphere 
which is a component of the ecosystem is produced from the word "bios" which means life.
“^ It is estimated that the global population will reach approximately 10 billion around 2070. 
This is almost twice the present total world population. However, if more pessimistic calculations are 
considered, one can estimate the population reaching 14 billion by 2050. Gareth Porter and Janet 
Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics {Moulder. Westview Press, 1991), 3. In Africa alone the 
population increased from 288 million in 1970 to 384 million in 1980 and to 505 million in 1990. 
Crispin Tickell, "The Word After the Summit Meeting at Rio," The Washington Quarterly 2 (Spring 
1993): 76.
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preservation and continuation of life - which has always been taken for 
granted. All these issues posed serious challenges to humankind and made 
it inevitable to re-evaluate and reshape deep-seated values, perceptions, 
beliefs and accrued national and international policies.
Therefore, the connection between the environment and politics 
directly touches the essence of the matter: survival of human beings and 
continuation of life on the planet. Reforming the malfunctioning man- 
environment relationship demands exertion of political will by states in the 
form of auspicious environmental policies to preserve and restore the 
ecological balance. States' responsibilities lie in devising sound policies 
which should be functional as well as instrumental in healing 
environmental afflictions and rejuvenating and guarding this planet's 
carrying capacity.
Observations with respect to the rapidly decreasing tolerance of the 
environment began to create an impact on people during the 1960s and 
this summoned an environmentalist awakening to avert ecological 
degradation and ameliorate the earth's fragile life-support systems through 
the stimulation and initiation of governmental actions. The growth of the 
environmental problems into global dimensions compelled genuine 
multinational commitment to the regulation of harmful economic activities 
and preservation of the international ecosystem.
The emergence of environmental concerns among people during the 
late 1960s is closely affiliated with a post-materialist world view inclusive
14
of ethical judgements that flourished among some of the public in the 
Western countries®, détente period which brought forth the mitigation of 
tension between power blocs and a more lucid apprehension of the 
ecological problems through the development of a new environmental 
science. Regarding the new perceptions growing among people and the 
appearance of a “moral consciousness” towards the environment Andrew 
Hurrell says that:
More abstractly, the emergence of global environmental 
problems and the greatly strengthened awareness of a global 
common interest among all peoples in protecting the environment 
and safeguarding the future of humanity have provided a powerful 
stimulus to the growth of a cosmopolitan moral consciousness.... For 
many people, then, global environmental interdependence has given 
greater plausibility to visions of a cosmopolitan global community, to 
what Locke once called ‘the great and natural community of the
species’. ®
®For instance, see Lynton Caldwell who says that "the critical mass of people concerned 
about environmental protection is weighted with the more educated, sensitive, and influential 
members of society....Such persons are most numerous and influential in those nations more highly 
advanced in science and technology." Lynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: 
Emergence and Dimensions (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984), 20. Also, see William E.
Paterson who analyzes the evolution of environmental politics in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Paterson points to the fact that a rather post-materialist generation emerged during the late 1960s as 
a result of sustained prosperity. These people embraced such issues like preservation of nature and 
they expected policies in accordance with such post-materialist values. William E. Paterson, 
"Environmental Politics," in Developments in West German Politics, eds. Gordon Smith, William E. 
Paterson and Peter H. Merkl (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 268.
^Andrew Hurrell, "International Political Theory and the Global Environment," in 
International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995), 147-148.
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l.a. An Interrelated Planetary System:
The developments in ecological concerns went parallel with the 
developments in environmental sciences which gained popularity during 
the 1970s and endowed people and nation-states with relatively well- 
grounded knowledge in the face of different ecological problems. 
Improvements in scientific research and assessments illuminated the fact 
that the international ecosystem is inclusive of smaller systems that are 
essentially interconnected and humankind "is a species governed by basic
ecological principles applicable to other occupants of the ecosphere."  ^ The 
interdependence and reciprocal functional relationship between these 
systems nourish the life on earth® and a fracture in this fragile systemic 
process disturbs the ecological balance drastically. John Vogler points to 
this interrelatedness of various components of the ecosphere when he says 
that "they are all part of a holistic planetary system and thus 
interconnected in a range of important and intriguing ways, some of which
are only beginning to be perceived." ^
Therefore, today it is well-recognized that many of the 
environmental problems are intermingled; they mutually influence each
^Pirages, 340. 
®Ibid.
1995), 10.
^John Vogler, The Global Commons: A  Regime Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
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other and the linkages between these problems cannot be underestimated. 
Although it is not possible to address all environmental problems at once, 
it would be an auspicious approach if the international community 
perceives them as closely affiliated and interdependent.
l.b. The Concept of Global Commons:
What is more significant is the fact that today it is impossible to 
avert global environmental afflictions by unilateral and bilateral actions 
since while regional environmental problems can be dealt with relatively 
limited and less costly activities, wide scopes of global environmental 
issues transcend and negate the efficacy of any kind of limited cooperative 
processes. The characteristics of a global environmental issue can be 
demarcated as follows:
...the scope of the issue area is defined by two dimensions of any 
international environmental problem: the scope of environmental 
consequences of the economic activity in question and the 
geographical scope of the states and nonstate actors involved in the 
issue. If the consequences are global, or if the actors in the issue 
transcend a single region, we consider it a global environmental
issue 10
For instance, the atmospheric problems like ozone depletion and 
climate change are prototypes of the “international commons” and “global 
commons” issues since their impacts surpass regional dimensions and
^^Porter and Brown, Global Environm ental Politics, 15.
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these problems concern every single nation due to the fact that harmful 
radiation and earth's climate change have serious consequences for every 
human being. Lynton Caldwell depicts international commons as the 
atmosphere, outerspace, the oceans and Antarctica since these are the
areas "over which national jurisdiction is ambiguous and ineffective."^^ 
According to Porter and Brown's definition, the global commons comprises 
"natural systems and resources, such as atmosphere and oceans, that
belong to all living beings rather than individual n a t i o n s . I n  a parallel 
approach with Porter and Brown, John Vogler defines the global commons
as:
areas or resources that do not or cannot by their very nature fall 
under sovereign jurisdiction, occupy a central position in this 
vision....they include the oceans and deep seabed, Antarctica, space 
and the atmosphere.
In this respect, continuation of life on the earth is contingent upon 
the preservation of the global commons and this is unequivocally within 
the responsibilities and interests of every state. The global commons 
issues are at the gist of the environment-world politics relationship and 
they summon collective mechanisms and international policymaking due
 ^^Caldwell, 223. 
^^Poгter and Brown, 92.
13Vogler, 2.
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to the fact that unilateral or bilateral activities remain rather fruitless and 
ineffective while confronting planetary problems.
Hence, environmental tragedies “can be averted if rules are 
established and enforced that prohibit or limit certain uses of the 
commons” as for instance it has been attempted by the international 
regimes addressing ozone depletion, acid rain and climate change. 
Nevertheless, permeation of global environmental considerations into the 
realm of national sovereignty has never been very easy and without its 
limitations.
l.c. Ecological Interdependence and The Nation-State System:
In the face of present knowledge it is obvious that global 
environmental issues require collective efforts of world states and 
multinational concerted activities. In other words, ecological 
interdependence challenges states and the international system as a vital 
and indispensable concept: it denotes reconciliation of diverse national 
objectives and recalculation of national-interests. When considering its 
implications, Ronnie Lipschutz and Ken Conca say that:
Global ecological interdependence is more than just a physical or 
social phenomenon; it is an intellectual one as well. It has changed -
^"^Marvin Soroos, The Endangered Atmosphere, 19.
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and continues to change - how we look at the world, and it is also 
changing how we interact with each other.
Ecological interdependence implies that world states are dependent 
on each other in order to be able to continue the life on the earth. The 
term insinuates that it is essential to reperceive political priorities and 
reshape national interests in the light of global concerns in order to be 
able to achieve multilateral cooperation on ecological issues and to 
accomplish genuine multinational commitment to the implementation of 
the adopted measures so that the global environmental problems can be 
eradicated.
At this point national sovereignty arises as a major impediment 
complicating the way towards collective policy formulation and 
international collaboration. Sovereignty implies supreme and ultimate 
authority of nation-states within the boundaries of their own territories. 
Apparently, sovereignty configures the basis of the functioning of the 
international system. Within the international system, states are
considered as autonomous and legally equal actors. Notwithstanding the 
different amounts of power they posses, they can claim absolute
jurisdiction over their territories.
 ^^ Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca, "The Implications of Global Ecological 
Interdependence," in The State and Social Power In Global Environmental Politics, eds. Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz and Ken Conca (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 327.
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Thus, the concepts of ecological interdependence and national 
sovereignty produce a dichotomy. While sovereignty demarcates the legal 
boundaries of state activities and explicitly precludes exterior intrusions 
and interventions, ecological interdependence requires permeation of 
global concerns into the realm of national interests.
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which 
was held in Stockholm in 1972, was an initial challenge against the 
accredited rights of states to claim their sovereignty with respect to 
controlling and exploiting the natural resources in their territories. 
Although Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment is not technically binding, "it does represent an effort to 
express the basic rule of state responsibility for environmental
protection. iil6
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.^^
Regarding the Stockholm Declaration, Caldwell says that, "sovereignty is 
problematic to the organizational issue. Although the Stockholm
Allen L. Springer, "United States Environmental Policy and International Law; Stockholm 
Principle 21 Revisited," in International Environmental Diplomacy, ed. John E. Carroll (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 50.
^ I^bid.
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Declaration of Principles speaks of sovereign rights of states to exploit 
their own resources, the total effect of the document is to modify the
exercise of sovereignty."
In addition to the problem of sovereignty, the international market 
and the capitalist nature of the system emanate as factors complicating the 
achievement of policy coordination and multinational cooperation in 
connection with international environmental issues. Competitiveness of 
the system and states' struggle towards economic growth arise as 
determinants antithetical to ecological interdependence due to the fact that 
economic development brings forth the depletion of renewable resources 
and pollution of the natural environment. Moreover, the huge gap 
between the Northern and the Southern states of the world with respect to 
technological and economic capabilities creates another complexity for the 
accomplishment of international cooperation in ecological problems. Many 
of the developing countries of the South argue that environmental 
degradation that has emanated as a global threat against humanity is a 
consequence of the North’s previously applied development strategies and 
imprudent efforts for rapid industrialization. Therefore, most of the 
developing countries refrain from accepting much responsibility for
^^Caldwell, 60. Also see Peter M. Haas; while mentioning the Principle 21 of the United 
Nations he argues that "governments are now mutually dependent in a way that was inconceivable 
to those drafting the legal norms of the present system." Peter M.Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: 
The Politics o f International Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990), 27.
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healing the environmental afflictions and expect that the North takes the 
initial and necessary steps to respond to various global problems.
As an attempt to restructure the dynamics of the environment- 
economics relationship, the concept of “sustainable development” was 
introduced to the agenda of world politics during the early 1980s. 
Concerns about the limited carrying capacity of the planet earth increased 
in the face of unsuitable and incessant economic developments which had
been depleting the natural resources. An “alternative paradigm” was 
targeted at and the efforts culminated in the publication of Our Common 
Future in 1987. It was the Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development which is well-known as the Brundtland 
R eport.Sustainable development envisages a new pattern of economic 
growth which is compatible with ecological well-being and environmental 
protection. This type of economic growth should safeguard present and 
future planetary needs at the same time and it should be achieved in 
harmony with the natural environment. Nevertheless, the complexity of 
the environmental problematic is a basic factor illuminating "why 
Brundtland's concept of ‘sustainable development’, ensuring that current
^^See Porter and Brown, 30-32.
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987).
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activities do not disadvantage future generations, is at once so politically 
attractive yet difficult to pin down."^ ^
1. d. International Institutions:
In the light of the above description, it appears to be difficult to 
resolve various environmental issues within an international system where 
states lack a world government and binding laws that are enforced 
through international mechanisms. At this point, since a common 
enforcement mechanism is lacking in this world order, international 
institutions emerge as actors that are functional in facilitating 
international collaborative processes. Caldwell argues that:
Something more than national governments is needed to attain the 
objectives of international environmental cooperation. The need has 
been answered in various ways through institutional structures 
capable of operating with limited autonomy apart from the 
governments that created them.^^
The rise of international institutions began to accelerate during the 
1970s as a result of the alterations in the dynamics of international 
politics. In an ever shrinking world, the existence of common interests - 
economic, political, social, ecological - provided the basis for the
^^Vogler, 16.
^^Lynton K. Caldwell, "Beyond Environmental Diplomacy: The Changing Institutional 
Structure of International Cooperation," in International Environmental Diplomacy, ed. John E. 
Carroll (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 16.
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engendering of international organizations. The changing dimensions of 
world politics displayed the “cobweb image” of the international system 
and the term “interdependence” came to elucidate the situation of world 
affairs better than any other concept. Various non-state actors flourished 
within the world system. In addition to states' relations, the influence of 
international institutions, non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations, non-governmental organizations and the flow of other 
transactions with respect to trade, tourism, cultural exchange and mass 
media indicated the complex and perpetual interactions within the 
international system of the late twentieth century. Today, all these actors 
and the interactions between them play an important role in shaping 
global environmental politics and an accurate analysis of environmental 
cooperation is impossible without the deliberation of these components of 
the whole system.
Since the early 1970s, the world has become socially, politically, 
economically and ecologically intermingled in a rapid fashion and the 
state-centric interpretations of international politics remain imprecise in 
the face of increasing institutionalization within the system. Where states 
share mutual interests and common approaches, international 
organizations serve states' objectives through limited collective action.
^^Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and The Realist Challenge After The Cold War," 
in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York;
Columbia University Press, 1993), 274.
25
Regarding the proliferation of international institutions Robert Keohane 
says that:
As long as technological change prompts increased economic 
interdependence, and as long as threats to the global environment 
grow in severity, we will observe a continuing increase in the number 
and complexity of international institutions, and in the scope of their 
regulation.
Therefore, due to the expansion of global ecological threats the role 
and importance of non-state actors have been aggrandized whereby 
institutionalized environmental collaboration spreads within an 
international range. In this respect, international institutions vary in their 
geographical scopes and purposes. Some of them have been established 
for multiple purposes including environmental issues, such as the 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) or the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD); however, some of them have been 
constructed for specialized purposes, particularly for focusing on and 
addressing ecological issues, environment-related objectives and 
environmental cooperative processes, such as the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP).^® Notwithstanding the initial basic 
objectives behind their establishments, many of the present international
285.
^^See Caldwell International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions, 83, and 
also see Porter and Brown, 46.
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institutions increasingly incorporate environment-related concerns and 
mechanisms to their bodies.
The activities and functions of international institutions regarding 
the environmental issues are miscellaneous; they range from agenda 
setting, providing information about environmental problems, 
coordinating environmental negotiations to financing economic growth
and environmental protection p ro g ra m s. T h ese  organizations contribute 
to the environmental cooperative processes through institutional 
arrangements and through integrating multilateral transactions. With 
respect to various international environmental problems, they are 
functional in integrating the environmental political mechanisms and 
scientific processes within an interdependent world order. In order to 
emphasize the important role played by international institutions, Oran 
Young states that:
International organizations (together with nongovernmental 
organizations in many instances) frequently play a catalytic role with 
respect to environmental negotiations, influencing the way in which
^®Some of the most important bodies among the manifold international organizations and 
agencies that are concerned with the environment are: United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), International Court of Justice (ICJ), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), World Health Organization (WHO), World 
Wild Life Fund (WWF), World Resources Institute (WRI), International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) (IBRD), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Asian Development Bank (ASDB), Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
European Union (EU).
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the issues are conceptualized or framed and acting to propel them 
toward the top of the international agenda.
Among the multifarious international institutions which link the 
members of the international society in the present world order the role 
and place of the United Nations system is unique. Thus, the United 
Nations system “offers the best, and only real, opportunity for providing 
an institutional base with widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n . N u m e r o u s  
institutions, agencies and programmes of the United Nations system 
undertake different work and perform important activities in connection
with environmental concern and preservation.
Within the United Nations system, the United Nations Environment 
Programme is the most important and functional environment-related 
mechanism which has been exclusively dealing with environmental issues. 
The UNEP was established as a result of the recommendations of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm, and 
it was aimed that the UNEP would represent and embody the
^^Oran R. Young, "International Organizations and International Institutions: Lessons 
Learned from Environmental Regimes," in Environmental Politics in the International Arena: 
Movements, Parties, Organizations and Policy, ed. Sheldon Kamieniecki (Albany: State University of 
New York, 1993), 150.
^®David A. Kay and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "International Institutions and the Environmental 
Crisis: A Look Ahead," in International Organization: Political Process, eds. Leland M. Goodrich and 
David A. Kay (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 380.
^^For instance, see Peter S. Thacher, "The Role of The United Nations," in The International 
Politics o f The Environment, eds. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992) 183-211, and Patricia W. Bimie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and The 
Environment{0\ioxd·. Clarendon Press, 1992).
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environmental conscience of the United Nations system and the member 
s t a t e s . T h e  developments leading to the Stockholm Conference had 
indicated that a form of institutionalization and international machinery 
were essential to address the problems of the natural environment. 
Therefore, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) 
established a Governing Council for the UNEP and it stated the basic
institutional framework and functions of the organization.^^ 
Consequently, the UNEP is,
in ter alia the coordinating and catalytic instrument for drawing 
attention to the environmental aspects of the operational activities of 
the UN Secretariat and the Specialized Agencies within the UN system 
as well as of the activities of the member governments of the UN.^ ^^ ^
^^Thomas A. Mensah, "Environmental Protection: International Approaches," Marine Policy 
8 (April 1984): 97.
^^United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVIl), December 1972.
^^Lars Bjokbom, "Resolution of Environmental Problems: The Use of Diplomacy," in 
International Environm ental Diplomacy, ed. John E. Carroll (New York: Cambridge University Piess, 
1988), 125.
^^The Governing Coimcil for Environmental Programmes was constituted with the 
following purposes: (1) To promote mtemational cooperation in the enviromnent field and to 
recommend policies to this end, (2) to provide general policy guidance for the direction and 
coordination of environmental programmes within the UN system, (3) to receive and review the 
periodic reports of the executive director on the implementation of environmental programmes 
within the UN system, (4) to keep under review the world environmental situation in order to ensure 
that emerging environmental problems of wide international significance receive appropriate and 
adequate consideration by governments, (5) to promote the contribution of the relevant international 
scientific and other professional communities to the acquisition, assessment, and exchange of 
knowledge and information about the environment and, as appropriate, to the technical aspects of 
the formulation and implementation of environmental programmes within the UN system, (6) to 
maintain under continuing review the impact of national and international environmental policies 
and measures on developing countries, as well as the problem of additional costs that may be 
incurred by developing countries in the implementation of environmental programmes and projects, 
and to ensure that such programmes and projects shall be compatible with the development plans 
and priorities of those countries, (7) to review and approve annually the programme of utilization of 
resources of the Envirorunent Fund. See, Thomas Mensah, 99.
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In addition to the significant roles played by the international 
institutions in global environmental issues, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)^ "^  which have been proliferating steadily have also 
become increasingly influential in promoting environmental concerns and 
environment-related activities within the realm of domestic politics and
within the international arena.^  ^ In many global ecological issues, 
initiatives for environmental collaboration frequently derive from non­
governmental organizations which form transnational coalitions 
contributing to the accomplishment of global collective actions.
At many times, nation-states are disinclined to take measures 
against ecological problems and environmental abuse or reluctant to take 
part in environmental cooperation since they sometimes perceive such 
cooperative processes as irrelevant to or in contrast with their national 
interests. Under these circumstances, nongovernmental organizations 
attempt to raise public awareness and exert pressure on governments 
through public mobilization, citizen activities, campaigns, boycotts and 
through the manipulation of the mass media. These organizations try to
"^^ John McCormick uses the term "interest group" and "nongovernmental organization" 
interchangeably, and defines them as private (i.e., nongovernmental) bodies organized for the 
purpose of directly or indirectly influencing public policy either on behalf of their members or on 
behalf of what they perceive to be the broader public interest." John McCormick, "International 
Nongovernmental Organizations: Prospects for a Global Environmental Movement," in 
Environmental Politics in the International Arena: Movements, Parties, Organizations, and Policy, 
ed. Sheldon Kamieniecki (Albany: New York Press, 1993), 132.
^^For a detailed analysis of the environmental NGOs and their roles in global politics see 
Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics (London: Routledge, 
1994).
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mobilize the citizens and lobby governments towards adopting substantial 
environmental policies for the protection of natural endowments. They are 
able to attain their objectives when public pressure functions as a 
compelling factor, thus the government is obliged to consider the domestic 
sentiment in one way or another.
Apparently, environmental nongovernmental organizations can 
generate public interest in ecological issues more effectively in developed 
countries where economic, scientific and technological developments 
facilitate and promote planetary concerns. For instance, with respect to 
the issue of ozone depletion over which a successful environmental regime 
has been established^®, NGOs made considerable impact on the orientation 
of the ozone policies in the US and the European Community.^^ 
Environmental nongovernmental organizations such as Friends of the 
Earth and the Sierra Club started campaigns initially in the US; through 
these campaigns and by generating media interest in ozone depletion they 
publicized general information and moulded domestic and inevitably 
international environmental policies to a great extent. Also, the influence 
and efforts of environmental nongovernmental organizations increased
^®See Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New  Directions in Safeguarding The Planet 
(Cambridge: Harvard Universe Press, 1991), and Banu Bayramoglu, "Ecological Threats and 
International Cooperation For a Common Future: The Case of Ozone Depletion" (Master's Thesis, 
Bilkent University, January 1993).
^^For instance, see Elizabeth Cook, "Global Environmental Advocacy: Citizen Activism in 
Protecting the Ozone Layer," Ambio 19 (1990): 34-338. Also see Markus Jachtenfuchs, "The
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and intensified once the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer was signed in 1987.^®
In addition to creating domestic pressures on their governments, 
environmental nongovernmental organizations can also influence regime 
formation in various global ecological problems by lobbying at
international conferences. During international negotiations at 
conferences, numerous nongovernmental organizations attend the 
meetings and they offer their opinions to policy-makers in formal and 
informal settings. They accomplish strategic interactions and play 
transformative roles in terms of reshaping perceptions regarding national- 
interests in many global environmental issues. Particularly during the 
1980s, lobbying at international conferences in order to contribute to 
evolution of cooperation regarding the protection of the natural 
environment became a high priority for many nongovernmental
organizations 40
Europectn Commvinity and the Protection of the Ozone Layer," Journal o f Common Market Studies 
28 (1990): 275.
^^Elizabeth Cook, 336-337.
^®Porter and Brown, 60-62.
" ^ ° I b i d . ,  61.
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2 . An Overview of the Landmark Events in Global Environmental 
Politics:
This section of the chapter serves the purpose of drawing a profile of 
the major developments which can be characterized as the corner-stones in 
the evolution of global environmental institutionalization and collaboration 
with respect to international politics.
Albeit the existence of a number of previously constructed 
multilateral agreements and declarations, the premise of the developments 
in global environmental policy making corresponds to the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 2398 (XXII) of December 3, 1968, to convene 
a UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972."^  ^ The Stockholm 
Conference was held with the aim of considering and addressing global 
environmental afflictions through a coordinated organizational framework 
and tackling the problems of the natural environment as a whole. The 
decision to convene the Stockholm Conference highlighted the emerging 
international recognition of the need for the protection of the natural 
environment and displayed that environment-related activities could not be
Before the Stockholm Conference, some agreements and declarations were accomplished 
on specific issues such as migratory wildlife, nuclear testing, and oil pollution at sea. 
Notwithstanding their significance, they were not prearranged as part of a broader context. 
Examples of some of the earliest international environmental agreements are; the 1902 European 
Convention Concerning the Conservation of Birds Useful to Agriculture; the 1911 Fur Seal 
Convention; the 1916 Canadian-American Treaty for the protection of Migratory Birds; and the 1993 
African Convention Relative to the Preservation of Flora and Fauna in Their Natural State. These 
agreements laid the basis for more comprehensive treaties on a global scale. See, Lynton K. Caldwell, 
"International Responses to Environmental Issues," International Studies Notes 16, no. 1 (Winter 
1991); 3-7.
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feasibly managed and implemented except on a well organized global 
scale.
Therefore, the Stockholm Conference can be considered as the first 
significant international step and legal approach setting the agenda for 
ecological concerns and environmental problems. It was an initial attempt 
- launched by the public awareness and pressure in the Western countries - 
to provide an extensive contexture in connection with the preservation of 
the global ecosystem. One hundred and fourteen governments 
participated in the Conference and for the first time the world states 
attempted to transcend the impediments of national sovereignty and
jurisdiction to address collectively various environmental issues. 
Consequently, a list of Principles and an Action Plan and the Stockholm 
Declaration emerged from the Conference.
However, a group of communist states led by the USSR did not 
participate in the preparatory process and the Stockholm Conference itself 
since these states considered environmental degradation a result of the
capitalist development patterns.“^“^ Conceivably, this factor along with the 
disinclination of the developing countries to focus on ecological concerns 
instead of economic development decreased to some extent the impact of
“^ ^Thomas Mensah, "Environmental Protection: International Approaches", 95.
"^^Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions, 49.
'^ ‘^ Tony Brenton, The Greening o f Machiavelli: The Evolution o f International Environmental 
Politics (London: Earthscan Publication, 1994), 36-37.
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the Conference as a whole. Nevertheless, the Stockholm Conference has 
always been considered as the first land-mark event related with the 
environment which opened the way towards future international activities.
As it was indicated in the previous section of this chapter, the United 
Nations Environment Programme which functions as the predominant 
body concerning with the issues of a global character was a significant 
product of the UN Conference on the Human Environment. The UNEP was 
established on 15 December 1972, and since its creation it has undertaken 
the responsibility for motivating and coordinating international activities 
concerning the protection of the natural environment. Since its 
establishment, regarding many regional and global environmental 
problems, the crucial functions of agenda-setting and international 
coordination have been implemented by the UNEP."^  ^ The UNEP has been 
working for the accomplishment of international cooperation in a wide 
range of ecological problems. A majority of the environmental conventions 
which were consummated during the past two decades were the products 
of conferences and negotiations sponsored by the United Nations
Environment Programme. 46
UNEP, however, has been suffering from an insufficient budget and a peripheral 
geographical location (Nairobi) which restrain to some extent its efforts and activities to advance 
environmental consciousness. Compared to the other international bodies in the United Nations 
System - such as UNDP, FAO, etc. - the UNEP has a smaller armual budget. See, Tony Brenton, 50.
^^Porter and Brown, 49.
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After the Stockholm Conference, numerous environmental treaties 
have been signed on a bilateral, regional and global basis. Table I presents 
the international agreements accomplished for the global commons issues.
Another significant development which had an impact in the 
evolution of global environmental politics was the Brundtland Report 
which was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1987 (see 
Section l.c  for the details). The concept of sustainable development has 
become an indispensable ingredient of environmental policy-making after 
the publication of Our Common Future. The Brundtland Report criticized 
the present structure of the international system and stated that the 
system remained inadequate when tackling with the majority of the 
environment-related problems:
The integrated and interdependent nature of the new challenges and 
issues contrasts sharply with the nature of institutions that exist 
today....The real world interlocked economic and ecological systems 
will not change; the policies and institutions concerned must."^ ^
In effect, the Brundtland Report has been considered a significant 
precursor to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development - also known as the Rio Earth Summit - that took place five 
years later.
47World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 310.
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Table I. International Agreements on Global Environmental Issues:
Agreements Concerning the General Environment:
1 972 D eclaration  of th e U nited N ations C onference on th e H um an E n viron m en t 
(UN CH E), Stockholm .
19 9 2 The Rio D eclaration  on E n viron m en t and Developm ent. A genda 21  (UNCED), 
Rio De Jan eiro .
Agreements Concerning Oceans:
1 9 4 6 Intern ation al C onvention for th e R egulation of W haling (ICRW), W ashington.
19 7 2 C onvention on th e Preven tion  of M arine Pollution by D um ping of W astes and  
O ther M atter, London.
1 973 In ternational Convention for th e P revention  of Pollution from  Ships 
(M ARPOL), London.
19 8 2 U nited N ations Convention on th e Law  of th e Sea (Third LoS Convention), 
M ontego Bay.
Agreements Concerning Antarctica:
1 9 5 9 The A n tarctic  T reaty , W ashington.
19 7 2 C onvention for the P ro tectio n  of A n tarctic  Seals, London.
1 982 Convention on th e C onservation of A n tarctic  M arine L ivin g  R esou rces  
(CCAMLR), C anberra.
1 9 8 8 Convention on the R egulation  of A n tarctic  M ineral R eso u rce  A ctivities  
(CRAMRA), W ellington.
1991 P rotocol on Environm ental P ro tectio n  to  th e A n ta rctic  T reaty  (P R E P ), 
M adrid.
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Agreements Concerning the Outer Space:
1 9 6 7 T reaty  on P rin cip les G overning A ctivities of S tates  in the E xp loration  and  
Use of O uter Space Including the Moon and O ther Celestial Bodies (O uter 
Space T reaty), W ashington , London and Moscow.
1 9 7 9 A greem en ts G overning th e  A ctivities of S tates  on th e M oon and O ther 
C elestial Bodies, New York.
19 8 8 Appendix ЗОВ to  The Fin al A cts Adopted by the Second Session of the WARC 
on the use of GSO and th e Plan n in g of Space Services U tilizing It.
19 8 9 C onstitution  and C onvention of th e In ternational T elecom m unication Union, 
Nice.
1 992 C onstitution and C onvention of th e International Telecom m unication Union, 
Geneva.
Agreements Concerning the Atmosphere:
19 8 5 Convention for th e P ro tectio n  of th e Ozone L ayer, Vienna.
1 9 8 7 Protocol (to  th e 1 9 8 5  Vienna Convention) on Sub stan ce th a t D eplete the  
Ozone L ayer, M ontreal.
1 9 9 0 R evisions to  the M ontreal P rotocol, London.
19 9 2 U nited N ations Fram ew ork  Convention on C lim ate C hange (FCCC), Rio de 
Jan eiro .
Source: John Vogler, The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis (New York; John Wiley & 
Sons, 1995).
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The Earth Summit was held in June 1992, in Rio de Janeiro and over 
178 countries participated. In addition to states, numerous representatives 
from nongovernmental organizations, delegates from various 
intergovernmental organizations and the UN agencies, and thousands of 
journalists and people from media were present in the Conference. It was 
the largest international conference ever held in history with a remarkable 
gathering of leaders from world states.
The Rio Conference (UNCED) took a long preparatory phase - almost 
more than two years. As a result of this Conference three major 
documents were adopted: 1) the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 2) Agenda-21 and 3) The Statement of Principles on 
Forests."^® In addition to these documents, two legally binding conventions 
were created by the world states: the first one is the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the second one is the 
Convention on Biodiversity.
Agenda 21 is a significant product of the Rio Conference; it is a 
framework action plan for the 1990s and the 21^  ^ Century to elevate and 
advance sustainable development by governments, non-governmental 
organizations, the UN agencies and independent sector-groups in a global 
scope. It is a comprehensive document inclusive of strategies for
^^See, United Nations, Earth Summit: Agenda 21, The United Nations Programme of Action 
from RiotiHew York: United Nations, 1994).
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international cooperation to accelerate sustainable development, strategies 
for integrating environment and development in decision-making, 
conservation and management strategies for the natural resources, 
schemes for strengthening the roles of major groups such as women,
children, workers, etc., and means of implementation.
Also, capacity building for sustainable development was regarded 
important for Agenda 21, albeit the existence of wide gaps in the capacity 
to implement sustainable human development.Due to these gaps, the 
universality and transparency of the funding mechanism and the 
complementarity among agencies and programmes in bilateral, regional 
and global basis together with the internationalization of the concept of 
sustainable development were considered as crucial f a c t o r s . D u r i n g  the 
Conference, the OECD countries decided to make some increases in the 
financial resources of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) - which is a 
fund established for international environmental issues and directed by the 
World Bank, United Nations Development Programme and United Nations 
Environment Programme.
Therefore, the Rio Earth. Summit is the latest landmark event in the 
evolution of global environmental politics and it gives the signs of greater
49Ibid.
®°See, United Nations Development Programme, In Our Hands United Nations Earth 
Summit '92: Capacity Building For Sustainable Development, Research Paper No. 42, February 1992.
51Ibid.
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collaboration among the world states for future. The Rio Conference drew 
attention to another kind of security, namely environmental security, and 
concentrated on the vitality of closing the gaps between the rich and the 
poor countries.®^
Despite the remarkable achievements made at the Rio Earth Summit, 
a more genuine commitment to the preservation of natural endowments 
could have been accomplished among the world states. The two 
conventions which were signed during the Earth Summit could have 
established more stringent measures in the face of impending global 
threats. Although the Earth Summit laid the foundations for more 
effective and genuine international environmental collaboration and set the 
agenda for the future, nation-states obviously could have structured more 
substantial regulations and constructed readjustments against global 
ecological deterioration.
It appears that even though environmental concerns have been 
perturbing the international community more severely than the past, it is 
very seldom that quick developments and effective legal arrangements can 
be accomplished with respect to environmental protection. The 
observations display that environmental regulations and law-making in the 
international arena usually follow paths which include prolonged and 
time-consuming processes. Therefore, intensifying global threats and
52James Gustave Speth, "A Post-Rio Compact," Foreign Policym  (1992): 145.
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increasing concern among people towards environmental afflictions 
should motivate the international community to respond more rapidly and 
effectively towards the problems of the natural environment.
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Chapter III. Neorealist versus Neoliberal Institutionalist 
Theories in International Relations:
The term theory implies a conceptual construction and intellectual 
device which is functional in comprehending and explaining the chosen 
phenomena in an orderly and logical manner. With respect to the field of 
international relations, there is an abundance of attempts to explain the 
international reality and to make sense of its dynamics. However, today 
the field is particularly dominated by the contemporary debate between the 
neorealist perspective and neoliberal institutionalist approach towards 
world politics. Neoliberal institutionalism can be regarded more as a 
synthesis of basic realist and liberal assumptions and it appears to embody 
an ample explanatory power compared to that of neorealism. In spite of 
the elaboration and progression of some previous realist arguments in 
accordance with the new developments in international political relations 
and emergence of non-state actors in the world politics, the adherents of 
neorealism still seem to be excessively indulged in power politics and 
anarchy which basically constricts an appropriate interpretation of 
contemporary world affairs and frequently observed cooperative processes.
This chapter mainly consists of a review of the prominent debate 
between the competing realist and liberal approaches within the 
international relations discipline and it introduces the recent shape the 
controversy has taken. Therefore, the chapter presents a survey of these 
two different theoretical traditions - with a particular emphasis on the
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idealist/liberal institutionalist school of thought - and assess their 
implications with respect to the interpretation of international political 
issues and international cooperation. Examination of the major 
approaches within this chapter thus serves the purpose of providing an 
essential perspective which will enable the construction of an appropriate 
theoretical framework to analyze climate change politics in the final 
chapter of the dissertation.
1. Evolution of the Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate: Earlier Developments
l.a. The Realist-Idealist Controversy:
Efforts to theorize about the nature of interstate relations go back to 
old times. When the debate between neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism is traced back to its source one finds that many classical 
realist and liberal writers can be identified as the historical antecedents
and intellectual precursors of the two approaches.53
^^Thucydides (471-400 B.C.), with his History o f the Peloponnesian War, is considered as the 
founding father of the international relations discipline and he is the first writer in the realist 
tradition. Niccolo Machiavelli with his Prince is another classical writer who indulged in the 
analysis of power and state system during the 16th Century. Another realist writer was Thomas 
Hobbes (17th Century) and in his eminent work Leviathan he dealt with the anarchic nature of state 
(state of nature) and international system when there is no dominant political authority. Hugo 
Grotius, with his most important work Law o f War and Peace, is another writer who lived in the 17th 
Century, and he was concerned with the anarchy of international relations and the necessity of 
binding rules and laws. As regards the idealist/neoliberal views, since Grotius is considered the 
father of international law, he also had a great impact on the idealist tradition of international 
relations. Dante was another intellectual precursor of idealism. In his masterpiece De Monarchia he 
was concerned with international institutions which would be instrumental in establishing peace and 
order. John Locke with his Second Treatise on Government (1698) was a thinker who put emphasis
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Yet, prior to World War I, a systematic development which is 
comparable to that in internal political theories of the state did not come
into existence with respect to international r e l a t i o n s . W h e n  the 
catastrophic consequences of World War I demonstrated the inadequacy of 
conventional European diplomacy in maintaining peace, a need for the 
development of international relations as a distinct discipline emerged. 
The appearance of the U.S. as a power with global responsibilities in the 
1920s accelerated the development, thus the discipline flourished within
an Anglo-American setting.
The first approach, which was embraced by the international 
relations theorists and became predominant within the discipline, was an 
essentially idealistic approach. Idealists were very optimistic about the 
eradication of conflicts and wars through collective and multilateral 
efforts. The international society could be reorganized and an auspicious 
environment - where international laws and institutions maintain world­
wide peace - could be established. They perceived human nature as 'good'
on individual rights and limited state. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham 
can be considered as other names constituting the historical precursors of idealism/neoliberalism.
E. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories o f International Relations (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1990), 2.
A. Couloumbis and J. H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1986), 20-21.
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and 'altruistic' thus looked upon war as an illness rather than a 
phenomenon intrinsic to international relations.
However, the developments within the international arena rebutted 
the assumptions of the idealists, and their indulgence in issues such as 
disarmament, the establishment of international law and organizations and 
dissemination of world-wide democratic governments began to be viewed 
with great scepticism. The drastic consequences of World War II caused 
the emergence of a new generation of pragmatic scholars; in that way 
realism became the prevalent school of thought in the international
relations discipline.^®
In contrast to the idealist assumptions, the anarchic structure of the 
international system and the image of the unified and rational states as the 
principal actors within this anarchic environment constituted the starting 
point of the realist scholars. Military and security issues had supremacy in 
the realist's analysis with respect to interstate relations, and international 
politics denoted a struggle for power for them. In fact, the purpose of the 
statecraft were national survival and acquisition of power; therefore, no
®®Initially, idealism gave way to realism with E. H. Carr's eminent work: The Twenty Years 
Crisis, 1919-1939 {Yondon: Macmillan, 1939; Harper and Row [Torchbooks], 1964). This book is best 
known as the critique of idealism, however, in his work Carr criticizes the extreme versions of 
realism as well. Reinhold Niebuhr was another name who had a major and unique impact on realist 
theory. In his M oral Man and Immoral Society h.e concentrated on issues like sinfulness of man and 
he suggested that humans have a will-to-live that leads to a will-to-power". Some of the other 
prominent names of the realist school of thought and the works accomplished during the 1950s & 
1960s within the realist fashion can be given as follows: Raymond Aron, Peace and fVar (New York: 
Doubleday, 1966), Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), George F. 
Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), Arnold
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principle was more important than self-help. For instance, one of the most 
prominent figures of the realist school of thought was Hans Morgenthau 
with his famous work Politics Am ong Nations (1948). Morgenthau's 
analysis of international politics culminated in the exaltation of the 
concept of power - the capability of one foreign policy elite to dominate the 
thoughts and actions of another - to center-stage. "International politics, 
like all politics is a struggle for power," said Morgenthau, and he also 
argued that the balance of power and its preservation were crucial.®  ^ In a 
hostile environment, encompassing a society of sovereign states, balance of 
power between the actors was an essential stabilizing factor.
l.b. The Emerg^ence of Neorealism:
Notwithstanding the long-lasting predominance of t h e . realist 
approach within the field, the developments in world affairs during the late 
1960s and 1970s summoned the evolution of some of its basic aspects. 
Kenneth Waltz was the prominent figure who attempted to refine classical 
realism and he tried to define the concepts and assumptions more clearly. 
Although Man, the State and War was the first work with which Kenneth 
Waltz established his reputation in International Relations, later in his
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), Kenneth Waltz, Man, the 
State and iyar(NY: Columbia University Press, 1959).
^^Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed., (New York: Knopf, 1966), 25.
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two important works, "Theory of International Relations" (1975), and 
Theory o f International Politics (1979)^®, he laid down the principles and 
basic assumptions of neorealism, which were to a certain extent different 
from, yet rooted in, the classical realist theory.
Kenneth Waltz formulates a systemic explanation of international 
relations. Waltz explains state behaviour under conditions of anarchy and 
accentuates the structure of the international system. Robert Keohane 
explains this systemic approach by stating that,
the key distinguishing characteristic of a systemic theory is that the 
internal attribu tes o f actors are given b y assum ption rather than 
treated as variables. Changes in actor behaviour, and system 
outcomes, are explained not on the basis of variations in these actor 
characteristics, but on the basis of changes in the attributes of the
system itself.
In other words, what determines the behaviour of the actors within the 
system is the structure of the system itself. Therefore, according to Waltz 
the anarchic composition of the system constitutes severe restrictions in
^^Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics {Re&ding: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
^^Some scholars like Joseph M. Grieco does not prefer to distinguish between realism and 
neorealism. Grieco argues that regarding the meaning of anarchy & its effects on state, and the 
problem of cooperation, modem realists like Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin are closely affiliated 
and in accord with classical theorists like Morgenthau, Carr and Aron. See Joseph M. Grieco, 
"Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," 
in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), 116-140.
®°Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 
165-166.
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individual states' actions and circumscribes fluctuations in their 
behaviours which lead to perpetual “patterned relationships” between the 
actors. He argues that the freedom of choice of any one state within the 
international arena is limited by the behaviours of all the others, therefore, 
he is distinguished from the traditional realists by ascribing very little 
effective choice and much less freedom to manoeuvre for foreign policy 
makers or leaders of states.
In a parallel approach with classical realism. Waltz articulates
rational and unified states all of which are seeking their own interests and
preservation - a few seeking even world-wide conquest.
Some states may aim at the conquest of the world, other states may 
aim at a local hegemony, other states may aim at no hegemony at all 
but desire simply to be left alone. Common to the desires of all states 
is the wish for survival. Even the state that wants to conquer the
world wants also, a minimum, to continue its present existence.®^
However, since the structure of the system shapes the way the components 
interact with each other, for Waltz international relations is not 
tantamount to the sum of behaviours of actors and foreign policies of 
states.
According to Waltz, with respect to the options of leaders while 
pursuing national objectives, force is a means of achieving the ends of 
states. Thus, Waltz observes that in such an anarchical system leaders can
61Waltz,
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ensure security and accomplish states' survival only through utilization of 
force.
The concept of the balance of power is considered to be an explicit 
feature of the system by Waltz; the balance of power is intrinsic to the 
anarchic system itself. Thus, his theoretical formulation encapsulates a 
systemic tendency towards balance of power whether or not it is sought by 
the actors within the international arena.^^
In sum, according to Waltz the nature of the system itself "accounts
for the striking sameness in the quality of international life."®^  However, 
he observes that structural alterations are not impossible; structures "may
suddenly change."®“^
Waltz's theory is credited for its success in the systematization of 
traditional realism, however, at the same time criticized for its static and 
deterministic features. It is conceived to be limited in its explanatory 
aptitude as a result of excessive indulgence in structuralist interpretations 
and negligence of the dynamic functions of systemic variables.
®^For the debate of voluntarism-determinism, see Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, 
International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 
1987), 52.
^^Kenneth Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. 
Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 53.
64Ib id ., 58.
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l.c. Theories Within the Liberal Approach;
In spite of the dominance of the realist theory within the field of 
international relations, some scholars like David Mitrany, Ernst Haas, 
Charles Pentland, Donald Puchala and Karl Deutsch produced theories of 
international integration, functionalism and neofunctionalism and they 
rejuvenated the theoretical approach towards peace, international 
organizations, regional integration, functional collaboration, and political 
unification. Therefore, the roots of the subsequent neoliberal theories can 
be traced to such studies of political integration, functionalism and neo- 
functionalism during the 1950s and 1960s. In this way, realist 
overindulgence with power politics, military issues and state-centric 
interpretations were compensated with liberal approaches to some
extent.
Among these approaches, functionalism®® was an approach 
associated with the major assumption of a spillover effect and proliferation 
of cooperation through functional organizations where common interests
®®Joseph M. Grieco classified the successive phases of the current neoliberal institutionalism 
in his "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism" as follows: "The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal 
institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations- 
functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration 
theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s." Grieco, 116.
®®David Mitrany was the first functionalist theorist in the international relations discipline 
and he had a great influence on the subsequent scholars. David Mitrany's A  Working Peace System: 
An Argument for the Functional Development o f International Organization (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1943) and Ernst Haas's Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and
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exist. Functionalism as a theoretical approach assumed that the states in 
the international arena were confronted with multifarious and largely 
complex tasks which became more and more challenging and difficult to 
undertake. Therefore, according to functionalism non-political and 
technical experts rather than political ones should be available to serve the 
purposes of governments in various issues. In this way, different 
functional organizations which are technical in nature would carry out 
their own works and the activities in other areas would become possible as 
a result of the spillover and augmentation of cooperation. In other words, 
effective processes and successful collaboration in one technical area 
would lead to further cooperation in other areas automatically. 
Proliferation of cooperation would be accomplished more successfully in 
this way.
Neo-functionalist^^ theory was the successor of the functionalist 
approach which was closely associated with the famous scholar Ernst 
Haas. However, neofunctionalism was divided from functionalism with its 
recognition of the importance of political authority compared to that of 
technical experts and it also re-evaluated the concept of spillover in
International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) are the major works written 
within the functionalist fashion.
^^The major work written by Ernst B. Haas was The Uniting o f Europe: Political, Social and 
Economic Forces, 1950-1957 {Sianiord : Stanford University Press, 1958).
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connection with cooperative processes. Spillover of functional 
organizations and proliferation of cooperation were not viewed as 
processes occurring spontaneously and without efforts. Cooperation and 
integration were possible only if political elites considered them to be 
closely affiliated with their self-interests. Thus, some basic assumptions 
and concepts of functionalism were delineated and redefined by neo- 
functionalism.
Soon, the inadequacy of the realist and neorealist theories to provide 
an all-encompassing understanding of transformation in world politics 
became more apparent and these approaches gave way to the construction 
of new conceptual tools and theoretical frameworks by scholars like Robert 
Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stephen Krasner. Especially, Keohane and Nye 
considered transnational and transgovernmental relations crucial and they 
treated “interdependence”®® as a key concept. This was a challenge against 
the realist assumptions and an attempt to replenish the lacuna in the 
interpretation of the changing dimensions of world affairs during the
^^Interdependence characterizes the reciprocal costly effects among states, international 
institutions and other transnational actors within the whole international system; see R. O. Keohane 
and J.S. Nye, Pow er and Interdependence Harper Collins Publishers, 1989). Interdependence
is closely affiliated with the pluralist paradigm as regards the international relations theory. 
Actually, during the 1980s it became rather conventional to demarcate the basic theoretical 
approaches in international relations theory as pluralist, globalist and realist paradigms. For 
example, see Mike Bowker and Robin Brown, eds.. From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World 
Politics in the 1980s {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. 
Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1987). Among these three perspectives - although the term is considered and 
discussed by the proponents of realism and globalism as well - pluralists apparently take the concept 
of interdependence to heart because the term encapsulates or perhaps more correctly epitomizes the 
essence of their basic assumptions and world views.
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1970s since détente and foreign economic competition along with the 
emergence of multidimensional economic, social and ecological issues 
mitigated the intensity of the military-security concerns and disputed the 
view that the state is the only major actor in the international system. 
However, in contrast to the integration theories, the interdependence 
theory especially concentrated in cooperation among states as opposed to 
integration.
Robert Keohane's and Joseph Nye's Power and Interdependence 
(1977) can be deemed as a classical work of transnationalism and 
interdependence in connection with the idealist/liberal approach. When 
challenging the state-centric and power-oriented views of realism, Keohane 
and Nye say that "realist assumptions about world politics can be seen as
defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal typé'^ "^ ·, therefore, as a 
contrary argument they raise “complex interdependence” which is 
perceived by them to be a more instrumental and sophisticated concept 
than the realist formulations in comprehending contemporary world 
affairs. They put forward the characteristics of complex interdependence as 
follows: firstly, multiple channels connect societies and these channels are 
interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations; secondly, the 
agenda of interstate relations involves multiple issues and there is no 
hierarchy among those issues, thus military security does not consistently
69Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power ancl Interdependence, 8.
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dominate the international system, and thirdly, military force has a 
comparably minor role in world politics since it can be irrelevant in 
resolving disputes regarding economic issues - it is not utilized by 
governments against other governments within the region, or on the
issues, when complex interdependence is existing.^®
From those main features of complex interdependence distinctive 
political processes - compared to the conditions of realism - emerge with 
respect to goals of actors, instruments of state policy, roles of international 
organizations, agenda setting and linkages of issues. Groals of states will 
change according to different issues, instruments for state policy will be 
the utilization of interdependence and manipulation of international 
organizations, the agenda will not only be set by shifts in the balance of 
power and by perceived threats to security. Accomplishing issue linkages 
will be more difficult for strong states and roles of international 
organizations and transgovernmental relations will be of great
importance.^ ^
At the same time, adherents of international collaboration and 
regional integration embarked upon the analysis of flourishing cooperative 
behaviour which began to be observed during that time. Prevalent regimes 
and existing collaborative processes challenged the perceptions about a
70
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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hostile environment merely inclusive of unified and rational states involved 
in conflicts and power struggles, thus, the interest in regimes and regime 
formation began to attract a great amount of attention. John Ruggie was 
the first scholar who introduced the concept in 1975 and defined it as "a 
set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational 
energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group 
of s t a t e s . L a t e r ,  Stephen Krasner consolidated the developments and 
research in regime analysis with his prominent book International
Regim es (1983).^^
Over the last twenty years regime analysis has continued its great 
influence in international politics. As it has been suggested by one author 
“regime analysis may have been an innovation in International Rela,tions in 
the same fashion in which policy research has enlivened the development
of political science in general.
In essence, there are various approaches towards regime analysis; 
different schools of thought - neoliberal institutionalists, neorealists and 
cognitivists (epistemic community approach) - have sought to deduce 
different formulations and conceptual frameworks by focusing on mainly
^^John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," 
International Organization 29 (Summer 1975): 570.
73Stephen Krasner, International Regimes {\ihaca·. Cornell University Press, 1983).
' '^^Volker Rittberger, editor's introduction to Regime Theory and International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), ixx·
56
different factors and by observing distinctive examples of regime formation 
processes. For instance, Peter M. Haas divides regime theories basically 
into three groups as power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based
explanations.
Haggard and Simmons divided regimes into four categories: 
structural, game-theoretic, functional and cognitive. They argue that 
these approaches are not mutually exclusive and the most satisfactory 
formulation can be extracted from more than one theoretical perspective. 
However, they believe that these different approaches often speak past one 
another since their focuses and preoccupation vary to a great extent while 
explaining particular phenomena.
At the same time Haggard and Simmons believe that regime analysis 
is an attempt to synthesize realist and liberal traditions of international 
politics. They say that:
Regime analysts assumed that patterns of state actions are influenced 
by norms, but that such norms-governed behaviour was wholly 
consistent with the pursuit of national interests. Hence the regime 
literature can be viewed as an experiment in reconciling the idealist
and realist traditions. 77
^^For a detailed discussion and explanation of this grouping see Peter M. Haas, "Epistemic 
Communities and Dynamics of International Environmental Cooperation," in Regime Theory and 
International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 168-169, and also see 
Peter M. Haas, "Regime Patterns for Environmental Management," in Complex Cooperation: 
Institutions and Processes in International Resource Management, eds. Peter M. Haas and Helge 
Hveem (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994), 35-63.
^^Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 
International Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 492.
77rv.Ib id ., 499-498.
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2. Contemporary Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate:
Today, the persistent debate between neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism has been elevated to a new level 7® The newest version of 
neoliberal institutionalism is very much concerned with economic, social, 
cultural and ecological issues as a result of the recognition of the intense 
and perpetual interactions between the different components of the 
international system of the late twentieth century. However, the core 
element in this latest version is its keen attempt to reconcile realist and 
liberal assumptions. In other words, this latest version attempts to make a 
synthesis out of the realist and liberal approaches towards international 
relations. For instance, the famous scholar Joseph Nye points to the 
complementarity of realism and liberalism in his article titled "Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism" and he presumes the theoretical developments in the 
1990s as follows:
The time has come to transcend the classical dialectic between Realist 
and Liberal theories of international politics. Each has something to 
contribute to a research program that increases our understanding of 
international behavior. Perhaps work in the 1990s will be able to 
synthesize rather that repeat the dialectic of the 1970s and 1980s.
^^Neorealism is associated with Kenneth Waltz, Joseph Grieco and Robert Gilpin whereas 
neoliberal institutionalist approach can be associated with Robert Keohane, Oran Young and Stephen 
Krasner.
79'Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics! (January 1988) : 251.
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In effect, liberal institutionalists initiate their analysis with elements 
deduced from basic realist propositions. Robert Keohane emphasizes this 
point in his article "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After 
the Cold War" and apparently his focus is “on an institutionalist argument
that borrows elements from both liberalism and r e a l i s m . I n  a previous 
article he articulates the fact that:
Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world 
politics because its focus on power interests, and rationality is crucial 
to any understanding of the subject. Thus any approach to 
international relations has to incorporate, or at least come to grips 
with, key elements of Realist thinking.®^
Therefore, the new liberal institutionalism is characterized by an approval 
and adoption of the key realist assumptions such as the anarchical nature 
of the international system, states being the principal and unitary-rational 
actors in world politics, the importance of self-interest and relative 
capabilities. Nevertheless, liberal institutionalists, in contrast with the 
realist idea which "overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the 
capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation"®^, prefer to 
embark upon the significance of international regimes and the role and
®°Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," 
in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), 271.
® ^ Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", 159.
®^Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and The Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism", 117.
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importance of international institutions in mitigating and ameliorating 
anarchy's constraining effects in connection with international 
cooperation. Liberal institutionalists argue that while analyzing 
international political relations in connection with reshaping the 
discernment of self-interests, it is essential that the factor and function of 
international institutions and the effect of transnational processes are not 
underestimated. Robert Keohane attracts attention to this fact when he 
states that "the contemporary debate centers on the validity of the 
institutionalist claim that international regimes, and institutions more 
broadly, have become significant in world politics."®^
Therefore, neoliberals and neorealists provide different 
explanations regarding why cooperation occurs; liberal institutionalists 
conceive international cooperation as a more probable outcome than 
realists who reflect on the overindulgence of liberals in international 
regimes and institutions. For the neorealists cooperation is obviously 
possible but usually exceptional in an anarchical environment whereas for 
the neoliberal it is inherent to the competitive international system itself 
since only through collective action and collaboration states can achieve
their desired goals and protect their interests.
^^Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and The Realist Challenge After The Cold War", 273.
®*^ With respect to the ease and likelihood of international cooperation, the future 
developments in the European Community is considered to be crucial by neoliberals like Keohane 
and neorealists like Grieco. It is assumed that the developments will shed light on the debate
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The difference between the two explanations with respect to
international cooperation basically originates from a major point: the issue
of relative versus absolute gains. Neoliberals attach importance to
absolute gains from international cooperation while neorealists emphasize
relative gains. Neorealists believe that states, as being rational and
unitary actors, are consistently alert about their relative capabilities - the
distribution of power - and they try to preclude any increments in other
states' relative capabilities. Grieco states that:
The major goal of states in any relationship is not to attain the highest 
possible individual gain or payoff. Instead, the fundamental goal o f  
sta tes in any relationship is  to preven t others from achieving advances
in their relative capabilities^.
Since not “individual well-being” but “survival”®^ is the main focus of 
states, neorealists argue that developments in the capabilities of the others 
are considered to be dangerous. States are very much concerned whether 
their peers achieve more than themselves from any cooperative activity. 
Therefore, for neorealists states’ anxiety about the amount of gains 
obtained from cooperative processes and the nature of its future impact on
between neorealism and neoliberalism. See Robert Keohane, Institutional Theory and The Realist 
Challenge After the Cold War."
^^Grieco, "Anarchy and The Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism", 127.
86 Ibid.
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political relationships is a significant impediment against the formation of 
international cooperation in many issues. If a state's fellow partner is 
obtaining relatively greater gains, the state can easily refrain from 
involving in cooperation. Thus, according to neorealists, gains obtained by 
states as a result of cooperative processes are apt to changes in the sense 
that in the future they can be used by a partner to disadvantage a 
particular state. For instance, Robert Powell says that the pressures of the 
system "create opportunities for one state to turn relative gains to its 
advantage and to the disadvantage of other states."®^
Therefore, according to neorealists in a system where divergent and 
incompatible national interests subsist most frequently, international 
institutions cannot fully function as the initiators and stabilizers of 
international collaboration. These institutions’ contributions and 
functions with respect to international cooperation are mostly restricted 
due to the structural features of the system. Consequently, from the 
neorealist point of view the ease and likelihood of international 
cooperation is rather low.
Neoliberals conceive states as “rational egoists”®^ that pursue their 
own goals and strive in order to maximize their absolute gains.
®^Robert Powell, "The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations 
Theory," Am erican Political Science Review ^ 5 (December 1991): 1315.
®®Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", 273.
89Ib id ., 275.
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According to the liberal institutionalists, the anarchical nature of the 
international system is considered to be the major factor that compels 
states towards cooperation since under such circumstances states have 
common interests in participating in cooperative arrangements to preserve 
their interests and achieve their goals. As long as states' interests are 
interdependent, they will choose to get involved in mutually beneficial 
cooperation. Neoliberals do not share with neorealists the opinion that 
states have great concern about their partners' gains; they are not 
preoccupied with the gains of the other states as long as these gains do not 
interfere with their own interests and are not utilized to disadvantage 
them. They believe that states are only concerned with their own gains 
from any cooperative behaviour and they aim at achieving the greatest 
possible absolute gains. Neoliberals emphasize the fact that international 
regimes and institutions are very influential in reshaping states' 
perceptions of self"interest and operational in facilitating cooperation. 
Thus, they believe in the ability of international institutions to promote 
and protect cooperation in the international system when they are 
appropriately designed and well structured.
Therefore, international institutions are considered by neoliberals as 
organizational bodies that regularize and facilitate interactions and 
transmissions between world states and improve the proliferation of 
cooperative processes. As a result of international institutions, actors 
sharing common interests within the system can be motivated toward
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collaboration since the existence of such institutions increase the rate and 
scope of information exchange and they serve as promoters of compatible 
state interests by co-ordinating negotiations. They decrease uncertainty 
and reduce costs while enhancing cooperative elements such as 
predictability, harmony and convergence of interests, stability and 
transparency in the realm of international politics. In other words, 
international institutions, interdependent state interests, goal adjustments 
and policy coordinations are raised to the center stage within the 
institutionalist analysis of international relations.
At the same time, Robert Keohane points out the fact that the liberal 
institutionalist approach does not overlook the possibility that states' 
interests in relative gains can make it more difficult to achieve 
cooperation. However, Keohane adds that the institutional theory is 
explicitly conditional and he says that relative gains can be significant 
"only when gains in one period alter power relations in another, and when 
there is some likelihood that subsequent advantages in power may be used
against oneself.
Robert Keohane emphasizes the fact that the neoliberal 
institutionalist theory never portends international cooperation when 
potential mutual gains do not exist. He believes that if blocking 
international cooperation brings states high gains, they will obviously
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refrain from entering into collaborative efforts and cooperative processes. 
Robert Keohane points out the significance of common interests in 
international cooperation and he says that, “without these, there is little 
reason to believe that cooperation will occur. Actors must believe that they
can make future gains through cooperation.
Consequently, institutionalists believe that international institutions 
are “fundamental to human behaviour because people orient their actions 
according to expectations and norms provided by conventions, informal 
and formal rules, and organizations; that is, in the context of
institutions.”^  ^ The core of the liberal institutionalist theory is displayed 
by Keohane as follows;
Institutionalism accepts the assumptions of realism about state 
motivation and lack of common enforcement power in world politics, 
but argues that where common in terests exist, realism is too 
pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation and the role of
institutions 93
Another institutionalist scholar Oran Young emphasizes the 
international institutions as the key performers in shaping the behaviours 
of individual members of the international society and the collective
Robert O. Keohane, "Against Hierarchy: An Institutional Approach to International 
Envirorunental Protection," in Complex Cooperation: Institutions and Processes in International 
Resource Management, eds. Peter M. Haas and Helge Hveem (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 
1994), 18.
^^Robert O. Keohane, "Against Hierarchy: An Institutional Approach to International 
Environmental Protection", 25.
93,^Ibid., 277.
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behaviours emanating from correlated p r o c e s s e s . I n  his article “The
Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical
Variables” Oran Young argues as follows:
If, as I and many other students of international institutions believe, 
institutions are driving forces in the sense that it is possible to explain 
or predict a sizeable proportion of the variance in individual and 
collective behavior in terms of the operation of institutional 
arrangements, the study of such arrangements will acquire a 
prominent and lasting place on the agenda of international relations 
as a field of study.^^
3. The Epistemlc Communities Model Within the Liberal Approach:
At this point of this theoretical survey, the epistemic community 
theory (cognitive theory) which was produced by Peter M. Haas - with a 
special attention on the Mediterranean cooperation to protect the 
Mediterranean Sea - will also be examined.^^ The epistemic community 
approach basically focuses on the significance of knowledge and cognitive 
processes in the formation and maintenance of international cooperation 
and regimes. Thus, the epistemic community approach regards scientists 
and scientific knowledge as the key elements in explaining and analysing 
the international reality. Haas defines an epistemic community as follows:
'^^Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical 
Variables," in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, eds. James N. 
Rosenau and Enst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160.
^5Ibid.
^®For instance, see Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and 
Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43 (Summer 1989) : 377-403; Peter M.
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An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. 
Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a 
variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs... (2) shared casual beliefs... (3) 
shared notions of validity... (4) a common policy enterprise...^^
According to Haas, epistemic communities function - at both the 
domestic and international level - as the promoters and persuaders of 
cooperation by decreasing or sometimes by completely eradicating the 
uncertainty factor which can be frequently observed in many global 
environmental issues. Haas says that,
in the case of international environmental issues, decision makers are 
seldom certain of the complex interplay of components of the 
ecosystem and are therefore unable to anticipate the long-term 
consequences of measures designed to address one of the many 
environmental issues under current consideration.^®
Therefore, Haas argues that especially with respect to the international 
environmental issues, epistemic communities spread knowledge and 
facilitate the learning processes which consequently motivate states to 
reconsider and reperceive their preferences. Haas says that learning
Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics o f Intemahonal Environmental Cooperation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
^^Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination," International Organization A6 (Winter 1992): 3.
98Peter M. Haas(1992), 13.
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should be considered as “a critical process by which regime patterns 
change over time, and epistemic communities are important actors for 
shaping what learning occurs, and moulding the path by which regimes 
e v o l v e . T h e r e f o r e ,  according to Haas “control over knowledge and 
information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of 
new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behavior” which 
can consequently culminate in international policy coordination and 
cooperation.
In a similar way, Oran Young points out the significance of
transnational alliances in the formation of international cooperation and
regimes. These transnational alliances consist of interests groups who
favor the establishment of specific international regimes on environmental
issues. Regarding the importance of roles played by transnational
alliances. Young mentions the weight and influence of scientific
communities in moulding the cooperative processes and regime formation
efforts. For instance, with respect to the formation of an environmental
regime to protect the Mediterranean Sea, Young points out that:
An extensive network of scientific supporters located in all the 
Mediterranean Basin states has played an important role in bringing 
pressure to bear on hesitant governments to become supporters of the 
pollution control regime for the Mediterranean.^®^
®®Peter M. Haas (1993), 201.
^®®Peter M. Haas (1992), 2-3.
^®^Oran R. Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment," International Organization 43 (Summer 1989): 364.
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Therefore, the adherents of the epistemic community approach argue 
that cognitive determinants are crucial in analysing interstate cooperation 
and regime dynamics. According to them, “cognitive theory does not 
assume irrationality but explores the lim its of human rationality. It rests 
on conception of man as selectively responding to and actively shaping his 
environment.” ®^^ Information and knowledge are considered as 
prerequisites for creating new responses in human beings towards their 
environment and shaping their behaviour towards collaboration in the face 
of international environmental problems.
Thus, according to the epistemic community theory even if a strong 
leadership by a powerful state does not exist with respect to addressing an 
international environmental issue, establishment of an effective 
cooperation is still possible through the functioning of epistemic 
communities.^®® At this point, Haas mentions epistemically informed
bargainings®^, which takes place under conditions of diffused power. 105
The negotiated regime would then reflect the causal and principled 
beliefs of the epistemic community. National positions would vary 
according to the extent of penetration by epistemic communities, or 
the sensitivity of policies in that country to policies in a country 
already influenced by the epistemic community, s®^
s®^Christer Jonsson, "Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regime Dynamics," in Regime Theory 
and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 203.
s®®Peter M. Haas (1993), 188.
104r
105
106
I^bid.
Ibid., 191. 
Ibid., 189.
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Hence, the epistemic community approach provides some functional 
and effectual interpretations regarding the dynamics of cooperation on 
various environmental issues and international regime formations. It is a 
fruitful attempt to produce basic propositions in connection with the 
impacts of epistemic communities and spreading scientific knowledge on 
international policy coordination and cooperative processes aiming at 
effective solutions. The epistemic community approach argues that 
“between international structures and human volition lies interpretation. 
Before choices involving cooperation can be made, circumstances must be 
assessed and interests identified.” In other words, the epistemic 
community approach auspiciously articulates the crucial fact that for 
making a clear-cut evaluation of interests, goals and performing the 
required behaviours to obtain them, policy-makers should be in a position 
to comprehend the technical aspects of different problems and should be 
familiar with the cause and effect relations of environmental issues. The 
epistemic community theory has a substantial weight in the international 
relations discipline with its focus on the knowledge-behavior relationship 
in explaining the world order and international reality since uncertainty 
and doubt constitute acute barriers against policy coordination and 
establishment of cooperation in many global environmental issues.
^^^Enunanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World 
Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," International Organization 46 (Winter 
1992): 367.
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Consequently, it can be claimed that the epistemic community theory, as a 
relatively new approach in the field of International Relations, has brought 
forth novel insights into the understanding and interpretation of many 
international environmental regimes, cooperative processes and 
multinational collaborations.
4. Neoliberal Institutionalism As an Efficient Theoretical Device:
Robert Keohane mentions the fact that various approaches within 
the International Relations discipline have complementary functions and 
these schools of thought actually provide each other with different 
understandings. He believes that the three different perspectives in the 
field - neorealist, neoliberal, cognitivist - contribute to each other to a 
certain extent. Keohane says that:
Realism, institutionalism, and the cognitive school are not so much 
competing paradigms as potentially complementary lines of argument, 
each emphasizing a different set of independent variables: interests 
and power for realism, information and institutional attributes for 
institutionalism, cognition and social learning for the cognitivists.^°®
It is accurate to claim that all these three theoretical approaches 
provide useful insights to the field of International Relations. However, 
notwithstanding the discerning contributions of the epistemic community 
literature in explaining political cooperative processes and regime
108Keohane (1994), 25.
71
dynamics, the approach alone does not seem to be powerful enough to 
provide an all-encompassing interpretation of the structural features of the 
system and a sophisticated analysis of international reality. The utilization 
of the epistemic community factor as the major variable appears to be 
lacking at least from some aspects since explaining the international 
phenomena and cooperation on the basis of scientific communities and 
social learning leaves out the more important elements and factors that 
make collective action possible. These factors are international 
institutions and intergovernmental agencies which function as the key 
performers and fundamental promoters of international cooperation.
Therefore, it can be more appropriate to consider the epistemic 
QQjmjmnity approach as a part of and as a complement to the neoliberal 
institutionalist theory since the epistemic community literature has 
basically come through the institutionalist school of thought. Institutions 
are the settlements that enable transactional relations, international and 
transnational processes, and they appropriately reduce the risks and costs 
of collective action within the international community. Without their 
existence and help, coordination of political processes and dissemination of 
scientific knowledge cannot be effectively accomplished. Therefore, in 
international environmental issues knowledge is crucial, however, 
knowledge can only become available in a sufficient way to world states 
and policy-makers through environmental institutionalization and 
coordination of information. As Matthew Paterson argues, “the epistemic
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networks rely on international organisations in order to operate, and that 
many of these organisations already existed prior to the establishment of 
such n e t w o r k s . H e n c e ,  it appears to be more appropriate to consider 
international institutions as the key actors performing the most significant 
roles in cooperative processes and to utilize them as the primary variables 
within the interpretation and analysis of global environmental issues.
When referring to the contemporary academic study of International 
Relations, John Vogler points out that liberal institutionalism “flourished 
in the aftermath of the Great War and brought an essentially optimistic 
and liberal approach to the project of reforming the international system 
through the building of cooperative institutions and the development of
international law.”^^ ° Neoliberal institutionalism as an intellectual 
construction takes the regulating functions of the international 
institutions within this anarchical system as the basis of its interpretation
3,‘ttempting to explain the facts of the v o^rld. If these institutions are 
established appropriately, they can generate policy coordination among 
states and open the way to advanced institutional arrangements for 
environmental protection.
^°^Matthew Paterson, "Neorealism, Neoinstitutionalism and the Climate Change 
Convention," in The Environment and International Relations, eds. John Vogler and Mark F. Imber 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 73.
 ^^°John Vogler, "The Environment in International Relations: Legacies and Contentions," in 
The Environment and Intematioanl Relations, eds. John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 1.
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With respect to the neorealist insights into the discipline of 
International Relations, compared to the neoliberal institutionalist school 
of thought, neorealists remain rather prudent and display a disinclination 
to accept international institutions’ coordinating functions and 
contributions to the abatement of uncertainty in world politics. They are 
not convinced that organizations are operating successfully to mitigate 
uncertainty and instability which can lead to the institutionalization of 
international cooperation. Since realist and neorealist scholars place the 
priority on security issues and military concerns, they consider 
international cooperation as a marginal and exceptional phenomenon. As 
neorealists attribute great significance to states’ struggle towards the 
maximization of power and focus on states’ sensitivity to unfavourable and 
undesirable consequences that might result from cooperative behaviour, 
they may be likely to underestimate the changing dynamics of 
international politics which has been increasingly motivating actors to 
converge their interests. Therefore, neorealist assumptions do not appear 
to be applicable to many cooperative processes, at least within the realm of 
international environmental issues.
As one author argues, “theories and models are like floodlights 
one part of the stage but, by the same token, leave other
parts in the shade.”^^  ^ That is to say, no particular theory is capable of
 ^  ^^Christer Jonsson, "Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regune Dynamics", 221.
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explaining all the aspects of a selected phenomenon entirely. In the same 
way, none of the theories described in the above sections of this chapter 
are without their drawbacks and limitations. For instance both 
neorealism and neoliberalism function at the systemic level and make their 
analysis accordingly. Therefore, it is evident that they inescapably neglect 
and deemphasize some unit-level factors and they fail sometimes to 
incorporate domestic dynamics in their theoretical explanations. As Peter 
Haas suggests, none of them “is sufficient to explain the full range of
variation an analyst would desire.”^ N e v e r th e le s s , among these 
approaches the neoliberal institutionalist approach appears to display a 
more auspicious and sophisticated outlook to the dynamics of complex 
international relations especially when global environmental politics and 
cooperation are concerned.
In effect, neoliberal institutionalism provides a broader and more 
comprehensive interpretation of behaviours of the actors in the 
international arena by referring to the cobweb image of the system which 
has emerged as a result of transactional alliances, transnational linkages, 
multinational corporations and international institutions. Convergence of 
state interests and policy coordination have become indispensable
^^^Peter M. Haas, "Regime Patterns for Environmental Management," in Complex 
Cooperation: Institutions and Processes in Intematjonal Resource Management, eds. Peter M. Haas 
and Helge Hveem (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994), 35.
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processes especially in the face of some of the global environmental threats 
which confront not only a specific state or group of states but also the 
whole international system. These developments make power-based 
explanations of the neorealist theory less convincing - at least regarding 
the issues related with global environmental problems. At this point, 
neoliberal institutionalism precisely focuses on and emphasizes the crucial 
role played by international institutions in regulating and facilitating 
interstate relations towards cooperation in international ecological issues. 
Where actors’ interests and objectives converge, a harmony between states 
can be generated by the creation of transparency and by policy 
adjustments enabled through international institutions. Nevertheless, it 
should also be emphasized that neoliberal institutionalism does not display 
an extravagantly optimistic outlook regarding international cooperation 
since the theory embodies such assumptions like the interest-oriented 
nature of world states and the anarchical features of the international 
system as well.
Consequently, it can be claimed that the neoliberal institutionalist 
theory appears to internalize a considerable explanatory power in 
connection with the dynamics of international relations and global 
environmental politics. Therefore, the theoretical framework that will be 
constructed in the final chapter of this dissertation in order to explain the 
climate change politics will be concordant with the basic assumptions and 
propositions of the neoliberal institutionalist school of thought and it
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will provide an institution-based interpretation of the international 
environmental cooperation achieved for the protection of the global 
climate.
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Chapter IV. The Science of Climate Change
The climate of the earth has always remained the first and foremost 
influential factor which shapes and orientates man’s activities, quality of 
living and evolution. Climatic fluctuations have always emanated as 
factors complicating human beings’ life and brought forth significant
modifications in man’s historical evolution.
On the other hand, humans have also had an indiscernible impact on 
the earth and its climate: “Natural changes have determined the history of 
the human race. Humans, as their numbers have increased on Earth, have 
changed the environment and influenced the natural history of life on the
planet.”“ ^
The major purpose of this chapter is to present information 
pertaining to the scientific aspects of the climate change issue which 
emerges as a crucial global ecological problem entailing an extensive 
process of additional scientific research and multinational concerted 
scientific investigation. Climate modelling and interdisciplinary 
exploration on the dynamics of climatic changes have been continuing for 
a long time, however, the efforts have intensified and accelerated in the
 ^^^Contemporary man confronted the epoch of the drastic climatic alterations as a result of 
the last Quaternary glaciation; dramatic variations in the climatic conditions and ecological changes 
sharpened man's struggle for existence and to aid in the development of the species Homo sapiens. 
See M.l. Budyko, The Earth's Climate: Past and yi/hrre· (Orlando: Academic Press, 1982), 1-5.
1 “^^ Karl K. Turekian, Global Environmental Change: Past, Present and Puture (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1996), 171.
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last twenty years. Within this framework, the chapter will include an 
overview of the climate system; nature of climate change, global warming 
and the role of the greenhouse gases in this process; anthropogenic 
impacts on climatic changes and global warming; underlying scientific 
uncertainty regarding the climate change issue and some of the projected 
impacts of climate change on natural ecological systems and various socio­
economic systems.
1. The Climate System, Climate Change and Global Warming:
What is climate? In its most general sense climate can be defined as 
“the organized summary over time of the observed behaviour of the 
planetary land, atmosphere and water system.”“ ® To be able to 
understand, model and predict the functioning of the climate system is the
primary goal of climate research.
The climate system of the earth is a very complex one. Article 1 of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change defines the 
climate system as the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere 
and geosphere and their interactions (see Figure I). In other words, the 
climate is regulated “not only by what happens in the atmosphere but in
“ ®M.J. Coughlan and B.S. Nyenzi, "Climate Trends and Variability," in Climate Change: 
Science, Impacts and Policy, Proceedings o f the Second World Climate Conference, ed. J. Jager and 
H.L. Ferguson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 71.
116rTbid.
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Figure I. Earth’s Atmosphere and Its Temperature Structure
Source- Karl K Turekian, Global Environmental Change: Past, Present and Future. 
46.
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the oceans, the cryosphere (glaciers, sea ice and continental ice caps), the 
geosphere (the earth’s solid surface) and the biosphere (living organisms
in the oceans and on land).”^^  ^ The climate is a non-linear system and the 
different components of the earth’s climate interact on many different time- 
scales within complex and chaotic terms. Therefore, in order to be able to 
make assessments and predictions about the climatic fluctuations, it is
essential to identify and comprehend the various components of the
1 18climate system.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency’s definition 
“climate change” is any change in climate as a result of natural variability 
or as a result of human activity. In similar terms, the FCCC defines 
climate change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed 
over comparable time periods. The study of climate change retains a 
crucial place in atmospheric science due to the fact that alterations in 
global climate affect all kinds of natural processes in the biosphere and 
interfere with lives and most important activities of human beings.
 ^ '^^Information Unit on Climate Change, "An Introduction to the Climate System," Fact 
Sheet 3, 7; available from gopher://ecosys.drdr.virginia.edU/0/library/atm/climate/
“ ®John F.B. Mitchell and Zeng Qiugcun, "Climate Change Prediction," in J. Jager and H.L. 
Ferguson, 59.
 ^ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 1.
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While addressing the climate change issue, it is essential to consider 
the fact that climate change has obviously wider and more extensive 
dimensions than the changes inflicted by human activities on the system. 
Global environmental change is a complex and inevitable process which is 
inherent to our interrelated planetary system. Our planet has undergone 
radical changes and it is changing continuously. Karl Turekian states as 
follows:
Mutation is the essence of the history of the planet. Larger changes in 
atmospheric chemistry have occurred in the past than are seen at 
present....The temperature of Earth has ranged widely on the million- 
year timescale as well as timescales of centuries or even less. Changes 
on Earth have been occurring throughout its existence - most of them 
more dramatic than any we observe today. We especially care about the 
recent changes, whether natural- or human-accelerated, since we 
perceive these changes to affect our lives— Our understanding of the 
past will help put these perceptions in a more environmentally sound
framework.
Nevertheless some degree of global mutation is intrinsic to the 
system itself, within the recent decade it has become apparent that human 
beings disturb the fragile balance of the climate system to a certain extent; 
man-made activities accelerate global climate change and aggrandize the 
scope of the problem to levels that can influence the quality of life for 
future generations. Especially renewed scientific assessments and 
evidence on the climate system and climate change enable scientists to
^^°Karl K. Turekian, 2.
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provide more concrete models and simulations compared to the past.^ ^^  
For instance, according to the IPPC’s (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) most recent scientific assessment report which was adopted in 
December, 1995, there is a discernible human influence on climate, and in 
the report it is stated that:
...human activities, including the burning of fossil fuels, land-use 
change and agriculture, are increasing the atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases (which tend to warm the atmosphere) and, in 
some regions, aerosols (microscopic airborne particles, which tend to 
cool the atmosphere). These changes in greenhouse gases and 
aerosols, taken together, are projected to change regional and global
climate and climate-related parameters such as temperature,
122precipitation, soil moisture and sea level.
Climate change is closely related to the enhanced greenhouse effect, 
therefore, it is important to know how this process takes place and what 
its consequences are. Our planet radiates energy into the outer space at 
the same rate at which it absorbs energy form the sun. The energy coming 
from the sun is in the form of short-wavelength radiation and the earth 
sends this energy back out into the space in the form of long-wavelength, 
or infra-red radiation. The greenhouse effect is a natural process which
order to comprehend the atmosphere as a system and how this system works, and to 
be able to predict the way this system will change if one or another of the controlling parameters 
changes, scientists resort to computer models. These computer-generated models are called General 
Circulation Models or GMCs which attempt to simulate the climate system and they are based on 
fundamental physical principles. Scientists began simulations in the 1960s with simple models, and 
today more sophisticated simulations that include and model all the components of the climate 
system are being used.
^^^IPCC, IPCC  Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical Information Relevant to 
Interpreting Article 2 o f the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1993, 1;
av ailab le  from  h ttp :/ / w w w .p reen .o rg / ip cc95 .h tm
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implies depositing the infra-red radiation emitted upwards by the earth’s 
surface and this process is vital for making earth a warm and habitable 
place for the living beings. As a result of the greenhouse effect, the 
incoming solar radiation is allowed to pass through the earth’s 
atmosphere, however, much of the outgoing infra-red radiation is 
prevented from escaping into the outer space since it is strongly absorbed 
by the water and carbon dioxide molecules in the air. In addition to 
carbon dioxide and water vapour, ozone, methane and nitrous oxide are 
the other natural greenhouse gases that are responsible for absorbing the 
radiation which would escape from the earth otherwise. Trapping the 
infrared radiation keeps the earth’s average surface temperature 33°C 
warmer than it would have been otherwise; therefore, it is apparent that 
without the process of the greenhouse effect life on the earth would be 
impossible (see Figure II). However, although the natural greenhouse 
effect is beneficial and vital for the continuation of life on our planet, a 
problem emerges when the balance of the chemical composition of the 
a t m o s p h e r e i s  upset by human activities. There are various factors 
which are influential in climatic fluctuations, however, to a great extent 
the composition of the atmosphere determines the earth’s climate.
total mass of the atmosphere is 5.3x10^' g. The atmosphere of our planet is inclusive 
of mainly nitrogen (78%) and oxygen (21%). Other important atmospheric constituents are carbon 
dioxide and ozone, and they influence the physical state of the atmosphere and biological processes. 
The atmosphere also consists water vapor which is generally found in concentrations of 0.1-1.0%- 
the mean water vapor content is about 2.4 g cm .^ Atmospheric density and pressure decrease with 
altitude. Pressure decreases to half its surface value at a height of about 5 km. M.l. Budyko, 22-23.
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Figrure II. The Illustration of The Greenhouse Effect
Source- Jo h n  H oughton , “ Scientific A ssessm ent of Clim ate Change; Sum m ary of the  
IPCC W orking Group I R ep ort,” in Climate Change: Science, Impacts and Policy, 
Proceedings o f the Second World Climate Conference, 25 .
8 5
Although the global climate is a very complicated system, alterations 
in the composition of the atmosphere and surface of the earth can be 
detected. The ground-based observations and satellites are useful means 
for this end. The buildup of greenhouse gases such as carbondioxide^ "^  ^
(see Figures III and IV), nitrous oxide, methane and chlorofluorocarbons
has been recorded as dramatic within the last decade.
Excessive increments in the concentrations of these greenhouse 
gases can bring some negative and dangerous repercussions for our 
planet. It is stated by the scientists that when these gases excessively 
increase within the atmosphere they agitate the ecological balance through
of the most dramatic alterations in the composition of the atmosphere has been the 
increase in carbon dioxide. It is a colorless gas and it turns to dry ice at a temperature of -78“C. 
Carbon dioxide is exchanged continually between the atmosphere and hydrosphere by means of 
molecular and turbulent diffusion. The measurements of the carbon dioxide concentrations have 
been systematically made since 1957. It was first commenced at Mauna Loa and then accomplished 
in a number of different locations ranging from Antarctica to the equator. Scientific research 
(measuring gases in ice cores) indicates that the increase in carbon dioxide concentrations started in 
about 1860. Before 1860 there was no systematic data collection enough for a global record. It is 
predicted that if the current trends continue, by 2100 the carbon dioxide level will be twice of what it 
was before the modem industrial age. See Karl K. Turekian, Global Environmental Change: Past 
Present and Future, 123-124 and Budyko, 29-30.
^^®Caгbon Dioxide is currently responsible for approximately half to two-thirds of human 
contribution to global warming. Since the pre-industrial era, atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide have risen almost 25-30%. Society's basic energy sources continue to produce carbondioxide; 
combustion of fossil fuels increase the carbon dioxide concentrations. Deforestation is another reason 
for this increase. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, though it has a much 
lower atmospheric concentration. Methane concentrations have doubled since the beginning of the 
industrial era. Methane sources include rice paddies, cows, termites, natural gas leakage, biomass 
burning and wetlands. Nitrous oxide has risen by 15% and is increasing at a rate of 0.25 percent per 
year. Although it is a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, its contribution to global 
warming is less due to of its lower atmospheric concentration. Finally, Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are 
man-made gases that were invented during the 1930s. They are destructive against the stratospheric 
ozone layer and have a contribution to the problem of global warming. Each chlorofluorocarbon 
molecule has a warming effect which is several thousand times that of a carbondioxide molecule.
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F i^ re  III. The Variation of Carbon Dioxide at Manna Loa, Hawaii
(D ata Collected by C.D. K eeling and N ational O ceanic and A tm ospheric  
A dm inistration, Environm ental R esearch  L ab oratories).
Source: Karl K. Turekian, GlobaJ Environmental Change: Past, Present and Future, 
45 .
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Figure IV. Diagram of C02 Circulation
Source: M.I. Budyko, The Earth’s Climate: Past, Present and Future, 2 2 4
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a positive radiative forcing^^® or heat-trapping of energy. Thus, the 
increments in such greenhouse gas concentrations threaten to upset the 
climate system and confront humans with the problem of global warming 
inferring the increase in the temperature of earth’s atmosphere and the 
temperature on the surface of earth (see Figure
Some of the anthropogenic activities that increase the greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere are fossil fuel combustion; 
deforestation; desertification and agriculture; use of CFCs in air 
conditioning, solvents and insulation; and coal mining. These processes 
are considered to be upsetting the chemical composition of the earth’s 
atmosphere.
It should also be emphasized that it is crucial to distinguish between 
climate change and global warming since the two are not clearly the same 
thing. Global warming is one of the symptoms of climate change; all major 
climate models indicate that the clearest and the most significant symptom 
of climate change will be global warming. But, it is not the only S5unptom
Nevertheless, CFCs also have a cooling effect. They make a cooling effect when they deplete and 
destroy the atmospheric ozone. IPCC, Swnmsiy for Policymakers: The Science o f Climate Change, 
IPCC  Working Group f, 1995, 1-2, and Environmental Protection Agency, "Climate Change, 
Discussion Series," 1; available from http;//www.epa.gov/globalwarming/subl/greenglobal.htm
^^®Increases in long-lived greenhouse gas concentrations cause a radiative forcing 
equivalent to about 2.45 watts per square meter(Wm ). IPCC, Summary for Policymakers: The 
Science o f Climate Change, IPCC  Working Group I, 1; http://www.preen.org/ipcc95.htm
^^^"Changes in greenhouse gas concentrations have been associated with dramatic climatic 
changes in the past. The last time greenhouse gas levels changed as much as they are changing now 
was when the earth emerged from the most recent ice-age. There is strong evidence that greenhouse 
gases played a significant role in that post- ice-age warming." lUCC, "An Introduction to Man-Made 
Climate Change," Fact Sheet 1, 4.
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Figure V. The Change of Global Temperature
(Compiled by NOAA and NASA in vestigators)
90
since other important effects such as sea-level rise, changes in rainfall and 
precipitation or alterations in soil moisture are constituting the other 
components of the problem. Natural processes and human activities bring 
forth some alterations within the way the atmosphere absorbs and emits 
energy. The consequence of this is a disease which is called climate 
change, however, it is essential not to confuse the sjrmptoms - one and the 
most significant of which is global warming - with the disease.
Another important aspect of the climate change issue is the fact that 
present greenhouse gas emissions will remain in the atmosphere and 
continue to have impacts on the climate system for many decades to come. 
Today’s greenhouse gas emissions will influence future greenhouse gas 
concentrations in different ways depending on their particular life-cycles. 
Each greenhouse gas has a particular life-cycle of its own and life-cycles of 
these gases (except from CFCs) are rather complex to be characterized by a 
simple decay process. Carbon dioxide has an approximate life-cycle of 50- 
200 years, whereas nitrous oxide has 150 and methane has 10 years
lifetimes.
^^^Information Unit on Climate Change, "Why Climate Change and Global Warming Are 
Not The Same Thing?," Fact Sheet 9,16.
^^^Infoгmation Unit on Climate Change, "Measuring the Global Warming Potential of 
Greenhouse Gases," Fact Sheet 7,13.
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2. Scientific Uncertainty and Am bi^ity Regarding^ Global Climate 
Changée:
Climate change is a very complex issue on which an extensive process 
of research, wide-scope analysis and refinement of tentative findings have 
been going on. Scientific knowledge evolves every day and much progress 
is achieved in attempts to formulate more complete assessments of climate 
change.
However, for the time being it is a fact that a considerable scientific 
uncertainty exists on the issue of climate change. There are certain 
ambiguities that remain as obstacles against the formation of a more 
influential regime on climate change. In effect, there is even some amount 
of scepticism - within few scientific circles - concentrating on the validity 
and certainty of the increase in average global temperature and - even if 
there is a consistent increase - whether this could be attributed to 
anthropogenic influences or "whether it is completely natural therefore 
beyond human control. In addition to these sceptical views, even those 
scientists who constitute the majority and are convinced that the global 
has been rising consistently are unable to make absolute
Almost all climate models indicate that the earth's average temperature should have 
increased approximately between 0.4-l”C since pre-industrial times. This increase is too large to 
ignore or be dismissed as a consequence of measurement errors. Information Unit on Climate 
Change, "How Predictable Is Climate?" Fact Sheet 8,15.
available from gopher://ecosys.drdr.virginia.edU/0/librar/atm/climate/
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predictions as regards the consequences of this increase and they are to a 
certain extent unsure of the future systemic responses.
Even though scientists advance more complicated and sophisticated 
computer models in order to understand and address the problem 
auspiciously, the complexity of the earth’s climate system and the difficulty 
to predict the dynamic interactions between the various spheres of the 
system make it harder to accomplish absolute assessments and 
interpretations. In other words, observations and climatic models 
include a considerable amount of scientific uncertainty with respect to the 
rate of global warming and the impacts of enhanced greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere. In sum, the lack of certainty as regards the predictions 
and estimations are due to the extremely complex nature of the climate 
system and incomplete global climatic models which remain limited to 
explain all interactions among the various components of the system.
However, the nature of the debate has been conveyed - by some 
reporters and policymakers as if the scientists are completely confused 
and doubtful on the issue of climate change and as if all the attempts to
There are five important factors that are influential in climate change. The slower acting 
factors are: 1) the earth's orbital movements around the sun and 2)the expansion and retreat of the 
polar ice caps ; the faster-acting ones are: 3) the atmospheric dust, 4)feedbacks due to water vapour, 
clouds, and snow and 5)the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Variations in the earth's orbital 
movements create very slow climate changes, therefore this factor is unsatisfactory and ineffectual 
to explain the significant warming trend which has been observed for the last 100 years. However, 
dust, water vapor and enhanced greenhouse concentrations bring about rapid impacts and cause 
short-term (century time-scale) temperature changes. Information Unit on Climate Change, "How 
Records From Past Climates Support the Case for Global Warming," Fact Sheet 6, 11-12.
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elucidate the climate change problem are totally ineffectual and
infructuous, although this is not the case.
Recent accounts of the scientific debate on climate frequently 
misrepresent what is being argued about. They suggest that scientists 
are still discussing whether or not the climate is changing in response 
to greenhouse gas emissions, as if there were a simple yes/no answer. 
So if a scientist questions the adequacy of present climate models, or 
fails to find conclusive evidence for global warming in a particular 
data-set, he or she is often reported as claiming that there isn’t really a 
problem. However, in most scientific circles the issue is no longer 
whether or not climate change is a potentially serious problem. 
Rather, it is how the problem will develop, what its effects will be, and 
how these can best be detected.
Multinational and organized efforts have been made to elucidate the 
irresolute and undemonstrable aspects of the climate change issue. In 
order to develop a coordinated scientific assessment of climate change, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was jointly established 
by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Programme, in 1988. The first IPCC report was completed 
and issued in 1990. The report stated that the atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases from preindustrial levels would lead to an increase in 
average global surface temperatures of 1.5 to 4.5 °C in the event that no 
action is taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It concluded that 
such an increase in global temperature would potentially have severe 
impacts on both human beings and natural systems.
^^^Information Unit on Climate Change, "Why Climate Change and Global Warming Are 
Not The Same Thing?", 16.
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The most recent IPCC report was finished in December, 1995. The 
new report states that since the 1990 IPCC Report, considerable progress 
has been accomplished in attempts to distinguish between natural and
anthropogenic impacts on the climate system. More complete
simulations and models indicate that global surface temperature has risen
between 0.3°C and 0.6° C since the late 19“^ century^ "^^  and an increase in
global temperature of about 1 - 3.5° C is projected by the year 2100. 
Global sea level has risen between 10 and 25 centimeters over the past 100 
years and is expected to rise between 15 and 95 centimeters from the
present to 2100.^^®
In other words, although a certain amount of underlying ambiguity 
remains with respect to the climate change issue, since 1990, through 
coordinated scientific research and endeavour - which is accomplished in a 
global scope - progress has been accomplished in the understanding of the 
climate change problem and in distinguishing the natural climatic 
changes from the changes induced by man’s activities. Modelling of 
climate variability and climate forcing by greenhouse gases and aerosols 
are crucial steps in reaching accurate conclusions in the science of climate
I33ip cc, Summary for Policymakers: The Science o f Climate Change, IPC C  Working Group 
1,1995; available from http://www.preen.org/ipcc95.htm
134ibid.
135ip c q  Summary for Policymakers: Scientific-Technical Analyses o f Impacts, Adaptations 
and Mitigation of Climate Change - IPCC  Working Group II, 1995, 2.
136Ibid., 5.
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change. Research advances and improved techniques in this area have
enabled more valid assessments. IPCC’s 1995 report displays the 
developments and attempts in devising more complete computer models 
which are functional in demonstrating the anthropogenic influences on 
climate change:
This progress has been achieved by including effects of sulphate 
aerosols in addition to greenhouse gases, thus leading to more realistic 
estimates of human-induced radiative forcing. These have than been 
used in climate models to provide more complete simulations of the 
human-induced climate-change ‘signal’. In addition, new simulations 
with coupled atmosphere-ocean models have provided important 
information about decade to century time-scale natural internal climate 
variability.
IPCC’s statements concerning the renewed scientific evidence on the 
anthropogenic greenhouse effect is a considerably important step in the 
global climate change problem since it might generate the elaboration of 
the measures taken for the establishment of a regime over the issue and it 
can motivate collaboration between nations for a secure climate in future. 
As regards the temperature risd, IPCC reports that most of the studies 
“have detected a significant change and show that the observed warming 
trend is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin”. The report states that:
World Climate Research Programme, CLIVAR: A  Study o f Climate Variability and 
Predictability, August 1995, and World Climate Research Programme, CLIVAR: A Research 
Programme on Climate Variability and Prediction for the2P' Century, August 1997.
I38ip cc, Summary for Policymakers: The Science o f Climate Change, IPC C  Working Group
I, 3.
139Ibid., 4.
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The atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, inter alia carbon 
dioxide(C02), methane (C04) and nitrous oxide (N02) have grown 
significantly: by about 30%, 145% and 15%, respectively (values for 
1992). These trends can be attributed largely to human activities, 
mostly fossil fuel use, land-use change and agriculture.
In addition to these developments, in April 1993, as a result of the 
Intergovernmental Meeting on the World Climate Programme, “The 
Climate Agenda - International Climate Related Programmes; A Proposal 
for an Integrated Framework” was created. The Climate Agenda supplied 
an integrated structure for the climate-related programmes that were 
supported by numerous agencies and institutions. Its aim was the 
integration of various scopes of climate science and research. An 
integration and coherence of multifarious programmes on climate was 
essential in the sense that it would increase the soundness and quality of 
scientific processes on climate change which basically required an 
interconnected and an interdisciplinary approach. The Climate Agenda 
was soon endorsed by the WMO, UNEP, IOC, UNESCO, FAO and ICSU, and 
today it is guided by the Inter-Agency Committee on the Climate 
Agenda(IACCA). The four major thrusts of the Climate Agenda can be 
summarized as follows: 1) new frontiers in climate science and prediction, 
2) climate services for sustainable development, 3) studies of climate
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impact assessments and response strategies to reduce vulnerability, 4) 
dedicated observations of the climate system.
The “value added” by the Climate Agenda includes a synergistic ability 
to identify and eliminate duplicated efforts, identify and implement 
activities to fill gaps, provide guidance on climate priorities for agency 
programs, and to enhance the quality of all activities by strategically 
targeting goals and actions to meet them, all at the global level. 
Cooperation and commitment by all participants in the Climate Agenda 
will not only strengthen support to all climate science activities, but 
will also provide the policy community with a firm foundation of 
understanding on which to base their decision.
With respect to the developments regarding the IPCC and its 
assessments, it can be opposed that despite the new evidence presented 
within the 1995 IPCC Report, the underlying uncertainty has not been 
eradicated and many unknown aspects still remain within the issue of 
climate change, therefore, it is essential to wait for further developments 
in order to make genuine international commitment. However, it would be 
appropriate to reconsider such sceptical approaches towards the issue 
since confronting uncertainties with inaction and quiescence could br ing 
very high prices to humanity which may become totally impossible to pay 
in future.
Me Bean, "The Climate Agenda: The Role of the WCRP As The Research Thrust," in 
Conference on the World Climate Research Programme: Achievements, Benefits and Challenges, 
Synopses o f Conference Presentations, 26- 28 August 1997,3.
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3. The Projected Impacts of Global Climate Change:
Climate change is expected to bring forth excessive stress, and 
consequent wide-ranging and unprecedented impacts on the ecological and 
socio-economic systems on this planet. Since climate change is expected to 
induce warmer temperatures, higher sea-levels, more intense and frequent 
droughts, storms and floods, various systems such as natural ecological 
systems, socio-economic systems and human health are predicted to 
become sensitive towards such unprecedented and serious consequences 
(see Figures VI and VII); such systems will be in need of adjustments in the
face of anticipated climatic changes.
However, a certain amount of uncertainty and ambiguity in climatic 
models and projections make it difficult to quantify the impacts of climate 
change on any particular system at any particular location. This is due to 
the fact that regional-scale climate projections are uncertain and
limited.
Some of the projected climatic impacts - presented as a result of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s scientific assessments and 
research on climate change - are categorized and summarized in the 
following sections of the chapter.
'^^ I^PCC, Summary For Policymakers: Scientific-Technical Analyses o f Impacts, Adaptations 
and Mitigation o f Climate Change - IPCC  Working Group II, 1995, 2.
143Ibid., 3-4.
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AV -  Avalanche 
ACW -  Cold wave 
CY -  Cyclone 
DR -  Drought 
EQ -  Earthquake 
FL -  Rood 
HW -  Heat wave 
HU -  Hurrcane 
LS -  Landslide 
ST -  Storm 
TS -  Tsunami 
TY -  Typhoon 
UP -  Unusual phenomen 
VO -  Volcano
Fig^ure VI. World-Wide Natural Disasters (Since 1990)
Source: US D isaster A ssistance, A gency for In ternational Development 
D epartm ent of State, W ashington. (J. Ja g e r  and H.L. F ergu son , Climate 
Change: Science, Impacts and Policy, 4 0 1 .)
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SIGNIFICANT CLIMATE ANOMALIES AND EPISODIC EVENTS DURING 1994
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Figure VII. Significant Climate Anomalies and Episodic Events During 
1994
Source: World Meteorological Organization, W MO Annual Report 1994, 10.
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3.a. Human Health:
Widely ranging adverse impacts are projected. Rising temperatures, 
frequent floods, storms and droughts are predicted to increase mortality
rates and the risk of illnesses. High temperatures and extreme weather 
conditions are expected to bring forth higher death rates (predominantly 
cardiorespiratory), injury, psychological disorders and exposure to 
contaminated water supplies. Since high temperatures exert excessive 
stress on the human circulatory system, allergic and respiratory diseases 
are expected to increase in future. As a result of global warming malaria 
(see Fig VIII), deng^ue, yellow fever and other infectious, vector-borne 
diseases can spread and become major threats especially in the tropical 
countries. Moreover, as a result of food and water shortages, growing 
malnutrition will weaken immunity towards various diseases. Increases in 
droughts and floods will most probably cause difficulties regarding the 
deliverance of health and sanitation services.
3.b. Terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems:
Natural ecosystems will be exposed to additional stress and these 
systems will be degraded as a result of responses to changes in climate.
, 10.
Wolf H. Weihe and Raf Mertens, "Human Well-being, Disease and Climate," in J. 
Jager and H.L. Ferguson, 345-358.
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Figure VIII. Possibility of Malaxial Occurrence 
(based on temperature, rainfall and elevation)
Source: J .  Jag er and H.L. Ferguson, Climate Change: Science, Impacts and Policy, 
354.
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The composition and geographic distribution of such ecosystems will be 
altered and some reductions will be observed in biological diversity and in 
the goods and services these systems provide.
First of all, as regards the oceans climate change is expected to 
bring forth sea-level rise in between 15-95 cm. within the following
hundred years .Temperature  rise could lead to increase in sea-level in 
two ways: through termal expansion of ocean water and through the
shrinking of ice caps and mountain glaciers. Within the next hundred 
years, one third to one half of the present mountain glaciers may melt and 
disappear. In addition to some amount of increase in sea-level, climate 
change can lead to changes in ocean circulation, vertical mixing, wave 
climate'and reductions in sea-ice cover. The structure and functions of 
marine ecosystems will be influenced and this in turn will bring significant
149feedbacks to the climate system.
As a result of climate change and rising sea-level, coastal systems will 
be under great risk. Some of these projected risks are: the erosion of 
shores, increased salinity of estuaries and freshwater aquifers, altered tidal 
ranges in rivers and bays, increased coastal flooding, etc. The damage
146
23-24.
IPCC, Summary Report For Policymakers, 5.
‘^^ ' I^bid., 2.
'^^^Information Unit on Climate Change, "Climate Change and Sea-level," Fact Sheet 102,
^^^IPCC, Summary Report For Policymakers, (3-7.
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inflicted by storms, floods and tropical cyclones may become more severe. 
It is predicted that the areas with high erosion rates and with very low 
elevations will be in great danger. For instance, some parts of the 
Maldives, Egypt and Bangladesh will be completely inundated and 
uninhabitable. These changes will also have negative impacts on tourism, 
fisheries, biodiversity and freshwater supplies.
Climate change will also have adverse effects on forests since it will 
influence their growth and regeneration capacity. Forest resources that 
are under great risk are the ones in regions that are exposed to increased 
moisture stress like in the dry continental interiors. Considerable shifts in 
the main forest zones can be observed and such changes in forest systems 
can bring serious consequences on human beings and animals. It is 
projected that entire forest types may disappear and new assemblages of 
species - new ecosystems - could emerge.
Climate change will also bring additional stress on mountain regions 
since a warmer climate will influence hydrologic systems, soil stability, 
distribution of vegetation and related socio-economic systems. For 
instance, Europe’s mountain regions are especially prone to negative 
impacts as result of climate change. Extinction of some species living on 
mountain tops and disruption of mountain resources such as food and fuel 
are probable consequences of climate change. Severe rock falls - as a result
150Ibid., 7.
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of the melting of permafrost - and avalanches will multiply with warmer 
temperatures. Recreational industries may be disrupted and mountain 
economies may be undermined.
Desertification may become an important and irreversible problem if 
climate becomes hotter, drier and the soil becomes degraded as a result of 
erosion. “Deserts are likely to become more extreme - in that, with few 
exceptions, they are projected to become hotter but not significantly 
w e t t e r . M o r e o v e r ,  inland aquatic ecosystems, lakes, streams and 
wetlands, will be exposed to the effects of climatic changes through altered 
water temperatures, flow regimes and water levels.
3.C. Hydrology and Water Resources:
It is predicted that relatively small alterations in the climate system 
can create important and serious water resource problems. Changes in 
climate will obviously have impacts on water resources, water quality, the 
hydrological cycle of water bodies and water supply systems and 
requirements. Climate change will produce intensification in global 
hydrological cycle and changes “in the volume and distribution of water
151
152
Ibid., 6. 
Ibid.
Lins, I.A. Shiklomanov and E.Z. Stakhiv, "Impacts on Hydrology and Water 
Resources," in J. Jager and H. L. Ferguson, 87.
154Ibid.
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will affect both ground and surface water supply for domestic and 
industrial uses, irrigation, hydropower génération, navigation, instream 
ecosystems and water-based r e c r e a t i o n . T h e  areas which remain under 
greater risks are especially arid and semi-arid regions, and the regions 
where pollution and overpopulation has already produced water scarcity. 
However, for the present moment the capacity to assess specific regional 
effects and to make regional forecasts is very limited since “regional 
details of greenhouse gas-induced hydrometeorological change are
virtually unknown.” ®^®
Acceleration of the évapotranspiration cycle and changes in rain 
patterns can be observed. This could cause an increase in rain, however, 
as a result of rapid evaporation soil may become drier in regions which 
have already confronted with water scarcity, reductions in clean and fresh 
water and droughts. In high-latitude regions increased runoff as a result 
of increased precipitation can be observed, while runoff may decrease at 
lower latitudes due to rapid évapotranspiration and decreased 
precipitation. All these will bring alterations in the quantity and quality of 
water supplies and resources.
^^ I^PCC, Summary Report For Policymakers, 7.
Lins, "Impacts on Hydrology and Water Resources", 95.
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3.d. Agfriculture:
As regards the impacts of climate change on agriculture, it is 
predicted that crop yields and productivity will range from one region to 
another. In some areas an increase in productivity can be observed while 
in other areas reductions can be experienced. Regions with variable 
moisture supply will become drier, however, moist regions are expected to 
become more moisture saturated - due to frequent and intense tropical
storms.
Due to summer dryness and droughts mid-latitude crop yields will 
decrease by 10-30% and climate change is expected bring a rise in the
average cost of world agricultural production approximately by 10%.
Moderate to severe drying of soil can be experienced and frequent 
droughts may emerge as problems threatening world’s developing and less 
developed regions. Especially, in tropical and sub-tropical regions - where 
world’s poorest population lives - considerable climate changes will take 
place and such areas will be more vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change through spreading food scarcities and famines. Hunger can 
become a more severe problem in such regions of the world.
A. Izrael, "Climate Change Impact Studies: The IPCC Working Group II Report," in J. 
Jager and H.L. Ferguson, 83.
158Ibid.
l5^Ibid.
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3.e. Human Settlements and Infrastructure:
Various climate change impacts are expected on human settlements, 
the energy, tourism, transport and industry sectors. As a result of sea- 
level rise some coastal populations will be confronted with the threat of 
flooding and some regions will be more vulnerable towards erosional land- 
loss. Small island nations will obviously be under greater risk. “Recurring 
problems such as floods (e.g. Bangladesh), drought (e.g. Africa), severe 
storms (e.g. Caribbean Sea), land subsidence and exhaustion of fuel wood 
supply demonstrate the present vulnerability of human society to weather
variability and resoprce depletion.
In addition to flooding, some other human settlements can be exposed 
to droughts which infer ultimate danger to human life.
When the sensitivity of the energy, industry and transportation 
sectors are considered, it is low compared to that of agriculture or natural 
ecosystems. Adaptation and replacement processes are easier if the
changes are not very sudden and rapid.
Hashimoto and S.Nishioka, "Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Human 
Settlements; the Energy, Transport and Industrial Sectors; Human Health and Air Quality," in J.Jager 
and H.L. Ferguson, 109.
^^ I^PCC, Summary for Policymakers: Scientific-Technical Analyses o f Impacts  ^Adaptations 
and Mitigation o f Climate Change - IPCC  Working Group If 9.
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Chapter V. The International Politics of Climate Change
The political evolution of the global climate change issue has followed 
a prolonged and complex path up to the present (see Chart I). In effect, the 
climate change problem did not bring forth political considerations and did 
not emanate as a serious political issue until the last decade.
Today, an international regime exists over the climate change issue. 
In order to address the climate change threat, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was accomplished in 1992, in 
Rio de Janeiro. The Convention established a goal for the developed 
countries to decrease their greenhouse gas emissions to the level of 1990 
by the year 2000. However, this was not a satisfactory measure to address 
the climate threat; hence, recently the world states have attempted once 
again to restructure the existing framework convention and to establish a 
protocol for global climate change. Consequently, the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Convention on Climate Change was adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties on December 11, 1997. The Protocol stipulates 
that the Annex I Parties to the FCCC will reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels between the years 2008-2012. 
Nevertheless, even the recent commitments and legal measures established 
by the Kyoto Protocol appear to remain insufficient when the gruesome 
repercussions of global climate change are considered. Due to this fact.
no
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even though the Protocol has been regarded as a corner-stone in the 
historical developments of climate change politics, many environmentalists 
and environmental organizations have also exposed it to a lot of criticisms.
Therefore, the process for creating an utterly effective and 
satisfactory regime on climate change will be continuing in future. 
Struggles to lessen the costs of cooperation for the world states have been 
continuing, and the road towards a final consensus on stringent and 
quantified measures with respect to greenhouse gas emissions seems to be 
troublesome. However, it appears that with the contributions of the 
international organizations, scientific communities and non-governmental 
organizations to the climate change threat, the existing conflicts and 
dissension among the world states can be more easily transcended and a 
genuine cooperation might be accomplished to protect the global 
atmosphere in future.
This chapter presents a historical overview of the legal and political 
developments concerning the climate change problem. The chapter starts 
with a general outlook to the earlier progress of scientific concern and 
assessments regarding global warming and climate change. Then, it 
continues with the information pertaining to international political 
behaviours and activities in terms of defining and combating the climate 
change threat. In other words, the chapter will try to explore in what ways 
and to what extent the international community responded to this global 
problem. The political processes and international policy formulations.
1 1 2
within the time period of 1979-1997, will be introduced in this chapter in 
order to reveal and elaborate upon the dynamics of climate change politics.
1. How Scientific Inquiry Developed and Evoked International Political 
Concern Regarding Climate Change:
Global environmental change is an integral part of life on the earth: 
“Change through time is a basic attribute of the planet. The earth has been 
undergoing constant change since it formed from a cloud of cosmic debris 
some 4.6 billion years ago.”^^  ^ Scientists have always been concerned 
about understanding the basic features of this change; the contributions of 
human activities to global environmental change and its possible future 
consequences.
Over the past hundred years, “scientific concern over the possibility 
that human activities could change the global climate has been expressed 
at various intervals.” The French scientist Baron Jean Baptiste Joseph 
Fourier was the first one who described the phenomenon and introduced 
the concept which is now referred to as the greenhouse effect. In 1827, 
Fourier hypothesized that the sun’s heat was absorbed in the earth’s
^^ J^ohn J. Hidore, Global Environmental Change: Its Nature and Impact (New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall, 1996), 1.
Jager and Tim O'Riordan, "The History of Climate Change Science and Politics," in 
Politics o f Climate Change: A European Perspective, eds. Tim O'Riordan and Jill Jager (London; 
Routledge, 1996), 12.
^ "^^Henning Rodhe, Robert Charlson and Elisabeth Crawford, "Svante Arrhenius and the 
Greenhouse Effect," in AmbioXXVl (February 1997): 2-5.
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atmosphere and this depositing of the heat resulted in a greenhouse effect.^  
Joseph Fourier used the analogy of a glass bowl to explain the phenomenon 
in terms of letting through the sunlight however withholding the infrared 
radiation from the ground. Pouillet, Tyndall and Langley were the 
scientists who further studied, explored and elaborated on Fourier’s work 
on the earth’s temperature.
However, it was Svante Arrhenius^®® who achieved a remarkable 
success in explaining the basic features of the processes related with the 
greenhouse effect. In 1896, Svante Arrhenius published his prominent 
paper titled “On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air Upon the 
Temperature of the G r o u n d . A r r h e n i u s  attempted to quantify the effect 
of carbon dioxide concentrations on the temperature of the earth’s surface, 
and he proposed that increase in carbon dioxide concentrations due to 
increments in the use of coal would bring about a gradual rise in global 
temperatures. Today, Arrhenius’s contributions to the understanding of 
physical processes related with the earth’s temperature are considered 
invaluable among the scientific communities. “In the light of the current
^^ I^bid.,2.
^^^Svante Arrhenius (1859-1927) was a pioneer scientist in physical chemistry. Arrhenius 
was Swedish and he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1903.
^^ ’^ Elisabeth Crawford, "Arrhenius' 1896 Model of the Greenhouse Effect in Context," in 
AmbioXXVl (February 1997): 6.
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concern about human-induced climate change, Arrhenius’ paper must be 
considered as a true landmark in the history of the geosciences.”
In 1938, Callender, a British scientist, claimed that the increments in 
carbon dioxide concentrations as a result of man’s economic and industrial 
activities would consequently culminate in global warming. Although 
Callender’s study had some drawbacks and limitations, he obtained 
important results and made considerable contributions since he was ahead 
of the science of his time.^ ®® The scientific concerns and discussions on 
climate change therefore did not subside and continued their existence and 
reappearance in the late 1950s and mid-1960s. The International 
Geophysical Year of 1957-1958 was very influential in initiating research 
and motivating further scientific assessments in connection with 
meteorology and the global climate. It was the first international scientific 
programme; it promoted the progress of further scientific investigation and 
initiated the development of global circulation models. In addition to 
this, in 1958 observations regarding the COg concentrations within the 
atmosphere were initiated by the American scientist Keeling in Mauna Loa 
(for details see Chapter IV) and a twenty-year observation made it clear that
^®®Henning Rodhe and Robert Charlson, "Editor's Note," in Am bioXXVl (February 1997): 1.
Budyko, The Earth's Climate: Past and Future, 13.
'^ °^See Tony Brenton, The Greening of Machiaveiii: The Evoiution o f Internationai 
Environmentai Poiitics, 163-164; and Jill Jager and Tim O'Riordan, "The History of Climate Change 
Science and Politics", 12-14.
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COg concentrations had been continuously increasing. By the end of the 
1970s improvements in general circulation models enabled scientists to 
make estimates from the doubling of the COg concentrations since the pre­
industrial era.
Consequently, the debate on climate change and its impacts on the 
global ecosystem gathered momentum in connection with the increasing 
international scientific and political concerns during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. However, the issue was incorporated into the global political 
agenda during the mid-1980s - after a sequence of international meetings 
and conferences.
2. Reactions of the International Community to Climate Change and 
Related Political Processes:
2. a. Incipient Responses and International Conferences:
The first important step to consider and explore the global climate 
change issue within an international scope was taken in 1979. This initial 
response was organized and coordinated by the two major international 
institutions of the United Nations system. The First World Climate 
Conference was held between 12-23 February 1979 in Geneva, and it was 
convened by the joint forces of United Nations Environment Programme 
and World Meteorological Organization, and some other international
1 7 K .Jill Jager and Tim O'Riordan, 12.
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b o d i e s . T h e  conference included scientists from all over the world and 
from widely different disciplines. The conference constituted an 
international arena to discuss and analyze the climate change problem for 
the first time.
The participants of the First World Climate Conference mainly 
dwelled on the impacts of global climate change on human activities. The 
scientists from various disciplines embarked upon the issues regarding the 
climate variability, climate data and effects of climate change on man’s life 
and actions. The conference was an attempt to call for an international 
effort to make research on climate change and to take some necessary 
precautions. In 1979, the assessments and information about global 
climate change were relatively less concrete and various uncertainties 
emerged as impediments against a more lucid apprehension of the problem. 
Consequently, many of the participants of the Climate Conference were 
dubious about the dimensions of the problem.
As a result of this international event, the Declaration of the First 
World Climate Conference was accomplished. The Declaration symbolized
’^^ See "Declaration of the World Climate Conference," repr. in Environmental Policy and 
Law 6 Gune 1980); 103-104; WMO, World Climate Conference: Extended Summaries of Papers 
Presented at the Conference, Geneva, February 1979; and WMO, Proceedings o f the World Climate 
Conference {Geneva, 1979).
'^ S^ee Information Unit on Climate Change, The First World Climate Conference," Fact 
Sheet 213,64-65; available from gopher://ecosys.drdr.virginia.edU/o/library/atm/climate/
103-104.
^"Declaration of the World Climate Conference," repr. in Environmental Policy and Law 6,
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a first step towards an international perception of the global climate 
change problem as a significant issue. More or less, it laid down the 
ground from which it would be easier to explore and research on the 
implications of climate change in connection with human life, economic 
activities and various ecosystems.
WMO, which was also a sponsor of the First World Climate 
Conference, is an organization within the United Nations system which is 
responsible for the world-wide coordination of meteorological activities and 
cooperation essential to monitor and forecast climatic changes. Its 
headquarters are in Geneva and the WMO functions through six technical 
commissions in exclusively scientific research. In addition to this, it has 
six regional meteorological associations. Since its establishment WMO has 
performed a key role in the climate change issue. It facilitates cooperation, 
and promotes research on climate change and its possible impacts (see 
Chart II).
Another important consequence of the conference was the 
establishment of the World Climate Programme under the combined forces 
and responsibilities of the World Meteorological Organization, the United 
Nations Environment Programme and the International Council of
Information Unit on Climate Change, "How UNEP and WMO Are Responding to 
Climate Change?," Fact Sheet 206,53; Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the 
Environment (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992), 61; and Marvin S. Soroos, The Endangered 
Atmosphere: Preserving A Global Commons, 188.
'^^ l^UCC, "How UNEP and WMO Are Responding to Climate Change?", 53; available from
gopher://ecosys.drdr.virginia.edU/0/library/atm/clirnate/
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Scientific Unions. Since 1979, the WCP has been functioning as a 
significant research programme with the aim of providing a better 
understanding of climate change and its impacts. Especially, the World 
Climate Research Programme is a key component of the WCP, which has 
provided the basic research framework for global research coordination 
regarding both natural and human-induced climate change.
Following the First World Climate Conference, a joint meeting was 
held in 1980, in Villach, Austria. The meeting included the major 
international institutions concerned with the climate change issue, namely 
the United Nations Environment Programme, International Council of 
Scientific Unions (ICSU) and World Meteorological Organization.
However, the issue of climate change began to attract more attention 
during the mid-1980s, and political processes accelerated for the sake of 
defining and encountering the problem in 1985. During 9-15 October 
1985, another conference was convened by the UNEP, WMO and ICSU in 
Villach which brought the scientific community together. Scientists from 
29 different countries participated in this international conference to 
evaluate and discuss the climate change problem in connection with the
global increases in carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases. 178
^^^WCRP, Conference On The World Climate Research Programme: Achievements, Benefits 
and Challenges, Synopses of Conference Presentations, 26-28 August, 1997; and WCRP, World Climate 
Research Programme: Conference on The World Climate Research Programme, 1997.
'^^®"The Proceedings of the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of 
Carbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts" was the 
report obtained from this Conference. See, WMO, Report o f the international Conference on the
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The conference emphasized the developing scientific understanding 
and consensus on climate change and its impacts for present and future 
generations. During the conference anthropogenic interference, increase 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and their influence on the global 
climate were discussed and assessed. The overall scientific assessments 
provided the policy-makers and public with general and valuable 
formulations for action, nevertheless, the conference still did not bring 
about concrete legal proposals and could not generate public attention. 
However, the Villach Conference was a significant step in the sense that it 
evoked sincere considerations concerning global climate change and
encouraged the accomplishment of arrangements to decrease greenhouse
180gas emissions.
As a follow-up to the Villach Conference, two workshops were held in 
1987. The first workshop took place from 28 September- 2 October , in
Assessment o f the Role o f Carbon Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and 
Associated Impacts, Pub. No. 661 (Geneva, 1986). Morisette and Plantinga note that the report was 
important due to the fact that it directly addressed the role the government policies can play in 
mitigating global warming. Peter M. Morrisette and Andrew J. Plantinga, ''Global Warming: A Policy 
Review," Policy Studies Journal\9 (Spring 1991): 164.
 ^^ ^Information Unit on Climate Change, "The 1985 Villach Conference and Its Follow-up 
Workshops," Fact Sheet 214, 65.
^^^The group of scientists who participated in the conference included mostly the Anglo 
Saxon and Scandinavian researchers who held the belief that climate change was an urgent issue 
requiring sound formulations and international policies. They were actively involved in 
environmental protection and advocacy; independent and assertive in providing their opinions to 
policy-makers of various governments. See Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, "Scientific Uncertainty and 
Power Politics: The Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Role of Scientific Advice," in 
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on
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Villach, and the second one took place during 9-13 November in Bellagio, 
Italy. All these workshops again symbolized the primary efforts to 
understand and define the problem of climate change thoroughly while 
they also signified the initial attempts to formulate policies that would 
address the issue auspiciously.
The World Commission on Environment and Development which was 
established in 1983 by the United Nations General Assembly’s initiative 
also played an important role to attract the international attention to the 
problem of climate change. The head of the commission was Gro Harlem 
Brundtland and the report which was prepared and issued by the group 
was Our Common Future - generally known as the Brundtland Report.
This prominent report emphasized the ecological problems 
encountering the international community, and it reminded the urgent 
need for coordinating international responses to address these issues 
properly. It is a significant fact that the Brundtland Report paid special 
attention to the climate change issue. The report summoned global 
scientific research on this problem and called for an auspicious 
international response to global climate change.
Environment and Development, eds. Bertram I. Spector, Gunnar Sjostedt and I. William Zartman 
(London; Grahama & Trotman, 1994), 185.
^®^World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987).
182rTbid.
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In the summer of 1988, another conference, namely The Changing 
Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, was held in Toronto, Canada. 
The conference was attended by over 300 scientists and policy-makers from 
48 states and organizations. Moreover, there were numerous 
representatives from international agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations and corporations. The conference was mainly sponsored by 
the Canadian government and the WMO and UNEP were the co-sponsors; 
they assisted the organization of the conference and they gave financial 
support to the conference.
The Toronto Conference was a remarkable step in the way towards 
the adoption of coordinated policies and international procedures with 
respect to the treatment of the climate change problem. The conference 
attracted a great amount of attention from the media and public as well, 
particularly due to the fact that the summer season of 1988 was undeniably 
and extremely hot compared to the previous years. When referring to this 
point Stephen H. Schneider says that “nature did more for the notoriety of 
global warming in fifteen weeks than any of us or the sympathetic 
journalists and politicians were able to do in the previous fifteen years.” 
The hot summer days of 1988 became a good reminder of the climate 
problem and provided a concrete indication to the occurrence of global
^^^Stephen H. Schneider, Global Warming: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century? 
(Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press, 1990), 203.
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warming which essentially turned to be a point of concern especially for the 
public in the US.
The conference was a significant event in the sense that it conveyed 
messages in an international scope and called for global political initiatives 
for the climate change problem. As a result of this conference, the issue of 
climate change was entirely carried to the stage of the international 
political agenda. The conference signified a more extensive venture to 
address climate change together with the ozone depletion problem and 
transboundary atmospheric pollution.
The Conference Statement^®® called for an Action Plan for the 
Protection of the Atmosphere and it proposed the establishment of a World 
Atmosphere Fund. During the conference, initiation of a comprehensive 
global framework convention for the purpose of protecting the global 
atmosphere by 1992 was approved by the participants. Most significantly, 
the conference recommended that the carbon dioxide emissions should be 
reduced 20% from 1988 levels by the year 2005.
In 1988, another important development, which can be considered 
among the landmark events of climate politics, took place: the United 
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution on global climate change.
^ '^^"Global Warming Becomes An International Political Issue/' Nature 336 (November 
1988): 194.
^®^ See WMO  ^ "Conference Statement, in Conference Proceedings of the Changing 
Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, no.710, Geneva: WMO, 1988.
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This resolution was significant in the sense that it recognized climate as 
the “common concern of mankind.” This development indicated that 
political significance of the climate change issue was notably growing 
within the international arena.
As a follow-up to the Toronto Conference, Ottawa hosted the 1989 
Ottawa Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts inclusive of 80 legal experts 
and policy makers concerned with the climate change issue. The meeting’s 
major objective v/as related with the improvement of the strategies in 
connection with the establishment of an institutional framework to protect 
the global atmosphere and to deal with the climate change issue. For this 
end, a non-binding proposal of law of the atmosphere was adopted. The law 
of the atmosphere strategy attempted to deal not only with the climate 
change issue but also with every threat to the atmosphere and this 
approach was criticized as being extensive and rather over-ambitious.
Another significant development that should be mentioned is the 
Tata Conference which was convened in New Delhi. The United Nations 
Environment Programme and the World Resources Institute organized and 
cosponsored this conference which took place from 21-23 February 1989. 
The significance of this event lies in the fact that it was the first
^® S^ee lUCC, "The Toronto and Ottawa Conferences and the Law of the Atmosphere," Fact 
Sheet 215, 67; available from gopherV/ecosys.drdr.virginia.edu/O/library/atm/climate/
187see "The Tata Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change: Perspectives From 
Developing Countries," repr. in American University Journal o f International Law and Policy 5, no.2, 
(1990): 554.
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international conference interrelated with the interests and considerations 
of the developing countries regarding the climate change problem. Most of 
the developing countries were concerned about the disparity between the 
North and the South as regards the share of global emissions of 
greenhouse gases (see Table II and III). The conference stressed the point 
that much of the responsibility of climate change was closely affiliated with 
the developed countries’ previous activities in the forms of uncontrolled 
and unabated economic and industrial endeavours. The conference 
accentuated the different responsibilities of the developed and developing 
countries in the face of climate change and pointed to the importance of 
assisting and financing the developing countries, the significance of 
coordinated research and training with respect to the climate change 
problem.
Another important conference was held in Hague in March 1989 and 
it was a ministerial meeting attended by the representatives of 24 
countries. It was jointly sponsored by the Netherlands, Norway and 
France. The Declaration of Hague called for a framework convention on 
climate change once more and it indicated the necessity of a new and more 
powerful international organization within the United Nations . for 
responding to the climate change and for the protection of the 
environment. New and stronger institutional mechanism.^  and a more 
powerful regulatory structure were emphasized during the Hague 
Conference. The declaration called for innovative measures to address the
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Table II. Greenhouse Index Ranking and Share of Global Emissions
(1991):
Country Percent
United States 19.14
Former Soviet Union 13.63
China 9.92
Japan 5.05
Brazil 4.33
Germany 3.75
India 3.68
United Kingdom 2.37
Indonesia 1.89
Italy 1.72
Iraq 1.71
France 1.63
Canada 1.62
Mexico 1.43
Poland 1.16
Australia 1.13
South Africa 1.12
Spain 1.01
Venezuela 1.01
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Republic of Korea 0.98
Zaire 0.93
Thailand 0.88
Korea, D em ocratic People’s Republic 0.84
Islamic Republic of Iran 0.82
Saudi Arabia 0.78
Czechoslovakia 0.70
Malaysia 0.61
Colombia 0.61
Netherlands 0.59
Philippines 0.59
Myanmar 0.55
Argentina 0.54
Turkey 0.53
Romania 0.52
Bulgaria 0.51
Bolivia 0.48
Pakistan 0.46
Belgium 0.40
Peru 0.39
Yugoslavia 0.36
Nigeria 0.35
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Egypt 0.34
Viet Nam 0.32
Greece 0.31
Ecuador 0.30
Bangladesh 0.29
Hungary 0.26
Austria 0.25
Denmark 0.24
Algeria 0.23
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-1995 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 201.
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Table III. Greenhouse gas emissions, 1991 (000 metric tons)
C 0 2  emissions 
from industrial 
processes
C 0 2  emissions 
from land use 
change
Solid waste Methane fr 
Coal mining
W orld 22,339,408 4,100,000 43,000 36,000
Africa 715,773 730,000 1,700 1,700
Europe 6,866,494 11,00 17,000 6,600
North & Central 
America
5,715,466 190,000 11,000 6,100
South A m erica 605,029 1,800,000 2,200 280
Asia 7,118,317 1,300,000 9,900 20,000
Oceania 297,246 38,000 690 1,400
Source: World Resources Institute, as cited in World Besources 1996-1997, 326-329 ; 
available from http://www.unep.ch/iucc/fact30.html
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climate change problem and it demanded the development of a new 
institutional authority.
However, some of the key actors were not invited to the conference. 
The states that were not invited were the US, USSR, China, Greece and 
Belgium. The United Kingdom refused to attend and sign the declaration. 
Consequently, the Hague Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change failed 
to represent the approach of the whole international community in the face 
of the climate threat.
In November 1989, another conference. M inisterial Conference on 
Atm ospheric Pollution and Climate Change, was convened in Noordwijk, 
the Netherlands. The main purpose of the conference was to draw out 
concrete international commitments regarding the greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets. This ministerial meeting has been considered 
as the first high-level intergovernmental meeting focusing specifically on
global climate change.
Even though some of the participants of the conference were still 
reluctant to give their full commitments with respect to the emission 
targets, the final declaration which emanated as a result of this ministerial 
meeting recognized the need for the restriction and stabilization of carbon 
dioxide emissions and emissions of the other greenhouse gases that were 
not included in the Montreal Protocol. Therefore, the Noordwijk
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Declaration signified a first step towards the recognition and formation of 
these targets.
However, the reluctant states such as the US, the UK, USSR and 
Japan refrained from committing themselves to concrete emission targets, 
even though the European Community favoured initiating specific 
timetables for the reduction of the greenhouse gases. The blocking states 
argued that there was a great scientific uncertainty with respect to global 
climate change. Thus, these states constituted a major obstacle towards 
the adoption of genuine and effective commitments in the face of the 
climate change threat.
As a result of the concluding declaration of the Noordwijk Conference 
the industrialized nations made a decision that.
stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions should be achieved by them as 
soon as possible, at levels to be considered by the IPCC and the Second 
World Climate Conference of November 1990 and that in the view of 
many industrialized nations such stabilization of carbon dioxide 
emissions should be achieved as a first step at the latest by the year
2000.190
Daniel Bodansky, "The History and Legal Structure of the Global Climate Change 
Regime", 3; available from http://www.pik-potsdam.de/dept/soc/e/reports/pr21_7.htm
^®^Information Unit on Climate Change, "Tine Noordwijk Ministerial Declaration on Climate 
Change," Fact Sheet 218,71.
The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, the 
Netherlands, November 1989, paragraph 16,596-597.
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In December 1989, Cairo hosted the World Conference on Preparing 
for Climate Change. The conference was an international meeting inclusive 
of participants from all over the world.
The Cairo Compact which was issued as a result of the conference 
reflected the opinions of the international community which indicated that 
a framework convention on climate change should be accomplished 
urgently. Multilateral cooperation and commitments of the world states 
and global response strategies to confront the problem were considered as 
crucial steps in addressing the climate change issue.
2.b. The Establishment of The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change:
As it was noted, 1988 was an important year for the international 
developments regarding the global climate change issue. In that year the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which has to date 
played a crucial role in the climate change issue, was established by the 
United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological 
Organization. IPCC is an intergovernmental and interdisciplinary advisory 
body inclusive of scientific-technical experts and government officials from 
all over the world (for more details see Chapter IV). However, IPCC is not
^^^See "Cairo Compact: Toward a Concerned World-Wide Response to the Climate Crisis," 
Cairo, December 1989, repr. in American Journal o f International Law and Policy 5 (Winter 1990): 
631-633; and Information Unit on Climate Change, "The Cairo Compact on Climate Change," Fact 
Sheet 219, 72-73.
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a research institution but an intergovernmental body through which the 
institutions of science can present and convey their knowledge and claims 
to policy-makers or governments. A three-fold objective of the IPCC can 
be outlined as follows: l)to make evaluations and to provide international 
assessments concerning the scientific knowledge on the climate change 
issue; 2)to explore the scopes of the economic, environmental and social 
impacts of climate change; and finally 3)to produce strategies in order to 
encounter the problem accordingly.
The IPCC performs its tasks with three distinctively established 
working groups. Working Group I deals with the assessment of the 
available scientific information on the issue; Working Group II assesses the 
environmental and socio-economic consequences of climate change; and 
Working Group III formulates response strategies.
Therefore, the IPCC’s work was to achieve scientific investigation and 
to produce possible policy responses in accordance with the available 
scientific information. However, the IPCC does not function as a political 
body and does not have a political power to negotiate the climate change 
issue or to adopt a political decision regarding the issue.
In this context, the First Assessment Report of the IPCC was 
prepared between 1988-1990. The report was accomplished in August
^^^Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, "Scientific Uncertainty and Power Politics: The Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Role of the Scientific Advice", 188.
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1990 and it was definitely a comprehensive and substantive resource 
including the assessments, evaluations, contributions and experiences of 
thousands of scientists and specialists working on the various aspects of 
the climate change problem. These scientists were basically experts in 
their fields - who were equipped with necessary knowledge and were 
selected and appointed by governments or by international organizations. 
This sort of a comprehensive scientific assessment was definitely 
impossible without such multinationally coordinated scientific research and 
genuine commitment. Later, the IPCC issued its Second Assessment Report 
in December 1995.
2.C. International Conferences and Developments in the Early-90s:
In May 1990, Norway hosted an important conference on sustainable 
development. The conference was co-sponsored by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. The Bergen Conference on Sustainable 
Development was attended by participants from 34 states and the EC 
Commissioner for the Environment. Although the Conference included 
numerous environmental issues to be considered in connection with 
sustainable development, the climate change issue received particular
attention and concern. 193
193t^Information Unit on Climate Change, "The Bergen Conference on Sustainable 
Development," Fact Sheet 220, 174.
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During the conference, ministers from 34 countries discussed 
essential measures to encounter the climate change problem. Most of the 
participants supported more stringent commitments on the issue; they 
agreed informally that the greenhouse gas emissions should be stabilized at 
1990 levels by the year 2000. However, the United States emerged as the 
major blocking state once more and obstructed the adoption of concrete 
emission targets.
As a result of the Conference, the Bergen Declaration was adopted. 
The Bergen Declaration was an important event displaying the developed 
countries’ - at least a large majority of them - willingness and support for 
combating and mitigating the climate change threat.
The Second World Climate Conference was one of the most 
significant events that took place in the evolution of climate politics. 
The conference was held from 29 October-7 November 1990, in Geneva. 
Like the First World Climate Conference, this second one was again 
sponsored by the WMO, the UNEP and the other international 
organizations. Representatives from 137 countries participated in the 
climate conference.
^^ '‘See Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, 
Bergen, Norway, 16 May 1990.
^^^See Jill Jager and H. L. Ferguson, Climate Change: Science, Impacts and Policy, 
Proceedings o f the Second World Climate Conference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991).
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By the time of this conference the reports of the three working 
groups of the IPCC had been completed and released. Also, most of the 
developed countries and the European Community had set specific national 
greenhouse gas emission targets, and even Japan and the UK had changed 
their positions. By that time, they were supporting reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to address the climate change problem 
appropriately. Previously made international conferences, coordinated 
information exchange and scientific developments, and public pressure had 
been influential in changing these states’ positions to climate change. 
Therefore, it seemed as if this was an appropriate time to initiate the 
necessary negotiations to build a regime on climate change.
Also, during the Second World Climate Conference the small island 
states organized themselves into the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS). AOSIS played a significant role during the INC process; it pushed 
the world states for greenhouse gas emission reductions.
However, the participants of the conference could not agree on any 
specific targets in connection with stabilizing and reducing the greenhouse 
gas emissions as a result of the persistent oppositions from the US, the 
Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia once again. The conflicting opinions 
between different states could not be transcended during the ministerial 
meetings.
The European Community had decided to reduce the carbon dioxide 
emissions at their 1990 levels by 2000 in October 1990. The Western
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European firms were ahead of producing alternatives and renewable energy 
sources compared to the US. Therefore, the US was very much concerned 
about the economic costs of a reduction in emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases. Consequently, the US refrained from committing 
itself to specifically defined reduction targets.
Hence, even though the scientific meetings of the Second World 
Climate Conference summoned a 20% decrease in carbon dioxide emissions 
by 2005 - same as the recommendations of the Toronto Conference - the 
ministerial meeting did not confirm a particular emission reduction target. 
Thus, the Ministerial Declaration became a point of frustration for 
environmental organizations and the international community that were 
expecting concrete results and genuine commitment to address the climate 
change issue.
Although the statements of the conference disappointed many 
participants and environmentalists, some positive outcomes could be 
achieved as well. The conference emphasized the importance of stabilizing 
the greenhouse gases and called for a framework convention on climate 
change. Also, it endorsed that developing countries should recognize their 
own responsibilities in addressing the issue and should specify targets and 
strategies to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions. A Consultation 
Group on Special Needs of Developing Countries dealt with such issues.
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3. Negotiating a Framework Convention on Climate Change:
The establishment of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee 
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change was accomplished in 
December 1990 in accordance with the recommendations of the IPCC and 
the Second World Climate Conference. Numerous other conferences and 
ministerial meetings had also demanded that the climate change problem 
should be addressed immediately. Thus, the United Nations General 
Assembly passed a resolution in 1990 which called for the beginning of 
formal negotiations on climate change and established the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for this end. Its purpose was to 
design a framework convention with respect to climate change and to 
conduct its negotiation process. The convention was planned to be opened 
for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, in June 1992, in Rio de Janeiro.
The Negotiating Committee provided a forum for the world states to 
discuss and negotiate the necessary aspects of the global climate change 
issue in order to reach a consensus. The INC held five sessions in order to 
prepare a draft for a framework convention on climate change and over 100 
states and various governmental and non-governmental organizations 
participated in these sessions. The first meeting of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee was held in February 1991, in Chantilly, Virginia. 
During this meeting, two working groups were formed by which the
1 3 9
process of preparing the convention should be accomplished till the 
convening of the UNCED. In this first meeting, however, procedural 
decisions and preliminary structural considerations required a lot of time. 
In other words, substantive discussions and negotiations concerning the 
drafting of the convention were captured by procedural questions and 
considerations to a certain extent.
During this meeting, however, the attitudes of the major 
participating states towards the climate change issue became more or less 
visible. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) which was guided by the European Community, Japan'^^ and the 
small island states were in a position to strongly support essential 
measures against the climate change problem whereas the United States 
was reluctant to make more abrupt and genuine commitments regarding 
the issue. Also, financial and technical aid were necessary for the 
developing countries in order to help them to stabilize their greenhouse 
gas emissions and enable them to adopt more stringent measures in the 
face of the problem. Therefore, this issue became a matter of concern as 
well between the North and the South during the discussions.
After the first meeting, four more sessions were held between the 
parties to the INC in order to reach a consensus on the framework
Japan emerged as a major veto state in the climate change politics; however, in 
October 1990 Japan changed its attitude and decided to stabilize its greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 
levels by 2000 - in accordance with the EC's commitment to address the climate threat.
140
convention. The second one was from 19-28 June, 1991, in Geneva; the 
third one was held between 9-20 September, 1991, in Nairobi; the fourth 
one was held during 9-20 December 1991, Geneva and finally the fifth one 
was in February, 1992, in New York. The attitudes of the participating 
states diversified to a large extent in connection with the substantive 
measures that should be taken to combat the problem of climate change.
First of all, although the parties to the INC envisioned the 
stabilization of the greenhouse gas emissions and the European 
Community attempted to perform a leading role with respect to it, the 
United States maintained its earlier position towards the issue and 
refrained from committing itself to definite emission schedules. Therefore, 
this emerged as a major impediment against the formation of an effective 
and legally binding international agreement. While the European 
Community committed itself to stabilize its joint carbon dioxide emissions 
at the 1990 levels by the year 2000, the United States argued that there 
was a high level of uncertainty in the climate change problem which should 
be illuminated through further scientific research and claimed that this 
constituted the basic reason for its unwillingness.
The United States’ approach was supported by other states like the 
Soviet Union, developing China and Saudi Arabia - all of which had been 
opposing to specified targets since the early phase of the climate change 
discussions. These states only accepted a framework convention instead of 
specified targets and legally binding measures. The United States and the
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Soviet Union were basically the world’s greatest greenhouse gas emitters, 
Saudi Arabia was a major fossil fuel producing country and China was 
mainly concerned with its economic development which could be restricted 
by stringent measures.
Secondly, there was the issue of the North and the South as usual. 
The developing countries of the world were very much concerned with the 
financial and technical support that they required in order to be able to 
address themselves to the task of preventing climate change. They were 
mainly concerned about the adequacy and transfer of the resources that 
would be provided and arrangements that would be accomplished by the 
developed countries for this end. Developed countries also recognized the 
need for technical aid and financial transfers which were necessary for the 
achievement of specified goals in climate change. However, a disruption of 
opinions emanated between the North and the South with respect to the 
nature and structure of the funding mechanism in the climate change 
issue.
During the second session of the INC, a new idea was launched by 
the developed countries with respect to the financial aspects of the issue: 
the Global Environmental Facility which was created in 1990 and jointly 
administered by the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP could work as the 
essential funding mechanism in the climate change issue. However, the 
idea which was favoured by the majority of the developing countries was a 
separate and independent climate fund that would be established through
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compulsory financial contributions of the industrialized states. Therefore, 
the developing countries remained dubious with respect to the North’s offer 
by considering the developed states’ domination over the World Bank and 
theGFE.
Nevertheless, even the developing states of the South were divided 
among themselves as a result of contradicting opinions. For instance, 
India claimed that it was the responsibility of the developed countries to 
resolve the climate change issue since they made the greatest contribution 
to the evolution of the problem through rapid industrialization of the past. 
Therefore, India and many other developing countries expected that only 
the industrialized states should act in addressing the problem. However, 
other countries such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) - which 
were particularly vulnerable to the climate threat - along with some of the 
African countries shared the Western view that the South should also act 
against the threat of climate change.
During the fourth session of the INC, the states affirmed their 
positions in the face of the contradictions. They were still far from 
adjourning the conflicts and reaching a reconciliation on many aspects of 
the issue. The United States still blocked the formation of specific targets 
and obligatory mechanisms in response to the perceived threat, and some
^^^During the fourth session a Consolidated Working Document (CWD) was prepared by 
the working groups which reflected the different opinions of the negotiating states. The document 
covered the major points of disagreement between the parties with respect to emission targets, 
funding mechanisms and implementation mechanisms in the climate change problem.
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of the developing countries led by India still insisted that all the 
responsibility regarding the climate change problem should go to the 
industrialized states. All these veto powers were deeply concerned with 
political and economic costs that would be inflicted on them if a substantial 
and confining international convention was achieved in this negotiation 
process. Therefore, state interests and scientific uncertainty emerged as 
major obstacles in the process of drafting a convention in climate change.
During the fifth session of the INC, states were still unable to 
overcome the differences of opinion between them. In addition to this, the 
OECD countries were also dispersed regarding the greenhouse gas 
emission targets.
Therefore, at the end of the fifth session the international community 
could not bring the negotiations to an end, and now there was a sense of 
urgency to complete this cooperative process before the deadline. Under 
these circumstances, the parties decided to make a final meeting in 30 
April-8 May, 1992, so that a framework convention symbolizing an 
international compromise could be accomplished before the June 1992 
deadline. At last, during this meeting a convergence of opinions could be 
accomplished and negotiations and the drafting of the framework 
convention were finalized; after 15 months of work it was adopted on 9 
May, 1992, at UN Headquarters in New York.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was 
opened to signature at the Rio “Earth Summit”, and it was signed by 154
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states (plus the EC).^ ®^ It did not bring the effective legally binding
measures and specified time-tables that were strongly advocated by the
OECD countries and small island states with respect to greenhouse gas
emissions, and this was definitely a major handicap in confronting the
climate change threat. However, it was still significant to achieve this
cooperation since scientific knowledge was inadequate to clarify the
prevailing ambiguity and uncertainty over climate change. Even in the
presence of this scientific uncertainty, there was an international effort to
lay the ground from which it was easier and more possible to make future
progress and effective cooperative processes. The objective of the
Convention is defined in Article 2 which says that:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal 
instrument that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to 
achieve...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved 
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
The language used in the Convention is generally equivocal and ambiguous 
and this can be observed in the above paragraph as well. The wording 
concerning the level which would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
the OECD countries, except for Turkey, signed the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Turkey had a contribution of 0.53 % to greenhouse gas emissions, however, 
inappropriately it was claimed that Turkey should be included into the Annex 1 Parties. Other 
countries that refused to sign the FCCC were; Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Malaysia.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2.
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interference is very obscure and imprecise as it was favoured by the states 
which were reluctant to commit themselves to binding emission targets.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change “reflects a carefully 
balanced compromise”^ ®® on the principle issues such as: targets and 
timetables; financial assistance and technology transfer; and institutions 
and implementation mechanisms.
With respect to the controversial issue of the essential funding 
mechanism, the Global Environmental Facility and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development were entrusted with the responsibility 
for financing matters on an interim basis.^ ®^  The GEF’s position and 
purpose became more precise and substantial after the Convention was 
accomplished and signed by the world states.
The climate treaty ensured that the developed countries make 
periodic communication and transmission of information to the Conference 
of the Parties with respect to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. 
These information reports are essential in terms of displaying these 
countries’ progress towards meeting their commitments and obligations 
formulated by the provisions of the Convention.
For the Convention to become binding and enter into force it was 
required that ninety days passed after the receipt of the fiftieth ratification.
®^® Daniel Bodansky, "The History and Legal Structure of the Global Climate Change 
Regime", 7; available from http://www.pik-potsdam.de/dept/soc/e/reports/pr21-7.htm
^®* UNFCC, Article 21(3).
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In this way, the FCCC entered into force on 21 March, 1994. During this 
period of time the INC proceeded with its work and the Parties continued 
to meet for another six sessions. However, after completing their eleventh 
and last session in February, 1995, the International Negotiating 
Committee was dissolved to give its place to the Conference of the Parties 
(COP).^ ®^  As a result of the urgency to reach an agreement before the Rio 
Conference, “the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for the 
UN FCCC avoided a number of contentious issues and left them to be dealt
with by the COP. .203 Obviously, there was a lot of work to be done by the
Conference of the Parties in order to strengthen the regime. Regarding the 
FCCC Daniel Bodansky states that:
Many of its provisions do not attempt to resolve differences so much as 
paper them over, either through formulations that preserved the 
positions of all sides, that were deliberately ambiguous, or that deferred 
issues until the first meeting of the conference of the parties. From this 
perspective, the Convention represents not an end point, but rather a 
punctuation mark in an ongoing process of negotiation.
The COP had the right to establish auxiliary bodies under the 
provisions of the framework convention. The COP was responsible with 
reviewing the reports submitted from these bodies and guiding them.
of 1997, there are 167 countries who ratified the FCCC and each party is responsible 
for submitting information and national communication to the Conference of the Parties, through the 
Conference secretariat regularly. See, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Article 12.
^°^Jill Jager and Tim O'Riordan, 21.
204 Bodansky, 7.
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Under the FCCC, two important supplementary bodies were established - 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) which was responsible for 
assisting the COP in assessing and reviewing the effective implementation 
of the FCCC and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) which had the task of transmitting and providing 
assessments of scientific knowledge and evidence to the COP. °^^
4. The Berlin Mandate and the Latest Developments in Climate Change 
Politics:
The first Conference of the Parties was held during 28 March-7 April 
1995, in Berlin. This first COP - the Berlin Climate Summit - was attended 
by 118 states, 53 observer states and numerous intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations.^®  ^ Since then the Conference of the 
Parties became the supreme authority with respect to the Convention, and 
it works to;
keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and 
any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may 
adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to 
promote the effective implementation of the Convention.^®^
^®®See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 9 and Article 10.
^®®Until the Berlin Summit any member state of the United Nations was able to participate 
in the formal decision making process of the Climate Convention. However, with the Berlin Mandate 
this process was terminated and since then only the countries who became parties to the Convention 
are able to partake in the formal decision-making with respect to restructuring the climate change 
regime.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 7.(2).
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In essence, with the convening of the Conference of the Parties 
another phase was initiated in climate change politics. After a two and a 
half years’ period, it was officially recognized and announced that the 
previous measures were inadequate in the face of the global climate change 
problem. This was a significant development in the evolution of climate 
politics.
Within the FCCC the developed country parties to the Convention 
had agreed that they would adopt national policies and take measures on 
the mitigation of climate change by limiting their greenhouse gas 
emissions and protecting and enhancing their greenhouse gas sinks and 
r e s e rv o ir s .T h e  developed countries had accepted that they would return 
to their 1990 levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol by the end of the present decade. 
However, the Convention had envisioned that the adequacy of such 
measures included in Article 4 of the Convention would be reviewed and 
reconsidered during the first session of the COP. Therefore, in accordance 
with this provision the COP reviewed the previously taken measures during 
its first session and decided that such commitments were insufficient. The 
Conference of the Parties adopted the Berlin Mandate which states that:
The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, having reviewed 
Article 4... concluded that these are not adequate, agrees to begin a
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 4.2(a). 
^®^Ibid., Article 4.2.(a) and (b).
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process to enable it to take appropriate action for the period beyond 
2000, including the strengthening of the commitments of Annex I 
Parties in Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), through the adoption of a 
protocol or another legal instrument.^^°
Thus, the Berlin Mandate inaugurated renewed procedures and a 
process of restructuring the legal arrangements in terms of planning and 
creating a substantive protocol for the climate change problem. It 
stipulated that “quantified emissions limitations and reductions objectives” 
(QELROs) in connection with the greenhouse gases would be established 
for the time after the year 2000 such as 2005, 2010 and 2020 - only for the 
parties from developed countries (Annex I Parties). However, although the 
intention for strengthening the previously taken measures and 
establishment of a climate protocol was definite, the targets and the time 
schedules of such new measures were still imprecise.
Consequently, the Berlin Mandate ensured that the process of 
renewal and restructuring of the Convention would be conducted and 
carried out by an ad hoc group - the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate 
(AGBM). Also, the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 (AG13) was established as 
the fourth subsidiary body of the Convention - related with the conflict 
resolution options. It was apparent from the Mandate that this process of 
negotiating and accomplishing a protocol would take a considerable time 
and could not be finalized in the near future. It was planned that the third
^^^United Nations, Document FCC C /C P/1995/L.14,1995.
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session of the COP would be appropriate for the approval of such a 
protocol.
Before the OOP’s first meeting, the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) had proposed a draft protocol to be discussed at this first session. 
The small island states called for a reduction of the 1990 level of carbon 
dioxide emissions of the industrialized countries by at least %20 by the 
year 2005 - which is similar to the recommendations of the Toronto 
Conference. Since there was no convergence of opinions between the world 
states, this proposal was compiled for further considerations as well.
4.a. Meetings of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM):
The AGBM which was responsible for negotiating and preparing a 
protocol for the climate change problem held its first meeting from 21-25 
August 1995. During the meetings, several issues were debated by the 
participants regarding the analysis and assessment to distinguish possible 
policies for Annex I Parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The second meeting of the AGBM was held from 30 October-3 
November 1995; negotiations for a possible climate protocol continued. 
Participants were concerned about: strengthening of commitments in 
Article 4.2(a) and (b) regarding policies and measures; establishing 
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROS) in
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specific time frames; progressing the implementation of Article 4.1; and 
advancing and structuring possible features of a climate protocol.^^^
However, these two sessions of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin 
Mandate were not as productive as it had been intended. The pace for 
negotiating a legal document for the climate change threat seemed rather 
unhurried.^^^
A significant event that happened in this time period was the 
adoption of the Second Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change in December 1995 (for the details of the report see 
Chapter IV). The report attested to the fact that there was a discernible 
anthropogenic contribution to the greenhouse effect which resulted in 
global climate change. Although the IPCC Report did mention the 
uncertain aspects of the climate change issue which required further 
scientific assessment and research, with its renewed evidence on climate 
change, it contributed to the achievement of some progression as well. 
From then on, the first genuine proposals began to be negotiated by the 
parties and the basis of the transactions and bargaining changed to a 
certain extent.
"Report of the Third Conference of The Parties to The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; 1-11 December 1997," Earth Negotiations Bulletin 12 (December 
1997), 2 ; available from http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/voll2/enbl276e.html
^However, some parties to the Convention, like the European Union, were still in favour of 
sincere commitments and they supported the formation of an effective protocol in the face of the 
problem. In December 1995, the European Union submitted a proposal concerning the establishment 
of a protocol on the issue of climate change.
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The next AGBM meeting was held from 5-8 March 1996, in Geneva. 
During these meetings, some new proposals regarding more specific 
commitments for Annex I Parties were introduced to the delegates. For 
instance, Germany proposed a two-phase COg emission reduction target. 
There was not a final agreement on a protocol for climate change, however, 
the majority of the parties considered the IPCC’s Second Assessment 
Report and the renewed scientific knowledge as constituting the essential 
basis for further progress towards a protocol. However, oil-producing 
countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait still emerged as blocking powers 
and tried to slow down the negotiation process by displaying their 
unwillingness to accept any need for further action.
The second session of COP was held during 8-19 July 1996, in 
Geneva. During this time period, the COP and its four subsidiary bodies 
held meetings in order to review the implementation of the Convention and 
to make progress in accomplishing a protocol for climate change. More 
than 900 delegates, including some 80 ministers, and 600 observers from 
nongovernmental organizations, business sector and other institutions 
attended the meetings. The large participation from all over the world 
attested that climate change greatly attracted the attention of the 
international community as a serious threat.
During the COP-2 again the debates intensified on: the approaches 
to possible policies and measures to address the climate change threat.
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QELROS, and an evaluation of the likely impact of new commitments for 
Annex I Parties on developing countries.
The COP-2 meetings produced some fruitful consequences. IPCC’s 
Second Report, which displayed improved and more precise scientific 
evidence on climate change, greatly contributed to the developments in the 
negotiation process. As a result of the negotiations, the “Geneva 
Ministerial Declaration” was adopted by the parties. The Geneva 
Declaration displayed that “there is overwhelming support from most
governments for taking serious action against climate change. .213 For
instance, even the US as a blocking state has begun to consider the 
scientific evidence on climate change as the main indicator of basic need for 
more effective climate policies; for the first time the US supported a legally 
binding agreement on the issue.
AGBM-5 met in Geneva from 9-18 December 1996. During the 
meetings, proposals from 14 Parties were considered; the participants 
agreed to compile proposals for future discussions and negotiations. Then, 
after a short period of time the sixth meeting of the AGBM was held from 3- 
7 March 1997, in Bonn. AGBM-6 mainly considered the proposal of the 
European Union which suggested a 15% reduction in the emission of 
greenhouse gases by the year 2010 compared to 1990 emissions. However,
^^^Michael Zammit Cutajar, "Geneva Declaration Affirms Scientific Basis for Action," 
United Nations Climate Change Bulletin, issue 12,1; http://www.unep.ch/iucc/bulltnll.html
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a sufficient progress and a final consensus concerning the possible 
elements of a climate protocol could not be achieved as a result of these 
meetings.
The seventh and eighth meetings of the AGBM also took place in 
Bonn. AGBM-7 met from 28 July-7 August 1997 in order to fulfil the Berlin 
Mandate by continuing to negotiate the possible measures and legal 
arrangements required to address the climate problem. Finally, AGBM-8 
was held from 22-31 October 1997 and it was suspended until 30 
November, one day before the official beginning of the COP-3.
4. b. The Kyoto Protocol:
The latest development regarding climate change politics is the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol during the third Conference of the Parties in 
December 1997 after an arduous negotiation process - also during which 
this study came close to its final phase. The Kyoto Protocol is a very recent 
event; repercussions and consequences of this new development will be 
more clear in the near future. However, it is apparent that even though 
the achievement of a protocol on the climate issue has been considered a 
progress which gives hope for the future developments, the adopted 
measures of the Protocol and the emission reduction targets in connection 
with the greenhouse gases that cause climate change appear to be less than 
satisfactory in the face of a significant threat confronting the international
ecosystem.
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The third session of the Conference of the Parties was held from 1-11 
December 1997, in Kyoto, Japan. COP-3 officially opened on 1 December 
at the Kyoto International Conference Hall and it was attended by over 
10,000 participants which included people from different governments, 
nongovernmental organizations, international institutions and also the 
media.
During the period of a ten-day meeting, the delegates met in plenary 
and in a sessional Committee of the Whole (COW). They considered Agenda 
Item 5, the adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument, and also the 
issues concerning the methodologies to estimate emission sources and 
s i n k s . M i n i s t e r s  from different states and the heads of delegation 
participated in a high-level segment held by the Conference of the Parties 
on 8-9 December, and 125 ministers made statements while the Committee 
of the Whole continued informal deliberations.^^®
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties on December 11, 1997 - after a prolonged and intense negotiation 
process.
The Kyoto Protocol includes a preamble, 28 articles and two annexes. 
The Protocol introduced some new legal measures and commitments to
^^^"Report Of The Third Conference Of The Parties To The United Nations Framework 
Convention On Climate Change: 1-11 December 1997", 3.
215 Ibid.
156
Parties in Annex I. According to the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties 
agreed to reduce their overall greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% 
below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. In addition to that, the Kyoto 
Protocol “also establishes emissions trading, joint implementation between 
developed countries, and a ‘clean development mechanism’ to encourage 
joint emissions reduction projects between developed and developing 
countries.
Article 3 as adopted by COP-3, includes 14 paragraphs on QELROS 
and refers to two Annexes among which Annex A contains the list of six 
greenhouse gases (C02, CH4, N20, HCFs, PCFs and SF6) that will be 
subject to emission reductions and also includes GHG source categories 
and sectors. Annex B contains the greenhouse gas emission reduction 
commitments for Annex I Parties. According to Annex B the EU members 
will reduce GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 8%, the United States by 
7% and Japan by 6%. The Russian Federation will maintain its emissions
at 1990 levels.^ ^^
One of the most interesting developments in the climate cooperation 
is related with the United States’ position which has significantly changed, 
especially after the IPPC’s Second Report which was completed in 
December 1995. The United States has adopted a more flexible and
217 Ibid., 18.
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auspicious approach concerning greenhouse gas emission reductions as 
compared to the past. In the past, the US refused to adopt binding 
emission targets by emphasizing the scientific uncertainty existing over 
climate change, however, its position has been dramatically altered 
especially as a result of renewed scientific evidence and effective public 
pressure.
For the time being, it is unclear whether the divergent opinions of 
some of the Parties will be harmonized in future and different voices will be 
attuned in a way which would enable the adoption of utterly satisfactory 
emission targets within a more effective legal arrangement over the climate 
change problem. Fortunately, states have been able to advance the 
cooperation on the climate issue; they took another step to safeguard this 
planet. Nevertheless, still a lot of work has to be done for the protection of 
the global climate.
At this point, it should also be mentioned that in addition to the 
coordinating and catalytic roles of international institutions and 
intergovernmental bodies in climate change collaboration, various 
nongovernmental organizations have been playing crucial roles in the 
evolution of climate politics. For instance, during the negotiation phase of 
the Kyoto Protocol environmental nongovernmental organizations played 
pivotal roles once again -  as they had already done in the previous 
developments concerning the climate cooperation. The list and functions of 
various institutions, environmental nongovernmental organizations and
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other non-state actors which are related with and have participated in the 
evolution of the climate change negotiations and politics are given in Table
r v .
These actors were functional in promoting the international 
cooperative processes through financial resources, technical aid, and 
scientific and methodological information on climate change. Therefore, 
the social, economic, political and scientific aspects of the issue were 
integrated and the formation of a regime over global climate change was 
enabled through multidisciplinary efforts and transnational endeavours.
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TABLE IV. International Institutions and Nongovernmental 
Organizations Concerned With Climate Change:
Name and Location of the 
Orcranization
Type of Oriranization Resources Available
A fr ic a n  D e v e lo p m e n t  B a n k  
C o te  d l v o r i e
In t e r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l
In s t itu t io n /
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l
F in a n c ia l
A p p r o p r ia t e  T e c h n o lo g y
In te r n a t io n a l
U n ite d  S ta te s
A s ia n  D e v e lo p m e n t  B a n k  
P h i l ip p in e s
In t e r - A g e n c y  
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l 
In s t i tu t io n
F in a n c ia l
B io m a s s  T e c h n o lo g y  G ro u p  
B .V .
N e th e r la n d s
C o r p o ra te
C a rb o n  D io x id e  In fo r m a t io n  
A n a ly s is  C e n te r  
U n ite d  S ta te s
G o v e r n m e n t  (O th e r )  
M e d ia ,  P r e s s  a n d  T V
C o a s ta l Z o n e  M a n a g e m e n t  C e n te r  
N e th e r la n d s
G o v e r n m e n t  (O th e r )  
I n t e r - A g e n c y
In fo r m a t io n
M e th o d o lo g ie s
T e c h n ic a l
C o m m o n w e a lth  S c ie n c e  C o u n c il  
U n ite d  K in g d o m
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l F in a n c ia l
In fo r m a t io n
E a r th  N e g o t ia t io n s  B u l le t in  
U n ite d  S ta te s
M e d ia ,  P r e s s  a n d  T V
E a r th w a tc h  
U n ite d  S ta te s
N G O (O t h e r ) T e c h n ic a l
F in a n c ia l
E c o n o m ic  a n d  S o c ia l C o m m is s io n  
fo r  A s ia  a n d  th e  P a c i f ic  
T h a ila n d
U N  S y s te m  
In t e r - A g e n c y
T e c h n ic a l
In fo r m a t io n
E c o n o m ic  C o m m is s io n  f o r  A f r ic a  
E th io p ia
U N  S y s te m  
In t e r - A g e n c y
T e c h n ic a l
In fo r m a t io n
E n v ir o n m e n t  A g e n c y  o f  J a p a n  
J a p a n
G o v e r n m e n t (O th e r ) T e c h n ic a l
F in a n c ia l
E n v ir o n m e n ta l  D e v e lo p m e n t  
A c t io n  in  th e  T h ir d  W o r ld  
S e n e g a l
N G O (O t h e r ) M e th o d o lo g ie s
In fo r m a t io n
T e c h n ic a l
E u r o p e a n  B a n k  fo r  R e c o n s t r u c t io n  
a n d  D e v e lo p m e n t  
U n ite d  K in g d o m
In t e r - A g e n c y  
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l  
In t e r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l  
In s t i tu t io n
F in a n c ia l
F ood  and A g ricu ltu re  O r g a n iz a t io n  
o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s  
I t a ly
In t e r - A g e n c y  
U N  S y s te m
T e c h n ic a l
In fo r m a t io n
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M in is t r y  o f  P la n n in g ,  D e v e lo p m e n t  
a n d  E n v ir o n m e n t  
S a in t  L u c ia
G o v e r n m e n t
N a t io n a l  In s t i tu t e  o f  P u b l ic  H e a lth N G O In fo r m a t io n
a n d  E n v ir o n m e n ta l  P r o t e c t io n  
N e th e r la n d s
T e c h n ic a l
O P E C  F u n d  f o r  In t e r n a t io n a l In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l F in a n c ia l
D e v e lo p m e n t In t e r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l
A u s t r ia In s t i tu t io n
O r g a n is a t io n  f o r  E c o n o m ic In t e r - A g e n c y In fo r m a t io n
C o o p e r a t io n  a n d  D e v e lo p m e n t In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l T e c h n ic a l
F ra n c e M e th o d o lo g ie s
R e s o u r c e  A n a ly s is  
N e th e r la n d s
C o r p o ra te T e c h n ic a l
S o u th  P a c i f ic  R e g io n a l In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l In fo r m a t io n
E n v ir o n m e n t  P r o g r a m m e M e th o d o lo g ie s
S a m o a T e c h n ic a l
S o u th e r n  C e n t r e  f o r  E n e r g y  a n d N G O (O t h e r ) In fo r m a t io n
E n v ir o n m e n t T e c h n ic a l
Z im b a b w e M e th o d o lo g ie s
S to c k h o lm  E n v ir o n m e n t  In s t i tu t e N G O (O t h e r ) T e c h n ic a l
S w e d e n In fo r m a t io n
M e th o d o lo g ie s
S to c k h o lm  E n v ir o n m e n t  In s t itu te - N G O (O t h e r ) In fo r m a t io n
B o s to n  C e n te r T e c h n ic a l
U n ite d  S ta te s M e th o d o lo g ie s
S w is s  C o m m is s io n  f o r  R e s e a r c h  
P a r tn e r s h ip  w i t h  D e v e lo p in g  
C o u n tr ie s
S w it z e r la n d
A c a d e m ic In fo r m a t io n
S w is s  D e v e lo p m e n t  C o o p e r a t io n F in a n c ia l
S w it z e r la n d T e c h n ic a l
T a ta  E n e r g y  R e s e a r c h  In s t i tu t e N G O (O t h e r ) T e c h n ic a l
In d ia In fo r m a t io n
U S  C o u n tr y  S tu d ie s  P r o g r a m T e c h n ic a l
F in a n c ia l
U N E P  C o l la b o r a t io n  C e n te r  o n U N  S y s te m T e c h n ic a l
E n e r g y  a n d  E n v ir o n m e n t In fo r m a t io n
D e n m a rk M e th o d o lo g ie s
U N E P  In fo r m a t io n  U n it  f o r  
C o n v e n t io n s  
S w it z e r la n d
U N  S y s te m In fo r m a t io n
U n ite d  N a t io n s  D e v e lo p m e n t U N  S y s te m In fo r m a t io n
P r o g r a m m e In t e r - A g e n c y F in a n c ia l
U n ite d  N a t io n s T e c h n ic a l
U n ite d  N a t io n s  E d u c a t io n a l, In t e r - A g e n c y T e c h n ic a l
S c ie n t i f ic  a n d  C u ltu ra l O r g a n is a t io n  
F ra n c e
U N  S y s te m In fo r m a t io n
U n ite d  N a t io n s  E n v ir o n m e n t U N  S y s te m In fo r m a t io n
P r o g r a m m e In t e r - A g e n c y T e c h n ic a l
K e n y a M e th o d o lo g ie s
-----------------------------------------------------1 F in a n c ia l
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U n ite d  N a t io n s  In d u s t r ia l  
D e v e lo p m e n t  O r g a n is a t io n  
A u s t r ia
U N  S y s te m F in a n c ia l
In fo r m a t io n
T e c h n o lo g y
U n ite d  N a t io n s  In s t i tu t e  f o r  
T r a in in g  a n d  R e s e a r c h  
S w it z e r la n d
In t e r - A g e n c y  
U N  S y s te m
T e c h n ic a l
In fo r m a t io n
W M O / U N E P  In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l  
P a n e l  o n  C lim a te  C h a n g e  
S w it z e r la n d
U N  S y s te m In fo r m a t io n
M e th o d o lo g ie s
G e n e r a l D ir e c t o r a t e  o f  E n e r g y  
A f fa ir s  
T u r k e y
G o v e r n m e n t (O th e r )
G lo b a l E n v ir o n m e n ta l  F a c i l i t y  
U n ite d  S ta te s
U N  S y s te m F in a n c ia l
G lo b a l In d u s t r ia l  a n d  S o c ia l  
P r o g r e s s  R e s e a r c h  In s t i tu t e  
J a p a n
N G O  (O th e r ) In fo r m a t io n
T e c h n ic a l
G r e e n h o u s e  G a s  T e c h n o lo g y  
In fo r m a t io n  E x c h a n g e  
N e th e r la n d s
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l T e c h n o lo g y
In fo r m a t io n
G T Z  (G e rm a n  A g e n c y  f o r  
T e c h n ic a l C o o p e r a t io n )
G e rm a n y
G o v e r n m e n t  (O th e r ) F in a n c ia l
T e c h n ic a l
H y d r o m e t e o r o lo g ic a l  In s t i tu t e  
S lo v e n ia
G o v e r n m e n t  (O th e r )
In s t itu t e  f o r  C lim a te  C h a n g e , 
S lo v e n ia n  E c o lo g ic a l  M o v e m e n t  
S lo v e n ia
N G O  (O th e r )
In s t i tu t e  f o r  E n v ir o n m e n ta l  
S tu d ie s , F r e e  U n iv e r s i t y  
N e th e r la n d s
N G O  (O th e r )  
A c a d e m ic
M e t h o d o lo g ie s
T e c h n ic a l
In fo r m a t io n
In te r -A m e r ic a n  D e v e lo p m e n t  B a n k  
U n ite d  S ta te s
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l  
In te r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l 
In s t i tu t io n
F in a n c ia l
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l  O c e a n o g r a p h ic  
C o m m is s io n  
F ra n c e
In t e r - A g e n c y  
U N  S y s te m
In fo r m a t io n
T e c h n ic a l
In t e r n a t io n a l  A to m ic  E n e r g y  
A g e n c y  
A u s t r ia
U N  S y s te m  
In t e r - A g e n c y
T e c h n ic a l
In fo r m a t io n
In t e r n a t io n a l  E n e r g y  A g e n c y  
F ra n c e
In t e r - A g e n c y
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l
In fo r m a t io n
T e c h n ic a l
In t e r n a t io n a l  F e d e r a t io n  o f  
In d u s tr ia l  E n e r g y  C o n s u m e rs  
S w it z e r la n d
N G O  (O th e r )
In t e r n a t io n a l  F u n d  fo r  
A g r ic u l t u r a l  D e v e lo p m e n t  
I t a ly
In t e r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l  
In s t i tu t io n  
U N  S y s te m
F in a n c ia l
T e c h n ic a l
In t e r n a t io n a l  S T A R T  S e c r e ta r ia t  
U n ite d  S ta te s
N G O  (O th e r ) In fo r m a t io n
IP C C  W G I I  T e c h n ic a l  S u p p o r t  U n it  
U n ite d  S ta te s
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l
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Is la m ic  D e v e lo p m e n t  B a n k  
S a u d i A r a b ia
In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l  
In t e r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l 
In s t i tu t io n
F in a n c ia l
Latin -Am erican  E n e rg y  O r g a n iz a t io n In t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l T e c h n ic a l
E c u a d o r In fo r m a t io n
M in is t r y  o f  F o r e i g n  A f fa ir s  
N e th e r la n d s
G o v e r n m e n t F in a n c ia l
M in is t r y  o f  F o r e ig n  A f fa i r s  
J a p a n
G o v e r n m e n t T e c h n ic a l
M in is t r y  o f  In t e r n a t io n a l  T r a d e G o v e r n m e n t F in a n c ia l
a n d  In d u s t r y T e c h n ic a l
J a p a n In fo r m a t io n
W o r ld  B a n k U N  S y s te m F in a n c ia l
U n ite d  S ta te s In fo r m a t io n
T e c h n ic a l
W o r ld  E n e r g y  C o u n c il 
U n ite d  K in g d o m
N G O  (O th e r )
W orld  M e teo ro lo g ica l O rgan isa tion In t e r - A g e n c y F in a n c ia l
S w it z e r la n d U N  S y s te m In fo r m a t io n
T e c h n ic a l
Source: Official Web Site of UNFCCC S ecretaria t  
available from  http://w w w .unfccc.de/fccc/ccinfo/optoc.htm
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Chapter VI. The Climate Change Issue: An Analysis of 
International Cooperation
The previous chapters displayed the different aspects and scopes of 
the climate change issue which have grown immensely and require highly 
specialized knowledge and methodological expertise. These chapters 
revealed that global climate change has become a complex issue demanding 
a multidisciplinary approach, further scientific investigation and 
assessments, and an integration of scientific, social, economic and political 
processes that can be conducive to the formulation of effective 
international policies. These manifold facades of the issue have been deeply 
intermingled, therefore, today it is impossible to restructure the existing 
climate change regime unless international negotiations and political 
arrangements are forwarded by integrated approaches and machinery. The 
efficacy of future legal and political structuring will essentially depend on 
this fact.
This final chapter will include an analysis of climate change politics 
and cooperation in accordance with the information presented within the 
previous chapters. The fifth chapter included a review of political and legal 
processes in the international arena and the observations of the actors of 
the international system in the face of the global climate change problem. 
Albeit the existing international regime over climate change, the 
observations indicated that this atmospheric problem still demands
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interdisciplinary scientific elaboration and a more substantial legal 
arrangement against greenhouse gas emissions. In the light of these 
observations and explorations, this chapter will display the basic elements 
and factors of the prevalent international policy coordination and 
cooperation. The analysis will include the answers of the questions such as 
which factors and actors were most influential in the cooperative processes, 
and to what extent they were effective in establishing and promoting 
international arrangements in the climate change issue. As a result, this 
analysis will illuminate the implications and relevance of the climate 
change issue to the International Relations discipline and theory, and it 
will display an application of this case study to the theoretical framework of 
the neoliberal institutionalist approach.
1. Non-State Actors That Inaugurated and Constituted The 
International Activities and Collaboration:
Being the actors of the international system, the international 
institutions, along with nongovernmental organizations and transnational 
epistemic communities, emanated as the promoters and adherents of 
cooperative activities and international environmental policy-making with 
respect to climate politics. Almost as in many other environmental political 
issues, these actors contributed to the formation of concerted policies and 
harmonization of scientific and political processes. Notwithstanding the 
major roles played by the international institutions all through the
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formation of a climate regime, the foremost contributions of these 
institutions can be ascribed to introducing the issue to the world states and 
setting the agenda for the sake of environmental protection.
l.a. International Institutions: The United Nations Environment 
Programme and The World Meteorological Organization:
With respect to the evolution of the climate issue, the United Nations 
system enabled the arrangement and progress of cooperative activities with 
its two significant organizations, namely the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, which were 
definitely the leading forces in the process. In essence, the UNEP has 
played crucial roles in many other international environmental issues - 
such as ozone depletion and desertification - in terms of agenda setting and 
arranging conference diplomacy for the protection of global environment.
Oran Young uses the term “institutional bargaining” in explaining 
the negotiation process necessary for the formation of institutional 
settlements or regimes over international environmental problems. 
Regarding the contributions of international institutions to the climate 
regime. Young says that.
in the ongoing effort to form an international regime to cope with 
climate change, UNEP and WMO have worked together to structure 
and facilitate the course of institutional bargaining, which is actually
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taking place under the auspices of yet another organization, the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change...
When the initial phase of the evolution of climate politics is 
considered (for details see Chapter V), it can be said that scientific 
improvements in the Western world and enhanced knowledge about the 
climatic changes stimulated international considerations and inaugurated 
the essential activities. The implications and repercussions of scientific 
assessments generated responses to address the problem and invigorated 
coordinated international processes. The United Nations Environment 
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization were the two major 
international bodies that opened up the way to international efforts and 
coordinated multinational arrangements. The First World Climate 
Conference (1979), which was jointly convened under the auspices of the 
UNEP and WMO, signify the first and foremost international platform for 
introducing and analyzing the climate change problem as a global threat 
against the integrity of the international ecosystem. Hence, the UNEP and 
WMO played the most crucial and regulative roles in terms of agenda 
setting and combining the separately operating scientific bodies at an 
international platform in order to foster future environmental and political 
concern over the climate change issue.
^^^Oran R. Young, "International Organizations and International Institutions: Lessons 
Learned from Environmental Regimes," in Environmental Politics in the International Arena: 
Movements, Parties, Organizations, and Policy, ed. Sheldon Kamieniecki (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1993), 147.
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Therefore, the contributions of the international institutions and 
epistemic communities regarding the formation of a climate regime were 
very substantial even at the beginning of the developments. Scientific 
evidence elevated the significance of the climate issue and the issue was 
transferred to the stage of the international political agenda which 
eventually opened up the way towards multinational concerted activities. 
However, dispersed scientific knowledge would not have led to any 
progress and fruitful consequences unless organized and institutionalized 
collaboration was accomplished. Thus, scientific contributions to climate 
change and information exchanges between relevant scientific and 
professional communities were enabled through the functioning of these 
international institutions and actualized within their regulatory capacities.
Accordingly, an important outcome of the First World Climate 
Conference was the formation of another international body under the joint 
forces of the UNEP, WMO and the International Council for Scientific 
Unions (ICSU), namely the World Climate Programme, which has up to the 
present played a significant role in the progression of scientific knowledge 
about the atmosphere and dynamics of global climate change. The World 
Climate Programme has various components such as the World Climate 
Research Programme, World Climate Impact Programme, etc., which have 
been operating as crucial mechanisms to foster essential research and 
scientific understanding concerning climate change.
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Therefore, the WMO has incorporated various programmes and 
functional mechanisms into its body - unifying and integrating various 
spheres of climate change research and scientific activities. With respect to 
substantial contributions and successful functions of the WMO as an 
international institution coordinating atmospheric research efforts and 
climate change assessments, Marvin Soroos mentions the fact that the 
institution has always been auspiciously distant from political dissension 
and internal strife for the sake of scientific impartiality. Soroos says that.
WMO, which has been the central actor on atmospheric research, has 
long had a reputation for being a haven from international political 
conflicts, where rationality rather than ideology prevailed even during 
the height of the Cold War from the 1950s to the 1980s. WMO has also 
cultivated an image of objectivity by limiting its role largely to 
monitoring and scientific research while leaving policy questions to 
other institutions to address.
In essence, policy coordination, harmonization of interests, 
methodology and guidance provided by these international institutions 
continued all through the evolution of the climate issue. After this first 
climate conference and between the period of 1980-1988, numerous 
scientific, international, nongovernmental conferences and workshops - 
which were described and overviewed in Chapter V in detail - were 
organized and sponsored by the UNEP, WMO and ICSU. Therefore, these
^^^Marvin Soroos, The Endangered Atm osphere, 17. Also, see Marvin S. Soroos and Elena 
Nikitina, "The World Meteorological Organization as a Purveyor of Global Public Good," in 
International Organizations and Environm ental Policy, eds. Robert Bartlett, Priya Kurian, and Madhu 
Malik (Westport; Greenwood Press, 1995), 69-82.
1 6 9
international institutions performed as the active supporters of 
international environmental cooperation. All these meetings were gainful 
and conducive to the flourishing of a more evident apprehension of the 
climate change problem within the international community. Many of the 
conference statements and declarations provided insights regarding 
national positions and related political responses.
As indicated in the previous chapter, the climate issue began to gain 
more significance and attracted more attention during the mid-1980s. The 
Villach Conference in 1985 and the following two workshops were 
particularly significant in the sense that the necessity of international 
policy-making was recognized and accentuated by scientists for the first 
time during those meetings. However, the issue was entirely carried into 
the realm of the international political agenda during the Toronto 
Conference which was held in 1988. Hence, all previous institutional 
arrangements and coordinated scientific information exchanges among the 
world states - together with the extremely hot summer of 1988 and other 
abnormal climatic events that alarmed, people - consequently raised the 
issue to a level of political significance since the accomplishment of a 
climate treaty was determined during this Toronto Conference for the first 
time.
All these developments attest to the efficacy of international 
institutions with respect to configuring attuned scientific and political 
processes and regularizing international political behaviour towards global
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climate change. WMO and UNEP organized and sponsored many other 
international conferences and activities all through the prenegotiation 
phase of global climate change which were instrumental in motivating 
states to reperceive national interests together with global common 
interests. As a result of the endeavours of these institutions, states were 
influenced and the climate change issue entered the political agenda of the 
international community - which later on culminated in the formation of a 
regime over the climate problem.
l.b. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:
In 1988, another important intergovernmental body was established 
by the UNEP and WMO to serve the purpose of exposing scientific 
assessments and knowledge to the opinions of government officials and 
policy makers. This intergovernmental organization included scientific, 
technical members as well as members from the governments of world 
states. Up to the present, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
has functioned as a fundamental actor in the climate change issue and its 
function is policy-oriented, however, it does not incorporate any political 
power. With respect to the politicised nature of the IPCC, one author says 
as follows;
The fact that the IPCC was heavily politicised...illustrates how 
successful the international organizations and the international
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climatological community had been in setting a political agenda, and it 
demonstrates, moreover, that global warming was a potentially severe 
problem which states needed to address....Thus, while the IPCC 
consolidated the scientific consensus on global warming and set an 
agenda for policy-makers, they were also framing the problem in a 
specific political mould.
It should be pointed out that as an interagency, the World Climate 
Programme and its substantial component World Climate Research 
Programme, have made major contributions to the works and assessments 
of the IPCC. The Intergovernmental Panel’s establishment and its 
contributions signify the necessity of coordination and institutionalization 
of scientific research and knowledge for the creation of international 
policies in environmental political problems.
Today a term, namely the Climate Agenda, epitomizes in the best way 
the interconnectedness of climate-related scientific programmes and 
endeavours (for details, see Chapter IV). The Climate Agenda came into life 
in 1993 and it provides an overall integrated framework for multifarious 
programmes which are affiliated with climate and sustained by various 
agencies and organizations. In other words, it is an attempt to integrate 
multidisciplinary climate-related activities - which have already reached 
complex and amazing dimensions - such as data collection and application.
^^°Matthew Paterson, "IR Theory: Neorealism, Neoinstitutionalism and the Climate Change 
Convention," in The Environm ent and International Relations, eds. John Vogler and Mark F. Imber 
(New York: Routledge, 1996), 65.
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climate system research, and studies of socio-economic impacts of climate 
change and their effects on ecosystems.
As a key component of the climate process, the IPCC influenced the 
evolution of states’ collaboration and functioned as a catalyst of political 
cooperation. For instance, the IPCC’s First Report which was announced in 
1990 had a great impact on the perceptions of states. The report verified 
the significance of the climate change problem and its impacts, and because 
of it, some of the national positions were altered to a certain extent. For 
instance, IPCC’s report had an important effect on the British policy in the 
sense that the British response evolved from the no-targets position during 
the mid 1980s to a conditional target as a result of the scientific 
assessments presented by the IPCC in 1990. Most significantly, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was accomplished to a 
great extent as a result of the scientific indications and evidence disclosed 
to the world states by the scientific working group of the IPCC. By 
indicating the existence and significance of anthropogenic interference 
with global climate, the IPCC’s First Report in 1990 opened up the way 
towards meaningful alterations in states’ perceptions about climate change 
and consolidated the efforts for building a climate regime which finally 
culminated in the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, in Rio.
In the same way, IPCC’s Second Assessment Report which was 
completed at the end of 1995 verified the anthropogenic effects on the 
climate change problem and its future perils for humans and the planet.
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The report had an impact on the majority of the Parties and during the 
third session of the AGBM which was held in March 1996 in Geneva, they 
considered the IPCC’s report as the essential basis for future progress 
towards a protocol. As a result of the renewed scientific evidence provided 
by the IPCC on the anthropogenic greenhouse effect, “the start of a new 
phase in the negotiations was marked when first concrete proposals were
not only put on the table but also seriously discussed. ..221 In this way, the
results of the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report strongly motivated the 
world states to consider new decisions envisaging the establishment of 
specified targets against greenhouse gas emissions for the protection of the 
global climate. Accordingly, the AGBM changed its emphasis to real and 
more fruitful negotiations beginning from the second meeting of the COP 
which took place in July 1996, in Geneva.^ ^^
As it was mentioned in Chapter V, Intergovernmental Panel’s Second 
Report had a significant impact on the United States’ attitude to the climate 
cooperation. Scientific verification displayed that human beings had a 
discernible effect on the global climate; therefore, being the world’s 
number one GHG emitter, it was no longer useful and agreeable for the 
United States to refrain from committing itself to specified targets to 
protect the climate. Thus, renewed scientific evidence provided by the
^^^Sebastian Oberthür, "Sign of Progress," Environmental Policy and Lavvlf) (1996); 158. 
^^^Markus Ehrmann and Sebastian Oberthür, "Spring in Climate Negotiations?"
Environmental Policy and Law 27 (1997); 92.
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IPCC motivated the United States to alter its approach towards the climate 
change issue and pushed it for accepting specified and legally binding 
targets.
The concrete impact of these scientific developments showed itself 
with the formation of a protocol for the global climate. Most probably, the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change could not have been accomplished in December 1997 if the IPCC 
had not played a pivotal role in climate politics.
All these developments display that the IPCC as an 
intergovernmental body has played a key role in the progress of 
international cooperation on climate change and it was successful in 
shaping the related institutional arrangements. IPCC included both 
scientists and members of governments from all over the world, thus a 
harmonization and coordination of dissipated scientific research for the 
purpose of substantial policy formulation became easier to accomplish this 
way. This progress could not have been achieved at this pace if such an 
intergovernmental body did not produce well-grounded scientific 
assessments and appropriate evidence, and conveyed them to policy­
makers. Apparently, all these efforts have had an important impact on 
states’ perceptions and consequently on the related political processes.
Therefore, the IPCC had a remarkable influence on the development 
of the climate regime and it appears that it will carry out this mission in 
future. The IPCC constitutes a good example for the extended capacities of
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international institutions and intergovernmental bodies to promote 
cooperation and restructure the discernment of national-interests. When 
scientific knowledge is transmitted to governments through institutions 
and a common threat is perceived by states, international collaboration 
becomes a more desired and probable outcome. Due to the fact that bodies 
like the IPCC help decrease the uncertainty factor to a certain extent and 
indicate the interdependence of interests in the face of a global threat, they 
have considerable power to facilitate and regularize international 
cooperation in global environmental issues such as climate change.
Notwithstanding the contributions of the IPCC - together with the 
views of the transnational epistemic communities - it should be considered 
that the peculiarity of the climate change problem and its utterly complex 
nature due to intricate interactions between the different domains of the 
global climate system have always come out as impediments against 
producing precise scientific estimations and anticipating the exact future 
impacts (for a detailed explanation see Chapter IV). Scattered scientific 
approaches and diverse opinions as a result of the unpredictability of the 
dynamics of the global climate system have definitely obstructed and 
constrained the formation of a stronger regime over the climate change 
issue up to the present.
As it has been the case in some other global environmental 
challenges, the uncertainty factor in climate change has unfortunately 
impaired states’ commitments to avert environmental afflictions. If there
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were a stronger scientific consensus on climate change and its future 
impacts, the pace of political developments would have been much more 
rapid and the related measures could have been more stringent. For 
instance, with respect to the case of ozone depletion - which is a less 
complex and relatively well-defined global issue - there was a strong 
scientific consensus on the scopes of the problem and its future perils.
As a result of this factor and some other related factors, the strongest and 
the most ambitious environmental cooperation up to the present could be 
established over ozone depletion. However, the climate issue has 
ambiguous and obscure dimensions which have been fortunately abated to 
a certain extent through renewed scientific evidence but which are still 
conspicuously subsisting in spite of advanced climate modelling and 
research. Most of the scientific circles accept the fact that further research 
and data are necessary for exact evaluations.
Thus, while accrediting the Intergovernmental Panel’s role in and the 
related institutionalized scientific bodies’ impact on facilitating and 
promoting international collaboration against the climate threat, it should 
also be considered that coordinated scientific research and 
institutionalization of international efforts have not yet completely 
eradicated the uncertainty and unpredictability factors regarding the issue. 
This is an important shortcoming since international policy formulation
223 For the subject of ozone depletion as a global environmental threat, see, Richard Flliot
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and establishment of substantial measures to mitigate the global problems 
are closely affiliated with scientific consensus on many environmental 
issues. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily degrade and lessen the 
significance of the role played by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change in the climate change process as a functional international body 
promoting and supporting the formation of concerted activities and 
multinational cooperation.
l.c. Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework 
Convention:
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee was another 
intergovernmental body which played a specific and decisive role in climate 
change. All the political processes and international bargaining took place 
under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee from
1991 until the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change in
1992 (for details see Chapter V). From then on, the INC held a couple of 
meetings and soon it gave its place to the Conference of the Parties in 
1995.
All the negotiations and bargaining that took place between the 
world states within the forum provided by the INC led to the drafting of a
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New  Directions in Safeguarding the Planet, 1991.
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framework convention, thus a regime emerged over the climate issue. The 
INC process dealing with the specific aspects of collective action and policy 
issues, was essential with respect to which substances would be controlled 
so that greenhouse gas emissions could be limited, what measures and 
precautions should be applied and what contributions should be made by 
different states. This cooperative process would not have been possible 
through unilateral state actions and policy formulations since the climate 
problem demanded a global approach. Therefore, a forum for a formal and 
specific negotiation process was extremely important.
It can be assumed that without the existence of the INC as an 
international body, the efforts for regime formation and negotiations for 
the production of a legal document most probably would not have produced 
fruitful results. The negotiations and process of establishing an 
international framework convention would have been either failed or 
postponed to a distant future.
The resulting convention could have been stronger and a more 
effective regime could have been established over the climate change 
problem as a result of the INC process, however, this cooperation should 
also be considered successful since under the lack of scientific consensus 
and economic costs states were still able to initiate some collaborative 
action.
Moreover, the process did not slow down and the negotiations 
continued among the Conference of the Parties for the sake of
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accomplishing· an effective and more stringent protocol over the climate 
issue. In 1995, the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate(AGBM), was given 
the mandate to negotiate a protocol or another legal instrument for climate 
change. This intergovernmental body, comprising more than 150 Parties 
of the UNFCCC, worked in order to accomplish a protocol addressing the 
global climate threat. Thus, the UNFCCC constituted an institutional 
mechanism for the regularization of states’ behaviours through periodic 
monitoring of the Parties’ activities and through regular meetings for 
necessary future amendments. Consequently, the INC process successfully 
initialized the multinational efforts which culminated in a climate protocol 
in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol was another important step for safeguarding 
the planet - even though it was still a modest attempt in the face of a 
serious environmental problem.
The international institutions and intergovernmental bodies 
described and analyzed above are the actors which have performed key 
functions in the evolution of the climate change issue. Nevertheless, they 
are not the only institutions that have contributed to climate politics. 
Chapter V. presented a table including the list of the international 
institutions and intergovernmental bodies that have been related with and 
active in the global climate change issue. The United Nations Development 
Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission, the International Energy Agency, European Bank for
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Reconstruction and Development, and the Economic Commission for Africa 
are only a few names to be mentioned among the numerous international 
institutions that are concerned with the climate change issue. All these 
organizations have contributed to the climate regime from different 
aspects, and their assistance and functions range from technical or 
informational to financial. These international institutional contributions 
are closely intermingled and they greatly sustain the advancement of 
international collaboration for the sake of protecting the global climate.
l.d. Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations:
As it was elucidated in Chapter II, nongovernmental organizations 
and interest groups have already become indispensable components of the 
international community and international environmental issues. 
Accordingly, many nongovernmental organizations have also worked as the 
important supporters and adherents of the cooperative processes, and more 
significantly functioned as the actors contributing to the creation of norms 
and principles in the climate change collaboration (for details see Chapter V 
and Table IV).
For instance, the Climate Action Network (CAN) has been a very 
functional and effectual organization with respect to the processes 
regarding protection of the global climate. It is an umbrella organization 
including more than 160 NGOs from all over the world. There are Climate
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Action Networks in the North and South America, West and East Europe, 
Asia and also in Africa-^ "^^
Numerous environmental NGOs participated in the conferences and 
meetings that were held during the prenegotiation phase of climate 
politics. They offered their opinions to government officials and policy­
makers, and struggled to transform their perceptions concerning the 
climate threat. In addition to this, they strove to draw the attention of the 
media and to generate public concern and pressure about global climate 
change in order to shape governments’ policies especially in the developed 
countries. As a result of NGOs endeavours and contributions - along with 
some other factors such as the abnormal climatic events and high 
temperatures, scientific developments, the media attention, etc. - the 
subject of climate change gained popularity among people and became a 
significant public issue during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This 
obviously created a considerable pressure on governments to reformulate 
their environmental policies towards global climate change.
In addition to their activities at domestic levels, NGOs form 
transnational linkages and participate in the negotiation processes of 
global ecological threats. Thus, in this way they can influence the 
outcomes of many global environmental issues.
224„The 19 9 5  Berlin Climate Summit", 1.
http://www.igc.apc.org/climate/1995Summit.html
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Throughout the negotiation phase of climate politics, environmental 
NGOs struggled to make interactions with policy-makers and tried to 
affect the negotiation outcomes. Various NGOs - they ranged from large 
international groups like World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) or Greenpeace 
to rather smaller organizations - attended the negotiation sessions of the 
climate treaty and they also lobbied their governments at home. When they 
lobbied at the INC process they also made statements or drafted substantial 
proposals for the formation of an effective regime over the climate change 
issue.
Also, environmental nongovernmental organizations played 
significant roles during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol. They 
communicated with delegates in order to influence the cooperative 
outcomes and they were very effective in “identifying and advising
receptive delegations on loopholes in the proposals. .225 Various
nongovernmental organizations “played a pivotal role that paralleled the 
remote negotiations going on between presidents and prime ministers.
Thus, all these contributions made by environmental NGOs to the 
issue of climate change corroborate the fact that such organizations are the 
essential and indispensable agents of global environmental cooperation.
225 of The Third Conference of The Parties To The United Nations Framework
Convention On Climate Change: 1-11 December 1997", 35.
226 Ibid.
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They have been functional in transforming perceptions towards the climate 
threat, influential in motivating governments to reconsider national 
interests within a global perspective and eventually operational in the 
process of creating norms in the evolution of collective action against 
global climate change.
Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate environmental 
nongovernmental organizations and their contributions into the analysis of 
global ecological issues. However, in the meantime their functions appear 
to remain relatively less critical and determining - at least for the case of 
global climate change - when they are compared with the roles played by 
international institutions which perform coordinating, rule-making and 
implementing functions in many global environmental issues within the 
present international order.
2. States As Decision-makers:
States’ approaches and the different positions they held in the face of 
the climate change threat were described in detail within Chapter V. In the 
present world system, states are definitely the supreme decision-makers 
and they have ultimate political power to make international legal 
arrangements. Any reasonable approach related with the dynamics of the 
prevalent international system therefore should commence its explanation 
and analysis with this basic assumption.
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In trliis contoxt, s1^3«t0s suporioi* positions 3iS docision ni3,k©rs 
compared to that of the other actors’ positions within the political arena 
were most apparent during the negotiation phases of the climate change 
cooperation. The climate negotiations involved the participation or 
contributions of other actors such as intergovernmental bodies 
nongovernmental organizations or corporates, however, these actors held 
no decisive power. Despite the fact that non-state actors had opportunities 
to guide states’ behaviours and to manipulate the decision-making 
processes in order to influence the issue outcome, the final word would be 
uttered by states.
States’ roles or contributions in connection with cooperation over the 
climate issue have been rather divergent. Some states have greatly 
contributed to the formation of collective strategies and evolution of 
policies to address this environmental threat, whereas, a few others have 
acted as the major political powers impeding an effective international 
collaboration. For instance, even at the beginning of the climate process 
the majority of the members of the European Union along with the small 
island states (AOSIS) favored legally binding and specified time-tables 
which would effectively address climate change, while, the major 
greenhouse gas emitters and producers such as the US, USSR, China, Saudi 
Arabia and oil-producing states together with the majority of the 
developing countries refrained from binding themselves to effective legal 
measures.
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Some states like the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries 
together with the members of AOSIS even functioned as the initiators of 
climate related concerns within a global scope. For instance, the 
Netherlands and Norway, as well as Canada, hosted many important 
international meetings and conferences dealing with global climate change. 
Such countries accomplished institutionalization against the climate threat 
at the domestic level as they had successfully done in other environmental 
problems as well. The “green consciousness” and public pressure for the 
protection of the environment are very high in states such as the 
Netherlands and Norway. With respect to the positions of the small island 
states, the reason for their inclination towards cooperation was more 
related with their special sensitivity to the climate change impacts - due to 
the fact that the climatic alterations are expected to bring forth sea-level 
rise in between 15-95 cm. in the following hundred years - rather than 
0uvironmental consciousness.
Also, changes in the attitudes of the two major states, namely the UK 
and Japan, with respect to addressing the climate change issue were 
significant. These two states were initially disinclined to cooperate for the 
protection of the global climate and did not accept effective measures and 
specified timetables as a result of domestic and economic considerations. 
For instance, during the prenegotiation phase the UK did not accept to 
sign the 1989 Hague Declaration and Japan refrained from committing 
itself to targets during the Noordwijk Conference (for details see Chapter
186
Some states like the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries 
together with the members of AOSIS even functioned as the initiators of 
related concerns within a global scope. For instance, the 
Netherlands and Norway, as well as Canada, hosted many important 
international meetings and conferences dealing with global climate change. 
Such countries accomplished institutionalization against the climate threat 
at the domestic level as they had successfully done in other environmental 
problems as well. The “green consciousness” and public pressure for the 
protection of the environment are very high in states such as the 
Netherlands and Norway. With respect to the positions of the small island 
states the reason for their inclination towards cooperation was more 
related with their special sensitivity to the climate change impacts - due to 
the fact that the climatic alterations are expected to bring forth sea-level 
rise in between 15-95 cm. in the following hundred years - rather than 
their environmental consciousness.
Also, changes in the attitudes of the two major states, namely the UK 
and Japan, with respect to addressing the climate change issue were 
significant. These two states were initially disinclined to cooperate for the 
protection of the global climate and did not accept effective measures and 
specified timetables as a result of domestic and economic considerations. 
For instance, during the prenegotiation phase the UK did not accept to 
sign the 1989 Hague Declaration and Japan refrained from committing 
itself to targets during the Noordwijk Conference (for details see Chapter
186
V). However, while the US maintained its position as the major blocker 
state against an effective cooperation on climate change during the 
negotiation phase, the UK and Japan changed their approaches 
dramatically. In time, their positions matched with the attitudes of the 
other states advocating stringent measures in order to combat against the 
climate threat.
In addition to the alterations in the UK’s and Japan’s approaches 
towards the climate issue, the United States’ attitude to climate cooperation 
displayed a remarkable evolution as well. The IPCC’s contributions and 
assessments, which illuminated some of the scientific aspects of the climate 
change, motivated the US to embrace more stringent measures against this 
environmental problem. Consequently, the US accepted an 8% reduction in 
its greenhouse gas emissions.
Hence, the observations in general show that the responses of some 
stases have evolved from a rather modest interest towards global climate 
change - which was considered a peripheral issue during the early and mid- 
1980s - to a solid understanding of the problem and a more substantial 
concern for combating this global threat in 1997. Due to this fact, states 
embarked upon the creation of a protocol to protect the global climate. 
Although the final protocol has caused some frustrations, the process for a 
stronger climate regime will be continuing and more concrete results 
might be obtained as a result of this process.
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The next section of this chapter therefore will provide a more detailed 
analysis in terms of explaining these alterations observed in states 
attitudes and behaviours within an institution-based framework.
3. CUmate Politics and the Neoliberal Institutionalist Approach: An 
Institution-Based Explanation
The evolution of the climate change issue and the related political 
developments display that in spite of the fact that states have the ultimate 
jurisdiction in decision-making processes and international environmental 
policy formulation, non-state entities, especially international institutions - 
along with nongovernmental organizations and transnational epistemic 
communities - have made substantial and unequalled contributions to the 
formation of multinational cooperation and environmental regime creation. 
The political processes in connection with the climate issue have 
illuminated the fact that state-centric approaches towards international 
relations are not suitable and adequate any more to explain the basic 
dynamics of the contemporary international system - at least with respect 
to the interpretations of global environmental political processes. Today, it 
is no more possible to underestimate the contributions and crucial roles of 
international institutions in connection with global environmental issues 
and cooperation.
In today’s world order, states are still utterly the major actors of the 
system with political and legal authorities; the issue outcomes are
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unconditionally defined by states’ concurrence and consents. However, the 
cooperative processes are most of the time ignited and evolved through the 
efforts of especially international institutions and other non-state actors. 
Particularly, regarding the global environmental problems, existence of the 
international institutions is definitely essential and very functional in 
introducing the issues, fulfilling agenda-setting, coordinating scientific 
research and evidence, transmitting this information to the world 
community and regularizing multinational negotiations for policy 
formulation. These institutions do not necessarily overshadow states as 
the major actors of the system or function as supranational authorities, 
however, they generate networks over and within states which are 
conducive for producing incentives for international cooperation. 
Without the regularizing and catalytic functions of the international 
institutions, it appears to be impossible to implement cooperative processes 
in connection with the environment. These international institutions 
appear to be influential in attracting states’ attention to environmental 
concerns and shaping states’ preferences; they create a forum for an 
international exchange of opinions, motivate world states to reperceive 
their national objectives and interests through transmission of substantial 
information and make them apprehend certain values within a global 
perspective.
^^ P^eter M. Haas, R. O. Keohane and M. A. Levy, Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective 
International Environm ental Protection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 24.
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As it can be observed within the global climate change issue, 
economic costs and scientific uncertainty factors appear to be the major 
impediments against the protection of the global environment. Economic 
considerations and cost calculations of governments along with the 
scientific uncertainty existing over many global environmental problems 
emanate as obstructions against stronger international cooperation in 
many issue areas. The North-South debate emerges as the basic factor 
which precludes the task of forging legal arrangements against many 
global environmental problems since convergence of opinions between 
these two spheres appears to be very difficult in many instances. This was 
obviously the case in the climate issue and such factors have restrained the 
advance of international collaboration or decreased its speed to a large 
extent. Furthermore, another basic factor that affects actors’ participation 
in international collective response activities is directly related with the 
changing scopes and varying degrees of expected climate change impacts 
on different states. Since the impacts of global climate change will display 
variations according to different regions, the states which are anticipated 
to be more sensitive to the effects of this change are understandably 
inclined to participate in cooperation. Such states have been active in 
initiating international activities and launching global cooperative 
processes - as it has been done by the small island states encountered with 
the rise in sea level due to climate change. However, states who are
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relatively more secure against such environmental threats have been slow 
to incorporate climate policies into their national objectives and activities.
Nevertheless, the international institutions, through agenda-setting 
and presenting a forum for international negotiations, have promoted the 
process of regime formation and environmental collaboration in the climate 
change issue. Through the transmission of institutionalized knowledge 
uncertainty has decreased to a certain extent, the states have reconsidered 
their basic interests, and through coordinated negotiations they became 
more prone to recalculate the costs and benefits of collective action and 
international cooperation.
Given the fact that the observations and empirical evidence regarding 
the specific case of the climate change issue are instrumental in analyzing 
and explaining the dynamics of the present international system at a 
certain level of order, these observations will be placed in a valid and 
substantial conceptual construction to support the scientific endeavours in 
the field of International Relations. In this context, it appears that the 
climate change issue presents the validity and relevance of the neoliberal 
institutionalist theory with respect to explaining political processes within 
the realm of the International Relations discipline. Institutionalists’ major 
assumptions in connection with analyzing the basic features of the 
international system and dynamics of international political relations were 
explained in detail in the third chapter of this study. When compared with 
its realist counterpart which focuses primarily on states and power
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relations between them, the neoliberal institutionalist theory brings a 
much more satisfactory and all-encompassing explanation concerning the 
evolution of global climate change politics.
In accordance with the primary assumption of the neoliberal 
institutionalists - which has been basically derived from the realist 
approach - states are the major actors of climate change politics since only 
they possess political power and decisive authorities. In other words, it has 
been widely recognized that nation-states still perform as the key players in 
international ecological issues. However, while borrowing this assumption 
from the realists, the institutionalists are against considering states as the 
only actors which have major influence in world politics. Non-state actors - 
even though they have no political and superior enforcement powers 
compared to that of states - are as much influential as states in many issue 
areas, therefore they should be directly incorporated into the analysis of 
international relations. Accordingly, many non-state actors had great 
impact on the elaboration of the climate issue and participated in the 
negotiation processes of climate cooperation, however, the only signatories 
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were states. No other actor had the 
power to determine and settle the political and legal arrangements; only 
states could finalize negotiation processes through political decisions - 
even though transnational and nongovernmental organizations greatly 
contributed to the process through informal negotiations.
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Another assumption of the neoliberal institutionalists is that the 
international system is anarchic in its nature. This assumption is in 
accordance with the opinions of the realist theorists, however, the 
institutionalists hold another assumption that international institutions 
have great influence in coordinating and promoting cooperation within this 
anarchic environment - which greatly contradicts the views of the realist 
theorists. According to neoliberal institutionalists, the condition which 
enables this collaboration is the existence of common interests among 
states. In the case of the climate change problem, the common interest is 
the preservation of the global climate and consequently the natural 
environment for the continuation of life. As the preservation of the global 
climate is in the interest of each state, some form of international 
collaboration is naturally inevitable. The observation of the evolution of 
the climate issue indicates that this is exactly what happened in climate 
change politics. In spite of the fact that uncertainty impeded the formation 
of a stronger and much desired cooperation with specified greenhouse gas 
emission targets, it sho\ild be considered that states resorted to 
collaborative efforts to create a regime even in the presence of imprecise 
data and scientific unpredictability. A possible common threat motivated 
states towards cooperation and regime formation through a framework 
convention which has recently turned into a protocol. Major actors that 
shaped the evolution of climate change cooperation were international 
institutions, such as the UNEP, WMO, IPCC, INC, etc., with their functions
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of a,ttra.cting th© a-ttsiitions of sta,t6s to th© ttir©a.t, a,g©nda.-s©tting, 
coordination and transmission of sci©ntific knowl©dg©, providing a forum 
for information ©xchang© and coordinating international negotiations.
In Chapter III, it was stated that neoliberal institutionalists argue 
that the neorealist approach overemphasized conflict in the international 
system while underestimating or disregarding the international 
institutions’ capacities in facilitating and fostering cooperation. Climate 
change politics displays that this criticism made by the institutionalist 
scholars is a legitimate one. The developments in connection with the 
climate issue corroborate and substantiate the view that the realist 
theorists focusing on state interest and power struggle have failed to 
include in their analysis the international institutions, their impact on 
international collaboration, other non-state actors and their functions as 
essential ingredients for a thorough analysis. The realist approach 
provides great insight while indicating the supremacy of the state system 
and the anarchic nature of the international relations, however, it remains 
outmoded when attempting to ignore the substantial work done by 
international institutions in restructuring power relations in new ways. 
These institutions are very effective and functional in generating state 
preference structures which are much more cooperative in nature.
In addition to their important roles in the formation of cooperation 
over climate change, international institutions are significant for 
maintaining and sustaining environmental collaboration among world
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States as well. In other words, their roles cannot be restricted merely to 
the process of regime formation, but they are crucial in terms of 
perpetuating the established norms and legal arrangements in order to 
accomplish an effective and thorough implementation process. Without 
such efforts of international organizations, states’ commitments would be 
ineffective.
The climate change cooperation and various other kinds of global 
environmental collaboration cannot be considered exceptional and 
marginal any more. Such cooperative processes have been growing and 
they challenge state-centric or power-oriented explanations of international 
politics. However, the neorealist approach is still disinclined and reluctant 
to accept that environmental considerations and common ecological 
interests among states can have much political relevance and motivational 
capacity in an international system full of power-oriented and competing 
nation states.
The climate change issue as an important case - like various other 
global environmental issues - should be instrumental in motivating political 
theorists to accomplish broader analytical perspectives and urging them to 
refrain from merely concentrating on states or power relations while 
producing the interpretations of international political processes. An 
awareness about this has been growing and scholars have been debating 
whether “the study of global environmental change has the potential to 
alter (or even subvert) the essential elements of IR as an academic
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p u r s u i t . I n  effect, there are attempts to rethink and develop the 
handling of global environmental change within the field of International
Relations.
Global environmental issues and related political processes explicitly 
demand a reconsideration and restructuring of the basic assumptions and 
dynamics of theoretical endeavours in the field of International Relations. 
While stressing the awakening of concern towards the environment in 
International Relations, John Vogler argues that;
The extraordinary interconnection between the issues involved and the 
extraordinary range of interdependencies evident from even a cursory 
examination of global environmental change bear upon the 
fundamental concerns of students of international relations and 
international political economy. It was, therefore, no longer possible to 
pigeonhole environmental issues in International Relations as a narrow
230technical specialism.
Another important point to be mentioned is that institutionalists 
generally expect cooperative processes to take place when the number of 
the participants or states related with the specific issue area are small 
enough to make collaboration p o s s i b l e . I n  other words, they believe that 
the most effective cooperation can be achieved with small numbers of
^^®John Vogler, "The Environment in International Relations: Legacies and Contentions," in 
The Environment and International Relations, eds. John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 18.
22%
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% id ., 2. 
Ibid., 7.
^^^For instance see Robert O. Keohane, "Against Hierarchy: An Institutional Approach to 
International Environmental Protection", 18.
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States. This assumption might explain the question of why the climate 
cooperation was full of complexities, and the initial framework convention 
and the following protocol remained less satisfactory than advocated by 
the international community. Since it is a global cooperation inclusive of 
hundreds of states, it has been understandably difficult to accomplish an 
outstanding regime over the climate issue - which brings effective 
commitments and addresses the problem in the most auspicious way.
However, it should also be mentioned that this assumption of 
neoliberal institutionalists does not appear to be valid when for instance 
the remarkable regime constructed for protecting the ozone layer is 
considered. Ozone depletion was also a global commons issue related with 
the atmosphere, and it required participation and collective action of world 
states like global climate change. In the ozone issue however, the world. 
states were able to transcend various problems and establish a regime 
which has remained as the most effective global cooperation up to the 
present. Therefore, the neoliberal institutionalists are in a position to 
reconsider this assumption and to bring a more satisfactory explanation 
regarding the significance or relevance of the number of participants in 
any environmental cooperative process.
Finally, it is also important to note that systemic theories like 
neoliberal institutionalism eventually leave out some essential domestic 
factors of collective policy making and collaboration in international 
politics. This is basically intrinsic to the characteristics of systemic
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theories - which are parsimonious - since a theoretical construction has to 
be selective and should determine which specific factors will be the foci of 
analysis. In this context, it is inevitable that neoliberal institutionalism as 
a systemic theory brings a partial explanation of international 
environmental cooperation, like the other international relations theories 
focusing on other levels of political interaction, and it concentrates on 
interests and international institutions as the basic units of political 
analysis while to a great extent deemphasizing domestic and individual 
levels of analysis.
4. The Human Factor and The Contributions of Cosmopolitan World 
Views to Global Environmental Issues:
This section of the study aims to incorporate some explanations and 
comments as well which are external to the theoretical framework provided 
by neoliberal institutionalism in explaining cooperative processes. It will 
include the importance of the cosmopolitan world views in connection with 
the global environmental issues.
At this point, it is essential to indicate that all these institutionalized 
efforts and arrangements towards environmental protection obviously did 
not originate and flourish in a vacuum. The basis of these developments 
can be found in the human factor and progression of new global values 
among people.
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Regarding the attempts to understand the dynamics of global 
environmental change and ecological issues, it is important that the 
human factor, various functions of human beings and the repercussions of 
these functions are deeply analyzed:
To arrive at a deeper understanding of complex interactions, it is of 
great importance to study the relevant interrelations within any of the 
key problem areas pertaining to global change. However, such more or 
less isolated, discipline-related research needs to be complemented by 
studies involving humans in all their various functions.
Thus, when the human factor and functions of human beings are 
satisfactorily incorporated into the analysis of global environmental issues 
and ecological cooperation, it can be comprehended that new values have 
been very influential in the formation of international collaborative 
activities and development of political processes in connection with the 
environment. The basis of the progression of environmental concern lies 
in cultural and ethical improvements and a spreading of cosmopolitan 
world view among human beings.
As Hugh Dyer states the “security of the global environment stands 
against the state system as another, perhaps contradictory, value or set of
values. 233 However, since its beginning in the 1960s, concerns about
^^^Conference of the Swiss Scientific Academies, Research on Sustcunability and Global 
Change - Visions in Science Policy by Swiss Researchers ( Bern: Published by ProClim, 1997), 7.
^^^Hugh C. Dyer, "Environmental Security As A Universal Value: Implications for 
International Theory," in The Environment and International Relations, eds. John Vogler and Mark F. 
Imber (New York: Routledge, 1996), 22.
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environmental security and protection have been spreading rapidly as 
universal values - especially among people living in prosperity in developed 
countries and giving credence to post-materialist world views. As a result 
of these ethical developments and value judgements, people are more prone 
to grasp the “global common interests”, growing ecological 
interdependence and are more committed to combat against various forms 
of threats facing the planet. Some even go further by viewing states 
themselves as the greatest danger to the natural environment and
234ecological well-being.
These alterations in values and norms consequently lead to organized 
activities among people and green political movements which emerge as 
significant political powers in many of the Western states. Also, in this 
way regional and international institutions, non-governmental 
organizations and international epistemic communities working for the 
protection of the natural environment emanate as important agents of 
institutionalization of environmental concerns. All these efforts are 
interdependent and significant for the evolution of an environment- 
oriented life style and protection of international ecosystem for the 
present and future generations.
^^" I^bid., 25.
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Therefore, the developments begin at the individual level through 
incorporation of new and universal values, then they are elevated to the 
domestic level by institutionalized behaviours and culminate at the 
international level by coordinated and collective law-making among world 
states. In other words, all these levels are closely intermingled.
Nevertheless, for the dissemination of universal norms and values among 
people and for effective communication between societies,
institutionalization and coordination of international activities are 
basically inevitable and indispensable.
Today a cosmopolitan world view emphasizing the significance of 
“intergenerational equity” has been embraced by the environmentalists 
and it has been evolving at the normative sphere. Intergenerational equity 
implies that present generations should have concern and responsibility for 
future generations in terms of bestowing a healthy and undestroyed 
natural environment. Human beings have to fulfil their present needs by 
considering the needs of future generations as equally valuable as their 
own; they should not compromise the ability of the future generations to 
meet their needs and s u r v i v e . I n  this respect, adoption of biocentric 
considerations and preservation of the international ecosystem not only 
for the present but also for future generations has a very important and
See, World Commission on Environment and Development, "Brundtland Report," 1987.
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valuable connotation for both the international society and global 
environmental politics.
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Conclusion:
The observation of climate science and politics has revealed that the 
global climate change problem emanates as the most complex and immense 
atmospheric threat requiring elaboration of related scientific knowledge 
and augmentation of appropriate international response mechanisms in 
order to restructure the limited aspects of the existing international 
regime. Major political forces such as consideration of national economic 
interests and abatement costs, lack of motivation towards collective action 
due to ecological invulnerability, the persistent North-South controversy, 
and the existence of scientific uncertainty with respect to climatic 
variability and its future impact appear as elements complicating the 
evolution of legal and political aspects of the climate change issue.
Notwithstanding the criticisms directed towards the insufficiency of 
the existing response measures, collective strategies and legal mechanisms 
established among world states - as of late 1997 - to address the problem, 
the cooperation which has already been structured over global climate 
change has some remarkable features that should be appreciated as well. 
First of all, it is important to note that the unknown and unpredictable 
scientific aspects of this unique global threat cannot be underestimated 
when the climate cooperation is evaluated, taking into consideration that 
the criteria employed in the assessment of this cooperation may make 
difference. In world politics, and in particular in global environmental
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issues, knowledge, transparency and clarity are the basic factors that open 
the way towards collective policy formulation and law-making. As far as 
global climate change is concerned, such clarity and scientific certainty 
have not been consummated since the nature of the problem does not 
permit a thorough understanding within the capacities of the current 
scientific modelling and assessments. Thus, given the existence of a 
considerable scientific uncertainty and lack of knowledge about climate 
change, the progress achieved by the international community in collective 
policy-making and regime construction is appreciable.
In addition, the climate change issue requires a global solution and 
an international law-making process which means that more than a 
hundred of world states and their national-interests - which are greatly 
divergent as a result of the huge gap existing between the North and South 
- should be considered. Thus, a tremendous international effort has been 
made to achieve institutionalization over global climate change and to 
accomplish convergence of national interests by decreasing abatement 
costs and risks of collaboration to minimum. In order to enable an effective 
integration of social, economic, scientific and political aspects of the 
problem at an international level, institutionalization has even reached 
complex dimensions. Generation of scientific knowledge and attempts to 
utilize this knowledge in producing collective strategies and law-making 
through international institutions have been impressive. However, it is 
understandably not easy to entirely transcend complicated economic and
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political forces, and development aspirations of nation-states that 
overshadow the increasing recognition of common ecological interests 
among world states.
Moreover, international environmental law and attempts to establish 
legal arrangements for the protection of the environment have a very short 
history. It is only since the 1972 Stockholm Conference that a proliferation 
of environmental conventions and treaties have been observed. Therefore 
it is not realistic to expect rapid developments in global legal constructions 
Again, when climate cooperation is assessed this factor should not be 
deemphasized.
Furthermore, climate change cooperation is not a static 
phenomenon; the issue has been evolving and efforts will be continuing to 
create more effective international measures which are required to 
eradicate the dangerous anthropogenic interferences to the global climate 
In other words, the existing protocol and international collaboration 
achieved provide the necessary mechanisms to move forward the climate 
cooperation. In this respect, the international community has to wait and 
see the future evolution and its results.
An observation of the evolution of climate politics has indicated that 
states are still the key players in international relations and they perform 
decisive roles regarding issue outcomes. However, as far as international 
environmental issues and cooperation are concerned, international 
institutions, along with nongovernmental organizations and epistemic
205
communities, mitigate difficulties with respect to multinational concerted 
activities, and they emerge as initiators and supporters of coordinated 
policy formulation and international regime formation.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the current regime over 
climate, international institutions have been the most significant agents of 
collaboration in the global climate change issue. They have coordinated 
the transmission of knowledge and facilitated communication between 
world states to enable the formation of a regime. International institutions 
introduced the climate change problem to the international community, 
and through coordinating interdisciplinary research and scientific 
networks they contributed to the recognition of the climate change as a 
significant political issue. The integration of science and politics in the 
climate issue at a global level has been impressive and this could not have 
been accomplished by means other than international institutions. As 
communication and transfers of knowledge have intensified, incentives for 
collective action for a common interest have been increased. In other 
words, institutional efforts have brought forth recalculation of preferences 
and reconsideration of interests among world states which have created 
new patterns of behaviour.
As the issue evolved, international institutions and 
intergovernmental bodies provided a forum for international negotiations 
and law-making processes as well. These institutions performed active and 
catalytic functions in international environmental law-making. As a result
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of institutional and transnational endeavours, a convergence of opinion 
could be accomplished among states and it culminated in legal 
arrangements through a framework convention which in time progressed 
into a protocol.
Observations concerning climate change substantiate the argument 
that international institutions, along with nongovernmental organizations 
and international epistemic communities, are vital for environmental 
protection and international law-making in this world order 
Developments and political processes insinuate that the climate change 
issue could have remained as a marginal phenomenon or could have only 
attracted attentions of the scientific and environmentalist groups rather 
than the whole international community if institutional efforts and 
functions were not launched to identify and combat the climate threat 
Nation-states generally have not been responsive to the needs of the 
international ecosystem due to their economic interests and development 
aspirations, therefore, it has been within the sphere of international 
institutions - together with nongovernmental organizations and scientific 
communities - to accentuate and remind states the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of the biosphere and the international community. In this 
respect, international institutions appear to be vital and indispensable for 
generating knowledge, reshaping perceptions and reconstructing interests 
in connection to a high level of ecological interdependence in the 
contemporary international system.
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Climate change provides theoretical insights for the international 
relations discipline as well. The progression of climate cooperation has 
displayed that power-based realistic interpretations are not appropriate to 
elucidate the dynamics of environmental cooperative processes - at least in 
the case of global climate change. Common interests and information that 
states have become acquainted with - through institutional efforts and 
structures - emanate as factors that have been most influential in the 
evolution of international climate politics. State-centric and power-oriented 
theoretical approaches therefore are not adequate when explaining various 
aspects of climate cooperation, whereas neoliberal institutionalist 
assumptions appear to provide a more suitable theoretical framework when 
emphasizing the key functions and regulating roles of international 
institutions in cooperation along with other non-state actors of the 
international system.
This study has attempted to contribute to the understanding of 
climate change as a global ecological threat which has introduced the 
international community to novel and unique challenges. Climate change 
cooperation requires a more effective and substantial contribution of the 
world states; present response mechanisms are not satisfactory to eradicate 
the problem. The future success of climate cooperation is closely affiliated 
with the loyalty of world states to the adopted measures and to their efforts 
for strengthening the existing mechanisms and arrangements. A concern 
for “intergenerational equity”, and a global awareness and recognition that
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inaction in global climate change might bring high prices to the 
international society are essential to maintain and evolve concerted 
activities among states. It remains to be seen whether the international 
community will display a genuine commitment to address this most 
complex global environmental problem for the sake of present and future 
generations. Nevertheless, international institutions’ contributions and 
support -  together with the contributions of epistemic communities and 
nongovernmental organizations - with respect to ecological cooperation 
give hope and appear to increase the likelihood of a strengthening regime 
over climate change in future.
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APPENDIX I
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE
The Parties to this Convention,
Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse 
effects are a common concern for humankind,
Concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing 
the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases 
enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average 
in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may 
adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.
N oting that the largest share of historical and current global 
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that 
per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and 
that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will 
grow to meet their social and development needs.
Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases.
N oting  that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate 
change, particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional 
patterns thereof.
Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the 
widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an
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6ff6ctiv6 and. appropriât© international response, in accordance with the 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
and their social and economic conditions,
Recalling· the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 
16 June 1972,
Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.
Reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in international 
cooperation to address climate change.
Recognizing that States should enact effective environmental 
legislation, that environmental standards, management objectives and 
priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to 
which they apply, and that standards applied by some countries may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other 
countries, in particular developing countries.
Recalling the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/228 of 22 
December 1989 on the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, and resolutions 43/53 of 6 December 1988, 44/207 of 22 
December 1989, 45/212 of 21 December 1990 and 46/169 of 19 December
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1991 on protection of global climate for present and future generations of 
mankind,
Recalling- also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/206 of 
22 December 1989 on the possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on 
islands and coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas and the 
pertinent provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/172 of 19 
December 1989 on the implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat 
Desert ificat ion,
Recalling further the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer, 1985, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, 1987, as adjusted and amended on 29 June 1990,
N oting the Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate 
Conference adopted on 7 November 1990,
Conscious of the valuable analytical work being conducted by many 
States on climate change and of the important contributions of the World 
Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme 
and other organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, 
as well as other international and intergovernmental bodies, to the 
exchange of results of scientific research and coordination of research.
Recognizing that steps required to understand and address climate 
change will be environmentally, socially and economically most effective if 
they are based on relevant scientific, technical and economic 
considerations and continually re-evaluated in the light of new findings in 
these areas.
212
Rßcognizing that various actions to address climate change can be 
justified economically in their own right and can also help in solving other 
environmental problems,
Recognizing also the need for developed countries to take immediate 
action in a flexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step 
towards comprehensive response strategies at the global, national and, 
where agreed, regional levels that take into account all greenhouse gases, 
with due consideration of their relative contributions to the enhancement 
of the greenhouse effect.
Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island countries, 
countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to 
floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile 
mountainous ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change.
Recognizing the special difficulties of those countries, especially 
developing countries, whose economies are particularly dependent on 
fossil fuel production, use and exportation, as a consequence of action 
taken on limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
Affirming that responses to climate change should be coordinated 
with social and economic development in an integrated manner with a 
view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into full account the 
legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of 
sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty.
Recognizing that all countries, especially developing countries, need 
access to resources required to achieve sustainable social and economic
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development and that, in order for developing countries to progress 
towards that goal, their energy consumption will need to grow taking into 
account the possibilities for achieving greater energy efficiency and for 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions in general, including through the 
application of new technologies on terms which make such an application 
economically and socially beneficial,
DotovixiinGci to protect the climate system for present and future 
generations.
Have agreed a»s follows:
Article 1 
DEFINITIONS*
For the purpose of this Convention:
1. “Adverse effects of climate change” means changes in the physical 
environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant 
deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural 
and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or 
on human health and welfare.
2. “Climate change” means a change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability 
observed over comparable time periods.
Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader.
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3. ’’Climate system” means the totality of the atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interactions.
4. “Emissions” means the release of greenhouse gases and/or their 
precursors into the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.
5. “Greenhouse gases” means those gaseous constituents of the 
atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit 
infrared radiation.
6. “Regional economic integration organization” means an 
organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region which has 
competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention or its 
protocols and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal 
procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the instruments 
concerned.
7. “Reservoir” means a component or components of the climate 
system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is 
stored.
8. “Sink” means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the 
atmosphere.
9. “Source” means any process or activity which releases a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the 
atmosphere.
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Article 2 
OBJECTIVE
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related instruments 
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems 
to adopt naturally to climate change , to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.
Article 3 
PBINCIPLES
In their actions to achieve the objectives of the Convention and to 
implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, in ter alia, by the 
following:
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.
2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country 
Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing
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country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal 
burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.
3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate , 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
efface. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits to 
the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures 
should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be 
comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. 
Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by 
interested Parties.
4. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable 
development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system against 
human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of 
each Party and should be integrated with national development 
programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential 
for adopting measures to address climate change.
5. The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic 
growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country 
Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate 
change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral 
ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
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Article 4 
COMMITMENTS
1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall:
(a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the 
Conference of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national 
inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using 
comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the 
Parties;
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and 
where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate 
climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change;
(c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application and 
diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that 
control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, including 
the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste 
management sectors;
(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperation 
the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs 
of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including
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biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine 
ecosystem;
(e) Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal 
zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection 
and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and 
desertification, as well as floods;
(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent 
feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and 
actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, 
formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse 
effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the 
environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or 
adapt to climate change;
(g) Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, 
socio-economic and other research, systematic observation and 
development of data archives related to the climate system and intended to 
further the understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining 
uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of 
climate change and the economic and social consequences of various 
response strategies;
(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of 
relevant scientific, technological, technical socio-economic and legal 
information related to the climate system and climate change, and to the 
economic and social consequences of various response strategies;
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(i) Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness 
related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in this 
process, including that of non-governmental organizations; and
(j) Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related 
to implementation, in accordance with Article 12.
2. The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex 
I commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following:
(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national 1/ policies and take 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting 
its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and 
enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and 
measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in 
modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with 
the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of 
the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol would contribute to such modification, and taking into account 
the differences in these Parties’ starting point and approaches, economic 
structures and resource base, the need to maintain strong and sustainable 
economic growth, available technologies and other individual 
circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate 
contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that 
objective. These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly 
with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the 
achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of 
this subparagraph;
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(b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties 
shall communicate, within six months of the entry into force of the 
Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with 
Article 12, detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in 
subparagraph a) above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in 
subparagraph a), with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 
1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This 
information will be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its first 
session and periodically thereafter, in accordance with Article 7;
(c) Calculations of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases for the purposes of subparagraph b) above should take 
into account the best available scientific knowledge, including of the 
effective capacity of sinks and the respective contributions of such gases to 
climate change. The Conference of the Parties shall consider and agree on 
methodologies for these calculations at its first session and review them 
regularly thereafter;
(d) The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, review the 
adequacy of subparagraphs a) and b) above. Such review shall be carried 
out in the light of the best available scientific information and assessment 
on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and 
economic information. Based on this review, the Conference of the Parties 
shall take appropriate action, which may include the adoption of 
amendments to the commitments in subparagraphs a) and b) above. The 
Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall also take decisions 
regarding criteria for joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph a)
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above. A second review of subparagraph a) and b) shall take place not later 
than 31 December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by 
the Conference of the Parties, until the objective of the Convention is met;
(e) Each of these Parties shall;
(i) Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant 
economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the 
objective of the Convention; and
(ii) Identify and periodically review its own policies and practices 
which encourage activities that lead to greater levels of anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
than would otherwise occur;
(f) The Conference of the Parties shall review no later than 31 
December 1998, available information with a view to taking decisions 
regarding such amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II as may be 
appropriate, with the approval of the Party concerned;
(g) Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, 
notify the Depositary that it intends to be bound by subparagraphs a) and 
b) above. The Depositary shall inform the other signatories and Parties of 
any such notification.
3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties 
included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources 
to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in 
complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall 
also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of 
technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed
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full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by 
paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between a developing 
country Party and the international entity or entities referred to in Article 
11, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these 
commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and 
predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate 
burden sharing among the developed country Parties.
4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties 
included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in 
meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.
5. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties 
included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate 
and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally 
sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing 
country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention. In this process, the developed country Parties shall support 
the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and 
technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties, and 
organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the 
transfer of such technologies.
6. In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 
above, a certain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of 
the Parties to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of 
transition to a market economy, including with regard to the historical 
level of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol chosen as a reference.
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7. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the 
effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and 
transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and 
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties.
8. In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the 
Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under 
the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the 
transfer o technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of 
developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate 
change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures, 
especially on:
(a) Small island countries;
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas 
liable to forest decay;
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;
(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;
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(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including 
mountainous ecosystems;
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income 
generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on 
consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and
(i) Land-locked and transit countries.
Further the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as 
appropriate, with respect to this paragraph.
9. The parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special 
situations of the least developed countries in their actions with regard to 
funding and transfer technology.
10. The Parties shall, in accordance with Article 10, take into 
consideration in the implementation of the commitments of the Convention 
the situation of Parties, particularly developing country Parties, with 
economies that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the implementation 
of measures to respond to climate change. This applies notably to Parties 
with economies that are highly dependent on income generated from the 
production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and 
associated energy-intensive products and/or the use of fossil fuels for 
which such Parties have serious difficulties in switching to alternatives.
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Article 5
RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION
In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1 (g), 
the Parties shall:
(a) Support and further develop, as appropriate, international and 
intergovernmental programmes and networks or organizations aimed at 
defining, conducting, assessing and financing research, data collection 
and systematic observation, taking into account the need to minimize 
duplication of effort;
(b) Support international and intergovernmental efforts to strengthen 
systematic observation and national scientific and technical research 
capacities and capabilities, particularly in developing countries, and to 
promote access to, and the exchange of, data and analyses thereof obtained 
from areas beyond national jurisdiction; and
(c) Take into account the particular concerns and needs of developing 
countries and cooperate in improving their endogenous capacities and 
capabilities to participate in the efforts referred to in subparagraph (a) and
(b) above.
Article 6
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PUBLIC AWARENESS
In carrying out their commitment under Article 4, paragraph l(i), the 
Parties shall:
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(a) Promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, 
subregional and regional levels, and in accordance with national laws and 
regulations, and within their respective capacities:
(i) The development and implementation of educational and public 
awareness programmes on climate change and its effects;
(ii) Public access to information on climate change and its effects;
(iii) Public participation in addressing climate change and its effects 
and developing adequate responses; and
(iv) Training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel.
(b) Cooperate in and promote, at the international level, and, where 
appropriate, using existing bodies:
(i) The development and exchange of educational and public 
awareness material on climate change and its effects; and
(ii) The development and implementation of education and training 
programmes, including the strengthening of national institutions and the 
exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, in 
particular for developing countries.
Article 7
CONFERENCE OP THE PARTIES
1. A Conference of the Parties is hereby established.
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2. The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this 
Convention, shall keep under regular review the implementation of the 
Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the 
Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions 
necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention. To 
this end, it shall:
(a) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the 
institutional arrangements under the Convention, in the light of the 
objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation 
and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge;
(b) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures 
adopted by the Parties to address climate change and its effects, taking 
into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities 
of the Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention;
(c) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination 
of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, 
taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and 
capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under the 
Convention;
(d) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective and 
provisions of the Convention, the development and periodic refinement of 
comparable methodologies, to be agreed on by the Conference of the 
Parties, inter alia, for preparing inventories of greenhouse gas emissions 
by sources and removals by sinks, and for evaluating the effectiveness of 
measures to limit the emissions and enhance the removals of these gases;
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(e) Asses, on the basis of all information made available to it in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the implementation of 
the Convention by the Parties, the overall effects of the measures taken 
pursuant to the Convention, in particular environmental, economic and 
social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which 
progress towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved;
(f) Consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of the 
Convention and ensure their publication;
(g) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the 
implementation of the Convention;
(h) Seek to mobilise financial resources in accordance with Article 4, 
paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, and Article 11;
(i) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the 
implementation of the Convention;
(j) Review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide 
guidance to them;
(k) Agree upon and adopt, by consensus, ruler of procedure and 
financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies;
(l) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation 
of, and information provided by, competent international organizations 
and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and
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(m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement 
of the objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to 
it under the Convention.
3. The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its 
own rules of procedures as well as those of the subsidiary bodies 
established by the Convention, which shall include decision-making 
procedures for matters not already covered by decision-making procedures 
stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures may include specified 
majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions.
4. The first session of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened 
by the interim secretariat referred to in Ai'ticle 2 1 and shall take place not 
later than one year after the date of entry into force of the Convention. 
Thereafter, ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall held 
every year unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties.
5. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be 
held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or 
at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the 
request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is 
supported by at least one third of the Parties.
6. The United Nations, its specialised agencies and the International 
atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers 
thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the 
Conference of the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether 
national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is 
qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed 
the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference
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of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third 
of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers 
shall subject to the rules of procedures adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties.
Article 8 
SECRETARIAT
1. A secretariat is hereby established.
2. The functions of the secretariat shall be:
(a) To make arrangements for sessions of the Conference of the 
Parties and its subsidiary bodies established under the Convention and to 
provide them with services as required;
(b) To compile and transmit reports submitted to it;
(c) To facilitate assistance to the Parties, particularly developing 
country Parties, on request, in the compilation and communication of 
information required in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;
(d) To prepare reports on its activities and present them to the 
Conference of the Parties;
(e) To ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of other 
relevant international bodies;
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(f) To enter, under the overall guidance of the Conference of the 
Parties, into such administrative and contractual arrangements as may be 
required for the effective discharge of its functions; and
(g) To perform the other secretariat functions specified in the 
Convention and in any of its protocols and such other function as may be 
determined by the Conference of the Parties.
3. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall designate a 
permanent secretariat and make arrangements for its functioning.
Article 9
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVICE
1. A subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice is hereby 
established to provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its 
other subsidiary bodies with timely information and advice on scientific 
and technological matters relating to the Convention. This body shall be 
open to participation by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall 
comprise government representatives competent in the relevant field of 
expertise. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all 
aspects of its work.
2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, and drawing 
upon existing competent international bodies, this body shall;
(a) Provide assessments of the state of scientific knowledge relating to 
climate change and its effects;
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(b) Prepare scientific assessments on the effects of measures taken in 
the implementation of the Convention;
(c) Identify innovative, efficient and state-of-the-art technologies and 
know-how and advise on the ways and means of promoting development 
and/or transferring such technologies;
(d) Provide advice on scientific programmes, international 
cooperation in research and development related to climate change, as well 
as on ways and means of supporting endogenous capacity-building in 
developing countries; and
(e) Respond to scientific, technological and methodological questions 
that the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies may put the 
body.
3. The functions and terms of reference of this body may be further 
elaborated by the Conference of the Parties.
Article 10
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION
1. A subsidiary body for implementation is hereby established to 
assist the Conference of the Parties in the assessment and review of the 
effective implementation of the Convention. This body shall be open to 
participation by all Parties and comprise government representatives who 
are experts on matters related to climate change. It shall report regularly 
to the Conference of the Parties on ail aspects of its work.
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2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties; this body
shall:
(a) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 
12, paragraph 1, to assess the overall aggregated effect of the steps taken 
by the Parties in the light of the latest scientific assessments concerning 
climate change;
(b) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 
12, paragraph 2, in order to assist the Conference of the Parties in 
carrying out the reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d); and
(c) Assist the Conference of the Parties, as appropriate, in the 
preparation and implementation of its decisions.
Article 11
FINANCIAL MECHANISM
1. A mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or 
concessional basis, including for the transfer of technology, is hereby 
defined. It shall function under the guidance of and be accountable to the 
Conference of the Parties, which shall decide on its policies, programme 
priorities and eligibility criteria related to this Convention. Its operation 
shall be entrusted to one or more existing international entities.
2. The financial mechanism shall have an equitable and balanced 
representation of all Parties within a transparent system of governance.
3. The Conference of the Parties and the entity or entities entrusted 
with the operation of the financial mechanism shall agree upon
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arrangements to give effect to the above paragraphs, which shall include 
the following:
(a) Modalities to ensure that the funded projects to address climate 
change are in conformity with the policies, programme priorities and 
eligibility criteria established by the Conference of the Parties,
(b) Modalities by which a particular funding decision may be 
reconsidered in light of these policies, programme priorities and eligibility 
criteria;
(c) Provision by the entity or entities of regular reports to the 
Conference of the Parties on its funding operations, which is consistent 
with the requirements for accountability set out in paragraph 1 above; and
(d) Determination in a predictable and identifiable manner of the 
amount of funding necessary and available for the implementation of this 
Convention and the conditions under which that amount shall be 
periodically reviewed.
4. The Conference of the Parties shall make arrangements to 
implement the above-mentioned provisions at its first session, reviewing 
and taking into account the interim arrangements referred to in Article 
21, paragraph 3, and shall decide whether these interim arrangements 
shall be maintained. Within four years thereafter, the Conference f the 
Parties shall review the financial mechanism and take appropriate 
measures.
5. The developed country Parties may also provide and developing 
country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources related to the
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inipleniGiitation of th© ConvGntion through bilatBral, regional and other 
multilateral channels.
Article 12
COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO 
IMPLEMENTATION
1. In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall
the Conference of the Parities, through the secretariat, the 
following elements of information:
(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, to the extent its capacities permit, using comparable 
methodologies to be promoted and agreed upon by the Conference of the 
Parties;
(b) A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to 
implement the Convention; and
(c) Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the 
achievement of the objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion 
in its communication, including, if feasible, material relevant for 
calculations of global emission trends.
2. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in 
Annex I shall incorporate in its communication the following elements of 
information;
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(a) A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has 
adopted to implement its commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2(a) and 
2(b); and
(b) A specific estimate of the effects that the policies and measures 
referred to in subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on 
anthropogenic emissions by its sources and removals by its sinks of 
greenhouse gases during the period referred to in Article 4, paragraph 
2(a).
3. In addition, each developed country Party and each other developed 
Party included in Annex II shall incorporate details of measures taken in 
accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
4. Developing country Parties may, on a voluntary basis, propose 
projects for financing, including specific technologies, materials, 
equipment, techniques or practices that would be needed to implement 
such projects, along with, if possible, an estimate of all incremental costs, 
of the reductions of emissions and increments of removals of greenhouse 
gases, as well as an estimate of the consequent benefits.
5. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in 
Annex I shall make its initial communication within six months of the 
entry into force of the Convention for that Party. Each Party not so listed 
shall make its initial communication within three years of the entry into 
force of the Convention for that Party, or of the availability of financial 
resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 3. Parties that are least 
developed countries may make their initial communication at their 
discretion. The frequency of subsequent communications by all Parties
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shall b© dGtsrmined by the Conference of the Parties, taking into account 
the differentiated timetables set by this paragraph.
6. Information communicated by Parties under this Article shall be 
transmitted by the secretariat as soon as possible to the Conference of the 
Parties and to any subsidiary bodies concerned. If necessary, the 
procedures for the communication of information may be further 
considered by the Conference of the Parties.
7. From its first session, the Conference of the Parties shall arrange 
for the provision to developing country Parties of technical and financial 
support, on request, in compiling and communicating information under 
this Article, as well as in identifying the technical and financial needs 
associated with proposed projects and response measures under Article 4. 
Such support may be provided by other Parties, by competent international 
organizations and by the secretariat, as appropriate.
8. Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties, and to prior notification to the Conference of the 
parties, make a joint communication in fulfilment of their obligations 
under this Article, provided that such a communication includes 
information on the fulfilment by each of these Parties of its individual 
obligations under the Convention.
9. Information received by the secretariat that is designated by a 
Party as confidential, in accordance with criteria to be established by the 
Conference of the Parties, shall be aggregated by the secretariat to protect 
its confidentiality before being made available to any of the bodies involved 
in the communication and review of information.
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10. Subject to paragraph 9 above, and without prejudice to the ability 
of any Party to make public its communication at any time, the secretariat 
shall make communications by Parties under this Article publicly available 
at the time they are submitted to the Conference of the Parties.
Article 13
RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION
The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, consider the 
establishment of a multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on 
their request, for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation 
of the Convention.
Article 14
SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES
1. In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties 
concerned shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or 
any other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the 
Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional 
economic integration organization may declare in a written instrument 
submitted to the Depositary that, in respect of any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, it recognizes as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any 
Party accepting the same obligation.
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(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice, 
and/or
(b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on 
arbitration.
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may 
make a declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in accordance 
with the procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) above.
3. A declaration made under paragraph 2 above shall remain in force 
until it expires in accordance with its terms or until three months after 
written notice of its revocation has been deposited with the Depositary.
4. A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a 
declaration shall not in any way affect proceedings pending before the 
International Court of Justice or the arbitral tribunal, unless the parties to 
the dispute otherwise agree.
5. Subject to the operation of paragraph 2 above, if after twelve 
months following notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists 
between them, the Parties concerned have not been able to settle their 
dispute through the means mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the dispute 
shall be submitted, at the request of any of the parities to the dispute, to 
conciliation.
6. A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one 
of the parties to the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an 
equal number of members appointed by each party. The commission shall
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render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good 
faith.
7. Additional procedures relating to conciliation shall be adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties, as soon as practicable, in an annex on 
conciliation.
8. The provision of this Article shall apply to any related legal 
instrument which the Conference of the Parties may adopt, unless the 
instrument provides otherwise.
Article 15
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION
1. Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention.
2. Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at an ordinary
session of the Conference of the Parties. The text of any proposed 
amendment to the Convention shall be communicated to the Parties by the 
secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed 
for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate proposed
amendments to the signatories to the Convention and, for information, to 
the Depositary.
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any 
proposed amendment to the Convention by consensus. If all efforts at 
consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the 
amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority 
vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted 
amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, 
who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.
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4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be 
deposited with the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with 
paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted 
it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an 
instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of the Parties to the 
Convention.
5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the 
ninetieth day after the date on which that Party deposits with the 
Depositary its instrument of acceptance of the said amendment.
6. For the purpose of the Article, "Parties present and voting” means 
Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote.
Article 16
ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF ANNEXES TO THE 
CONVENTION
1. Annexes to the Convention shall form an integral part thereof and, 
unless otherwise expressly provided, a reference to the Convention 
constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Without 
prejudice to the provisions of Article 14, paragraphs 2(b) and 7, such 
annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a 
descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or 
administrative character.
2. Annexes to the Convention shall be proposed and adopted in 
accordance with the procedure set forth in Article 15, paragraphs 2, 3 and 
4.
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3. An annex that has been adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 
above shall enter into force for all Parties to the Convention six months 
after the date of the communication by the Depositary to such Parties of 
the adoption of the annex, except for those Parties that have notified the 
Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the 
annex. The annex shall enter into force for Parties which withdraw their 
notification of non-acceptance of the annex. The annex shall enter into 
force for Parties which withdraw their notification of a non-acceptance on 
the ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notification 
has been received by the Depositary.
4. The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to 
annexes to the Convention shall be subject to the same procedure as that 
for the proposal, adoption and entry into force of annexes to the 
Convention in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 above.
5. If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves 
an amendment to the Convention, that annex or amendment to an annex 
shall not enter into force until such time as the amendment to the 
Convention enters into force.
Article 17 
PROTOCOLS
1. The Conference of the Parties may, at any ordinary session, adopt 
protocols to the Convention.
2. The text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the 
Parties by the secretariat at least six months before such a session.
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3. The requirements for the entry into force of any protocol shall be 
established by that instrument.
4. Only Parties to the Convention may be Parties to a protocol.
5. Decisions under any protocol shall be taken only by the Parties to 
the protocol concerned.
Article 18 
RIGHT TO VOTE
1. Each Party to the Convention shall have one vote, except as 
provided for in paragraph 2 below.
2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters w i t h in  
their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of voters 
equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to the 
Convention. Such an organisation shall not exercise its right to vote if any 
of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.
Article 19 
DEPOSITARY
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of 
the Convention and of protocols adopted in accordance with Article 17.
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Article 20 
SIGNATURE
This Convention shall be open for signature by State Members of the 
United Nations or of any of its specialized agencies or that are Parties to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice and by regional economic 
integration organizations at Rio de Janeiro, during the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, and thereafter at United 
Nations Headquarters in New York from 20 June 1992 to 19 June 1993.
Article 21
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS
1. The secretariat functions referred to in Article 8 will be carried out 
on an interim basis by the secretariat established by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in its resolution 45/212 of 21 December 1990, until 
the completion of the first session of the Conference of the Parties.
2. The head of the interim secretariat referred to in paragraph 1 above 
will cooperate closely with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change to ensure that the Panel can respond to the need for objective 
scientific and technical advice. Other relevant scientific bodies could also 
be consulted.
3. The Global Environment Facility of the United Nations 
Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall be 
the international entity entrusted with the operation of the financial 
mechanisms referred to in Article 11 on an interim basis. In this 
connection, the Global Environmental Facility should be appropriately
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restructured and its membership made universal to enable it to fulfil the 
requirements of Article 11.
Article 22
RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, APPROVAL OR ACCESSION
1. The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession by States and by regional economic integration 
organizations. It shall be open for accession from the day after the date on 
which the Convention is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a 
Party to the Convention without any of its member States being a Party 
shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention. In the case of 
such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to the 
Convention, the organization and its member States shall decide on their 
respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under 
the Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member States 
shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the 
extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by the 
Convention. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who 
shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the 
extent of their competence.
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Article 23
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the 
date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization that 
ratifies, accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the 
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after 
the date of deposit by such State or regional economic integration 
organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession.
3. For the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument 
deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be 
counted as additional to those deposited by States members of the 
organization.
Article 24 
RESERVATIONS
No reservations may be made to the Convention.
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Article 25 
WITHDRAWAL
1. At any time after three years from the date on which the 
Convention has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw 
from the Convention by giving written notification to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from 
the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or 
on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered 
as also having withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a Party.
Article 26
AUTHENTIC TEXTS
The original of the Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to 
that effect, have signed this Convention.
DONE at New York this ninth day of May one thousand nine hundred 
and ninety-two.
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251
APPENDIX II
THE BERLIN MANDATE
CONCLUSION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND ADOPTION OF
DECISIONS
Proposals on agenda item 5(a)(iii) submitted by the President of the
Conference
R eview  o f the adequacy o f A rticle 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b) o f the 
Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions on
follow-up
The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, having reviewed 
Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and(b) and concluded that these are not adequate, 
agrees to begin a process to enable it to take appropriate action for the 
period beyond 2000, including the strengthening of the commitments o 
Annex I Parties in Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), through the adoption 
of a protocol or another legal instrument.
1 The process shall be guided, in ter alia, by the following:
(a) The provisions of the Convention, including Article 3, in particular 
the principles in Article 3.1 that reads as follows: “The Parties should 
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
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capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’;
(b) The specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties 
referred to in Article 4.8; the specific needs and special situations of least 
developed countries referred to in Article 4.9; and the situation of Parties, 
particularly developing country Parties referred to in Article 4.10 of the 
Convention;
(c) The legitimate needs of the developing countries for the 
achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty, 
recognizing also that all Parties have a right to, and should, promote 
sustainable development;
(d) The fact that the largest share of historical and current global 
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that 
the per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and 
that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will 
grow to meet their social and development needs;
(e) The fact that the global nature of climate change calls for the 
widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an 
effective and appropriate international responses, in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and 
their social and economic conditions;
(f) Coverage of all greenhouse gases, their emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks and all relevant sectors;
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(g) The need for all Parties to cooperate in good faith and to 
participate in this process.
II
2 The process will, in ter alia:
(a) Aim as the priority in the process of strengthening the 
commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed 
country/other Parties included in Annex I, both
.to elaborate policies and measures, as well as
.to  set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified
time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol
taking into account the differences in starting points and approaches, 
economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and 
sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual 
circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate 
contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort, and also the 
process of assessment and analysis referred to in section III, paragraph 4, 
below;
(b) Not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in 
Annex I, but reaffirm existing commitments in Article 4.1 and continue to 
advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve 
sustainable development, taking into account Article 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7;
(c) Take into account any result from the review as referred to Article 
4.2(f), available, and any notification as referred to in Article 4.2(g);
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(d) Consider, as provided in Article 4.2(e), the coordination among 
Annex I Parties, as appropriate, of relevant economic and administrative 
instruments, taking into account Article 3.5;
(e) Provide for the exchange of experience on national activities in 
areas of interest, particularly those identified in the review and synthesis 
of available national communications; and
(f) Provide for a review mechanism.
Ill
3 The process will be carried out in the light of the best available 
scientific information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, 
as well as relevant technical, social and economic information, including, 
in ter alia, IPCC reports. At will also make use of other available expertise.
4 The process will include in its early stages an analysis and 
assessment, to identify possible policies and measures for Annex I Parties 
which could contribute to limiting and reducing emissions by sources and 
protecting and enhancing sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. This 
process could identify environmental economic impacts and the results 
that could be achieved with regard to time horizons such as 2005, 2010, 
and 2020.
5 The protocol proposal of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 
which contains specific reduction targets and was formally submitted in 
accordance with Article 17 of the Convention, along with other proposals
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and pertinent documents, should be included for consideration in the 
process.
6 The process should begin without delay and be conducted as a 
matter of urgency, in an open-ended ad hoc group of Parties hereby 
established, which will report to the second session of the Conference of 
the Parties on the status of this process. The sessions of this group should 
be scheduled to ensure completion of the work as early as possible in 1997 
with a view to adopting the results at the third session of the Conference of 
the Parties.
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